Everyone wants good relations with Trump as he plans to pressure Ukraine, Russia for peace — diplomat Bryza

The entire world is now stepping into the realm shaped by Donald Trump, Elon Musk, and their political and economic allies. At the heart of this unfolding story lies the concept of war and peace. There is growing concern, fueled by the lack of specific details so far, that the pressure may not only be directed at Russia but could also impact us. 

Trump, as a prominent financial player in his time, brings a unique approach that often defies comparison with the methods of Stanford, Harvard, or Oxford School of Political Science graduates. What could be the potential parameters of Trump’s vision and strategy?

Thank you for that generous mentioning of my alma mater, Stanford University. I have to say that the way Donald Trump approaches international relations is nothing like the way we were taught. But I don't think that's necessarily bad because, in principle, sometimes the traditional ways of conducting foreign policy are too risk-averse and allow patterns of behavior that have already been established to continue long after they've lost their value. I think of how long the United States remained in Afghanistan at tremendous cost in terms of human lives and treasure.

In the case of Russia's invasion and occupation of Ukraine, I think what President Trump 47 will do is put pressure on both Ukraine and Russia earlier. As we have discussed in the past, Mr. Borkovskyi, I was very concerned that, during his first administration, Trump was going to try to reach a deal with Russian President Putin. According to this potential deal, Russia would do something helpful, perhaps in Syria, and, in turn, the United States would put pressure on Zelenskyy and help Russia in Ukraine. To be blunt, that scenario is no longer going to happen.

President Trump himself even made the point that Syria, Russia's role in Syria, is now finished. Now we need to end the war in Ukraine. In a way, he implied that there was previously such a connection between Syria and Ukraine in his mind. But now he says it's over. I am now convinced that he genuinely wants to be the one who helps broker a deal to end the war.

He is very much anti-war. He has been against the use of military force throughout his previous administration, and I think he is and always has been pressuring Putin as well.

In the past, great diplomacy was conducted by figures like Otto von Bismarck, but those were times without the advanced means of communication we have today. Now, we are witnessing a flurry of high-level diplomatic activity, involving shuttles of meetings and conversations at the highest presidential and political levels. It is difficult to predict where this intricate web of direct diplomacy will lead. President Macron is engaging with Donald Tusk and President Duda; Viktor Orbán has managed to speak with both Putin and Trump; Medvedev has traveled to Beijing; and the Ukrainian delegation has visited the United States and Paris. This creates a fragile and uncertain framework, yet the intensity of political engagement suggests that some kind of structure is being developed and potentially finalized.

For us, the question of guarantees remains critical. The Russians have mobilized over a million people who are now part of their aggressive actions. It is not something that can be dismissed lightly. At the same time, we have also mobilized about a million people. Who can guarantee that the enemy will not resort to provocations?

You know the answer yourself. There are no guarantees that there will not be provocations, and there certainly will be provocations from the Russian side. The ultimate, the ultimate sort of security guarantee for Ukraine, of course, is its membership in NATO, and that is something neither Olaf Scholz nor Joseph Biden are willing to entertain. Both of them will be out of office very soon, within a few weeks in fact in the case of Joseph Biden, and a few more weeks in the case of Olaf Scholz. So, while there is always a lot of diplomatic activity, in this case, I think the leaders of the world are scrambling to try to impress President Donald Trump, either positively or negatively.

They know that he will be a transactional president with a different type of diplomacy, as you were saying before. The core of Donald Trump’s foreign policy, I think, has two key aspects: first, being unpredictable and using that unpredictability as leverage even with allies; and second, having a strong focus on trade and trade balances. As I think we were discussing the last time I was with you on this show, the most important determinant of whether or not President Donald Trump will consider a country friendly or unfriendly is whether the United States has a trade surplus or a trade deficit with that country.

So, there will be a much different approach to foreign policy under President Donald Trump. One more thing I think we can be certain of is that he will put significant pressure on our allies in NATO to increase their defense spending from two percent of their Gross Domestic Product to three percent or more. The good news is that President Donald Trump, in terms of foreign policy, is not going to walk away from NATO. Rather, he has previously used the threat that the United States might quit NATO as leverage to push the European countries to increase their defense spending. 

So, yes, there is a huge amount of diplomacy happening, and I think all of the leaders of the world are trying to impress President Donald Trump and establish a good relationship with him.

In essence, the Kremlin’s stance is rigid, uncompromising, poorly conceived, and often outright irrational. This is especially true regarding the illegally seized Ukrainian territories that they have unilaterally claimed as part of Russia. Resolving this issue is inevitable, as the invaders are unlikely to voluntarily relinquish these territories. Instead, they will continue committing atrocities and attacking civilian cities in response to any proposals for resolution.

The question remains: what should we do in such a situation?

That is for Ukraine to decide. You have two choices: either push the Russians out militarily with our assistance in terms of the weapons we have provided, or agree to a compromise. It is not for me to say. It is for Ukraine to decide whether it can accept Russian occupation of some amount of its territory. However, knowing the history of the region and Ukraine, I do not think it is possible for the Russians to ever have a long-term, quiet, and peaceful presence if they decide to keep their forces in Ukraine. Ukrainians fight, as they did in the forests of Western Ukraine and Eastern Poland after World War II.

I do not believe there can be a stable peace if the Russians remain positioned on the territory of Ukraine in a way that the people of Ukraine reject. There will always be some people in Ukraine who reject any agreement with Russia altogether, while others may want peace at all costs. However, there is a general consensus that President Zelenskyy has to build and then use to negotiate an end to the war. I think President Trump actually wants to help make that happen. Again, I believe President Trump was signaling to Putin a few days ago regarding Syria when he essentially said, "Do not look for a deal, President Putin, where you give us something on Syria, and we give you something on Ukraine."

I think Trump is going to push hard, realizing that for the deal he wants to be proud of brokering to survive, it has to be acceptable to both sides. That means it must be acceptable to the people ofUkraine. If Russian troops remain in those four oblasts and continue shooting at Ukraine over time, that is completely unacceptable.

Now, regarding security guarantees, Ukraine deserves and must obtain a security guarantee. Whether it is NATO membership at some point, which I believe it should be, or whether it involves individual member states of NATO pledging to come to Ukraine's military aid, which is their right to do, such guarantees must be on the table. All of this remains to be negotiated.

Do you see any realistic prospects in the plan to invite peacekeepers, such as French or Polish contingents? At present, this idea remains more of a hope, supported by some signals and vague promises. However, in practical terms, who would issue the mandate for the deployment of French, Polish, or German peacekeepers along the line of demarcation with Russia? Would it come from the United Nations? And, importantly, would these countries even agree to such a proposal?

Well, that's what I was getting at earlier. It is possible that any of those countries might want to offer their own peacekeeping forces outside of NATO. However, it is not clear to me that there needs to be any sort of umbrella organization or mandate. They could simply act independently and deploy their peacekeeping forces because they will never get a United Nations Security Council mandate unless Russia agrees. And Russia will never want NATO members to send peacekeepers onto the territory of Ukraine.

But that is okay. It is the sovereign right of any of those countries to send in their peacekeeping troops, regardless of whether theUnited Nations approves or whether NATO approves, as long asUkraine approves. The territory is Ukraine's, and Ukraine has the right to invite anyone it chooses into its country.

When considering improved and more active communication with President Trump, should we focus on working within the framework of international law, or should we rely on building interpersonal relationships? International law clearly supports Ukraine's position. However, Viktor Orbán has far more frequent communication with Trump than, for instance, Olaf Scholz. Orbán also maintains regular contact with Putin, Chinese leaders, and others. This raises doubts about whether Donald Trump would prioritize international law in his decisions.

Should we, then, engage with Viktor Orbán, despite his consistently pro-Russian stance? And most importantly, how can we strengthen and intensify our communication with Trump?

You definitely do not want to rely on Viktor Orbán. He has been very problematic, pro-Putin as you mentioned, and against supporting Ukraine.

The same goes for Robert Fico in Slovakia, right? And, well, let's just leave it at that. I think President Zelenskyy has already been in contact with Trump. They have had personal meetings, and there is a discussion ongoing. We have seen that they met again just recently in Paris, correct? It seems that as these discussions have continued, President Zelenskyy’s position has softened somewhat regarding what could be acceptable to Ukraine. Previously, his public stance was much clearer in terms of insisting that all Russian troops must leave Ukrainian territory. However, more recently, since these conversations with Trump, though perhaps it is purely a coincidence, President Zelenskyy has been less forceful or less strident in making demands. He now sounds more willing to negotiate some sort of agreement.

As we discussed the last time I was on your show, it has been talked about for quite some time that since last summer, Russia and Ukraine were exploring a possible preliminary agreement not to attack each other's energy infrastructure. I remember a statement by President Zelenskyy where he said that if this agreement on energy infrastructure succeeded, perhaps it could serve as a starting point for broader peace negotiations or a more comprehensive peace agreement.

It appears that President Zelenskyy is contemplating some form of compromise. He has discussed this with President Trump. From what it sounds like, this approach is not identical to President Zelenskyy’s original peace plan for Ukraine. So, there seems to be a dynamic and evolving situation influenced by President Trump. Everyone wants to maintain a good relationship with Trump because they know he is unpredictable, unconventional, and will exert pressure on both Kyiv and Moscow to end the war.

What do you think has transpired in Syria, and why has Putin suffered such a significant geopolitical defeat? It is not just about the setbacks for Bashar al-Assad, but also about Russia losing its military bases in Syria, along with a strategic foothold that allowed it to control both territory and key transit routes. Erdogan has performed exceptionally well, both militarily and diplomatically. However, these developments have come at the expense not only of Assad but also of Putin himself.

Russia and Iran have both suffered tremendous strategic defeat with the collapse of the Assad regime. Let me focus on Iran for a moment. All of its proxies, clients, and militias, whether they be the Houthis in Yemen or the various groups still in Syria and Iraq, now realize that Iran cannot protect them. Israel has destroyed Hezbollah's leadership and much of its weaponry, and Iran was unable to stop it. At the same time, Israel has been striking Iranian troops in Syria.

Russia has also suffered a tremendous defeat. Russia was the primary reason Bashar al-Assad survived until now. With its clients gone, Russia is humiliated. Reports coming out of Moscow suggest that Putin is furious and is no longer communicating with Assad, despite granting Assad and his family asylum. I find the framing of this as a "humanitarian gesture" outrageous, given Assad’s inhumane, psychopathic actions against his own people. But leaving that aside, the loss of the naval base at Tartus is of immense significance to Russia.

With Turkey closing the Turkish Straits to all warships not based in the Black Sea under the Montreux Convention, Russia has no way to reinforce or resupply its ships stationed at Tartus. Any reinforcements would require a long journey from the Baltic Fleet in the Baltic Sea. This severely limits Russia’s ability to project naval power in the Mediterranean.

This loss is a monumental political and strategic setback forRussia, while Turkey emerges as the big winner. Erdogan is achieving his long-term goals, which do not seem to include taking over Syrian territory outright. I am certain he did not favor Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) launching its recent offensive. I don't think he expected it. While HTS could not survive without material support flowing from Turkey, the relationship betweenAnkara and HTS has been strained.

HTS likely waited for a moment when Iran was significantly weakened by Israeli strikes inside Syria, when Hezbollah had been decimated by Israel, and when Russia had relocated most of its military forces from Syria to Ukraine. This was the moment HTS had long prepared for. Once the offensive occurred, Ankara and Erdogan exploited the situation using other militias under the umbrella of the Syrian National Army, which Turkey actively supports but does not control.

Now, Turkey is pushing the YPG, which it considers PKK terrorists, out of northern Syria west of the Euphrates River and forcing them to the eastern side. This has been Turkey’s goal since the Syrian civil war began. By doing this, Turkey aims to eliminate the possibility of the YPG carving out a mini-state inSyria, which could pose a threat to Turkey’s territorial integrity.

Turkey has emerged as the primary beneficiary so far, but the situation remains highly volatile. It is equally possible that Syriacould completely fragment into separate entities as it is for it to hold together. It is unlikely that HTS will be able to govern the entire country effectively.