Orbán’s gas strategy: Trap for Ukraine and Europe

The author of the Resurgam Telegram channel discussed Orbán's latest "trick."

"We're trying a trick… What if gas entering Ukraine was no longer Russian but owned by buyers?" Orbán said in a recent statement. "Thus, gas reaching Ukraine would no longer be Russian but Hungarian."

While framed as a “Reuters” headline in Ukrainian media, this statement was circulating in Russian-controlled sources well before. It marks part of a larger plan by Moscow, orchestrated through Orbán, to create issues not only for Ukraine but also for European partners, the author believes.

Orbán’s strategy, supported by Gazprom, extends beyond gas or finances, striking at the geopolitical landscape. On November 21, the U.S. imposed sanctions on Gazprombank, which Moscow uses for gas transaction settlements. The sanctions aimed to prevent Russia from exploiting payment exemptions for military procurement.

By December, Bulgarian Energy Minister Rosen Hristov threatened to halt gas transit through the TurkStream pipeline to Hungary and Serbia unless Gazprom made overdue payments. The U.S. clarified that these sanctions target Russian misuse, not European energy security, inviting dialogue to ensure compliant payments.

Orbán’s response was swift. After visiting the U.S. in December, Hungary and Turkey secured exemptions for gas payments through Gazprombank. However, Slovakia—reliant on the Ukrainian pipeline—did not. The exemptions appear temporary, extending until March 2025, to allow solutions ensuring Moscow doesn't exploit loopholes.

On December 20, Orbán met Bulgarian officials, reportedly securing a three-month payment delay and extending gas transit arrangements. Hungary’s Foreign Minister indicated plans for alternative payment methods, signaling Orbán’s next focus: safeguarding access to Europe via TurkStream and even maintaining Ukrainian transit routes.

Simultaneously, Orbán seeks to strengthen Hungary’s grip on regional energy markets. Negotiations are underway for Hungary's state-owned MVM to acquire E.ON Romania, giving Budapest (and Gazprom) influence over Romania's energy sector. This dependency risks entrenching Russian gas dominance.

Orbán’s larger scheme involves contractual safeguards ensuring Russian gas supply continues, even amidst U.S. ambitions to boost its LNG exports to Europe. His strategy minimizes friction with future U.S. administrations while exploiting current leniencies.

If successful, Orbán will solidify Moscow’s foothold in Europe through Hungarian-controlled energy channels, leaving countries like Romania and Moldova vulnerable to Kremlin influence. By repackaging Russian gas as “non-Russian” upon entry into third countries, Orbán crafts a workaround to sanctions while perpetuating dependency on Moscow, the author concludes.