Attack on Lviv, frontline update, and why allies won't allow Ukraine to use long-range weapons. Serhiy Zgurets' column

Strike on Lviv

Russia keeps up its deliberate missile terror against Ukraine — Kharkiv, Sumy, Poltava, and now Lviv. Yet again, both adults and children were hit by Russian missiles, with tragic fatalities. The damaged buildings in Lviv had nothing to do with "military objectives." Russia's goal is clear: to scare Ukraine's population, to weaken resistance. But it won’t work. About ukraine's air defense: there were 42 incoming targets. Ukrainian forces shot down seven missiles and 22 Russian drones. Unfortunately, two Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles and two Kh-22 missiles made it through. Four of the six Kh-101 cruise missiles were intercepted, along with all three Iskander-K cruise missiles.

While these are strong numbers, what managed to get past Ukraine's air defense caused significant damage and misery. In light of this, it’s evident Ukraine needs approval to strike the Russian launch sites directly. It also needs more Western air defense systems to intercept these missiles near its borders. For instance, the missiles aimed at Lviv could’ve been intercepted by Poland's Patriot systems if we had that coverage in place.

Today, Germany confirmed an order for 17 IRIS-T air defense systems in various configurations for Ukraine’s Armed Forces — an essential step forward.

Pokrovsk direction

Today, I'm focusing on just two of the eight areas where Russia is trying to push forward offensively. First up is the Pokrovsk direction. Over the past six months, Russia managed to push 30 kilometers into our defenses, with 4 kilometers gained just in the last month. The wedge they've created is 20 kilometers wide. All efforts are focused on reaching Pokrovsk, a key point that feeds both our eastern front in Donbas and the southern areas. Pokrovsk is only 8 kilometers away. Previously, the main goal was to move toward Pokrovsk, Myrnohrad, Hrodivka, and Novohrodivka (which our forces had to abandon). But now, the emphasis has shifted slightly.

Recently, Russia has shifted focus to the southern flank, aiming towards Selydove and along the line of Memryk, Lytsynivka, and Karlivka. The defense of Selydove is holding, slowing the Russians down between Ukrayinsk and Halytsynivka. This success is thanks to reinforcements transferred to this area. In fact, there were even counterattacks near Dolynivka, where Russian advances were halted, and we regained some lost ground.

We’ve also seen a tactical withdrawal of Ukrainian units to avoid encirclement along the Karlivka-Krasnohorivka line, towards the heights near Zhelanne Pershe and Zhelanne Druhe. This line of defense follows the eastern bank of the Vovcha River, where Russia is trying to put pressure on us. However, the direction in which the battle will tip is still unclear.

Overall, the Pokrovsk direction remains extremely tough, but the key takeaway is that despite the intensity of Russia’s offensive, their progress has slowed down. This slowdown suggests that the transfer of our reserves and possibly better troop management is making an impact.

Vuhledar

Now, let’s talk about the Vuhledar area, which has also become pretty tense lately. Russia is trying to encircle it from two directions. We know that for a long time, their frontal attacks failed miserably. Vuhledar sits on higher ground, surrounded by open terrain, making it impossible for Russian tank columns and troops to advance through the minefields without taking heavy losses. In fact, one of their marine brigades was wiped out there — twice. But now, Russia has slightly changed its approach and is trying to push forward from Vodiane, which is northwest of Vuhledar, and also from Pavlivka and Prechystivka. They've had some limited success in Prechystivka, but the Kashlahach River is slowing their progress.

So, what’s the risk? If Russia makes gains in both directions — from the west and east — then there’s no real need to capture Vuhledar itself. By cutting off logistics, they could simply threaten the Ukrainian garrison in Vuhledar. But let me tell you, this risk is straight out of a textbook, and Ukraine's General Staff is well aware of it. I’m confident that countermeasures will be taken to ensure that the situation doesn't tilt in Russia's favor.

Permits for using long-range weapons

Oleksiy Yizhak, an analyst at the National Institute for Strategic Studies, shared his thoughts on whether ukraine's military-political leadership can persuade partners to lift the ban on using long-range weapons and what these bans really are based on.

"In short, and unfortunately, our partners – sometimes we call them allies – don't view this as their personal war. Ukraine doesn't have formal alliance obligations with them, though there are moral, humanitarian commitments, and promises under the Budapest Memorandum. These factors compel our partners to help us, but despite that, they don’t see this war as their own. Since they don't, they're hesitant to take certain risks. To them, the risk is too high – a potential direct conflict, which both sides could interpret as a direct clash between nuclear powers. It's a wide gray area – where's the conflict, where isn't, what’s allowed, what’s not. That's why the process is ongoing," he said.

Yizhak thinks permissions will eventually be granted, but "not as dramatically as we might expect."

"Not right away. It'll be like what we saw with Kharkiv – a serious situation, but the permission may not be what we imagine. I wouldn't rule out something being announced even during this session of the UN General Assembly. But it might not be a broad, universal approval – it could be more about specific targets. The process is moving, and judging by how Western politicians react – especially with Joseph Biden paying particular attention to Poltava – he’s aware of certain decisions, and his signature may soon authorize the next permit. There was a permit for Sumy, and there could be more like that. But if we’re talking about a full-fledged permit, it’s something we’ll need to keep pushing for, and unfortunately, that's not easy," the analyst said.

The use of Polish air defense to shoot down Russian targets over Ukraine

Poland, as a NATO member, doesn’t want to involve itself in this war in such a direct way. This is why any hopes Ukrainian politicians have to pressure Polish partners will likely be in vain.

“If you listen to the Polish Foreign Minister, there’s some suggestion that this could happen. I think there are possibly internal debates in Poland, with different political groups discussing the matter. I wouldn’t rule out the possibility altogether. The concept of a more integrated European air defense system is being discussed — one that could potentially operate beyond NATO’s borders. If that’s the case, certain actions could be taken. It might look something like the U.S. permission for Kharkiv: if a Russian aircraft equipped with an air defense system openly flies towards Ukraine and nears the border, it can be shot down. But it wouldn’t be allowed to be hit while still on the airfield. I wouldn’t be surprised if something along these lines occurs,” the analyst said.

He believes some sort of decision could be made, but it won’t be game-changing for Ukraine. For instance, whether they’ll defend Lviv is uncertain, but a scenario similar to the Kharkiv situation could unfold.

Involvement of American pilots on F-16 fighters 

We know these aircraft can serve air defense roles. Now, it’s confirmed that the aircraft will arrive, but there are challenges with personnel, maintenance, and pilots. The Biden administration has made it clear that it opposes the idea of civilian contractors operating in Ukraine to maintain the F-16s. Instead, they’re leaving it to the Europeans. Still, there are probably some avenues where the potential of European nations or even the U.S. could be utilized, ensuring that ukraine's capacity with the F-16 extends beyond just the pilots it manages to train within its Air Force.

"I think, if you consider all the circumstances, it does feel at times like mercenary work, and there are particular risks tied to this. But to classify someone as a mercenary requires meeting a bunch of criteria — around five to seven — not all of which are straightforward. The real issue here is Russia's habit of treating any foreigner who comes their way as a hostage. The key point is the safety of these people — foreigners who might maintain or fly these airacraft. This is grounded in an old U.S. principle of avoiding direct involvement in foreign wars. The main thing for them is to avoid having troops on the ground. The U.S. cannot participate in wars abroad without a direct mandate, otherwise, it becomes a liability for the state,” Oleksiy Yizhak said.

The exception to this is when there are clear alliance obligations — like under the Washington Treaty or agreements with Australia, New Zealand, or Japan. Yizhak also reminded that U.S. defense firms and legal entities cannot operate in a conflict zone without direct approval.

"What’s promising is that there were reports this summer suggesting that the U.S., under the Biden administration, was considering letting American defense firms work in Ukraine. That is, they’re looking into it. Along those lines, I wouldn’t rule out the possibility of personnel being involved in maintenance, and yes, even pilots. The key here is safety — how secure these pilots will be, how protected they’ll be from Russian agents and influence in general. It’s a complex issue, but it’s central. I think if we see European pilots first, the U.S. will definitely play a role and sign off on it," the analyst said.

In fact, there are statements from U.S. politicians and veterans, some of whom have said they’re ready to fly combat missions over Ukraine. There are legal restrictions that appear strict but are, in some ways, open to interpretation. So, we need to explore ways to allow foreign nationals to maintain and pilot the F-16s in Ukrainian airspace.

"I think these options are possible. It’s important to note this has nothing to do with the idea of mercenaries — these are people flying in defense of Ukraine. Senator Lindsey Graham framed it as helping Ukraine defend freedom. This isn’t about money, though in any profession, money matters. The central factor here is security — how safe it is to deliver weapons, spend U.S. dollars in Ukraine, and ensure the safety of American personnel. Pilots are highly valuable, and of course, they would be prime targets for Russian attacks. If Ukraine can provide convincing security guarantees, the legal and financial aspects can be worked out," the analyst at the National Institute for Strategic Studies noted.

The Kursk operation and Russia’s review of its nuclear strategy

Oleksiy Yizhak reviewed Russia's statements about revising its nuclear strategy.

“There are several layers to this issue. If we’re talking about rhetoric, that will change. As for the criteria outlined in Russia's core defense documents — their military plans — the guidelines for using nuclear weapons are in there. I don’t think those will shift much. The fact is, many experts, both political and military, are realizing that nuclear weapons don’t have the paralyzing effect they once thought. The ‘boa constrictor hypnotizing the rabbit’ metaphor doesn’t quite hold anymore. Right now, it’s clear that nuclear weapons didn’t paralyze Ukraine’s defense capability. And beyond that, they don't seem to guarantee territorial security, unless there's a direct threat to the very existence of the Russian state. That’s the key issue. What unsettles global experts is the uncertainty: if a non-nuclear invasion does threaten a nuclear state’s survival, like Russia’s — would it use nuclear weapons or not?” the analyst questioned.

He also highlighted a third important point.

“And the third aspect, which I think everyone is waiting to see, is whether nuclear weapons can prevent a nuclear country from collapsing. They didn’t stop the Soviet Union’s collapse, though some countries believe that having nuclear weapons somehow protects the government and preserves territorial integrity from internal threats,” Yizhak concluded.