Putin’s plans for 2023

Putin's war plan for 2023: defense of the corridor to Crimea, an offensive launched with new 20 divisions, improvement of artillery and aviation control, drones for every military department.

Putin’s and Defense Minister Shoigu’s speeches at the board of the Russian Ministry of Defense show Russia’s war plan for 2023. I have collected the key theses from the 2 speeches into one text for analysis.

So, what is this plan, judging by the statements of the military and political leadership of the Russian Federation, and what conclusions can we draw:

1. The Russian army personnel number raises to 1.5 million people, the number of contract soldiers to 695,000

The staff of the Russian Defense Ministry was previously 2.1 million people, including 1.1 million servicemen. The increase in the number does not mean that Russia plans to conduct additional mobilization. It means, probably, that the Russian Armed Forceswill consider 300,000 mobilized Russians and, obviously, about 100,000 mobilized on the Ukrainian occupied territories as part of the 1st and 2nd army corps of the “LPR” and “DPR”, as part of its personnel.

The increase of the Armed Forces by 500,000 people is fully aimed at increasing the combat strength of the ground forces. Before the invasion, the ground, airborne troops and marines amounted to a total of 500,000 people. Thus, the number of ground forces is planned to be increased twofold compared to 2021. The number of professional contractors, which amounted to about 405,000 people in 2021, is planned to increase to 521,000 in 2022, and to 695,000 in 2023.

2. Deployment of 20 new divisions of ground forces to hold the Crimean corridor and to the war against Ukraine

“Form three motorized rifle divisions, including as part of combined arms units in the Kherson and Zaporizhzhya regions, as well as an army corps in Karelia;

Reform seven motorized rifle brigades into motorized rifle divisions;

Additionally, form two airborne assault divisions;

Form five artillery divisions of military districts, as well as high-powered artillery brigades;

Form five divisions of marines on the basis of existing marine brigades.” (Quote from Shoigu’s speech)

Russia’s priority is to hold the corridor from mainland Russia to Crimea through Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions, where it plans to create new divisions.

The most capable brigades of paratroopers, marines, and motorized infantry will be part of a division, i.e. where the most combat-capable command personnel are. Based on the current staff, Russia plans to deploy up to 100 new battalion tactical groups, and use them orderly, as part of their divisions. Presumably, some of those mobilized in Russia will serve in these new units.

The creation of artillery divisions is supposed to improve tactics of artillery offensive and counter-battery warfare.

3. Struggle for air superiority

"For each combined arms (tank) army to contain a mixed aviation division and a brigade of army aviation numbering 80-100 attack helicopters;

In addition, to form three additional directorates of aviation divisions, eight bomber aviation regiments, one fighter aviation regiment, and six brigades of army aviation.” (Quote from Shoigu’s speech)

To improve the interaction with ground forces, direct support of troops, suppression of the air defense system of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Russia gives each combined arms army in Ukraine a separate aviation division, and in each of these divisions they create a regiment of strike aviation, judging by the staff of bombers such as Su-24 and Su-34.

Judging by the plan to put into service 3 strategic missile carriers of Tu-160 type, it is also planned to increase the production of air-launched cruise missiles for strikes on Ukraine.

4. Sharp saturation of troops with drones up to the level of infantry unit, network-centric warfare

"The urgent task is to improve drones, including strategic and reconnaissance strike drones, as well as the ways they can be used. The experience of special military operations has shown that the use of drones has become almost ubiquitous, and such an arsenal should be in combat squads, platoons, companies, and battalions. The target should be detected as quickly as possible and the information transmitted for a strike in real time.

The drones must be linked together, integrated into a single reconnaissance network, and have secure channels of communication with headquarters and commanders. In the near future every soldier should be able to receive information transmitted from drones. This is something we should strive for.” (Quote from Shoigu’s speech)

The Russian command has realized the key importance of drones for situational awareness and plans to introduce changes in the organizational and staffing structure and dramatically increase the number of drones starting from the smallest unit - a squad. Currently, regular UAV units in the Russian Armed Forces are established exclusively at the brigade regiment level.

5. Raising the conscription age to 21 and increasing the combat capability of conscripts

The war experience has shown the complete incapacity of 18-year-old boys in the ranks of the Russian Armed Forces. Currently, the Russian Armed Forces call about 270,000 conscripts annually. Thus, the goal is to get more independent and responsible conscripts for the army with work experience and education, as conscripts are the main source of recruitment of contract servicemen for the Russian Armed Forces.

6. Leningrad and Moscow Military Districts are being created on the territory of the Western Military District

The purpose of the Leningrad Military District deployment is to increase Russia’s threat in the direction of the Baltic States and Finland.

The purpose of the Moscow District is to manage the strategic reserves of the Russian Armed Forces and units of central subordination, which are concentrated in central Russia.

The Western Military District, thus, will be fully focused on fighting against Ukraine and controlling Belarus.

7. Strengthening the combat capability of military equipment

Three new repair plants and additional repair units in the army are being deployed.

Conclusions:

Russia in 2023 plans to:

1. To gain a foothold in the occupied territories, primarily in the corridor to Crimea.

2. Prepare a large-scale offensive operation from all ground directions, creating a numerical advantage and expanding the front line.

3. Success in the ground war is planned to be achieved through qualitative changes in those areas where Russia is inferior to the Ukraine: changes in organization and management, close interaction of troops on the ground and in the air, achieving better coordination between intelligence and means of destruction, strengthening situational awareness.

4. Russia is aware of Ukraine’s superiority in combat capability, so it is trying to introduce qualitative changes in manning the troops to ensure higher quality of mobilization reserves.

5. Russia is preparing for a long war, no signs of a political solution and peace are visible.

Are these goals realistic:

Russia will not be able to fully fulfill its tasks, as it has limitations in personnel and industrial capabilities, new weapons are not enough to even restore losses. New units will be created on old equipment from storage bases, which is also lacking. They will not be able to fully form the staff.

Russia is not able to create any Starlink-type control networks, as it does not have hundreds of communication satellites and is not able to develop and deploy them.

There are no commanders for such a number of troops, especially at the platoon-battalion level.

The enemy will not achieve a significant numerical advantage over the Ukrainian Armed Forces, even with these numbers. However, local advantage is possible.

The enemy has made some correct conclusions from the combat operations, and has identified new priorities of its military policy, to which Ukraine and NATO will have to systematically respond in the new year.

Ukraine and allies have every opportunity to achieve victory in the war and in new battles. In order to do it, it is necessary to objectively assess the challenges and to carry out our own defense planning.

Source

About the author: Yuriy Butusov, journalist, soldier of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

Espreso TV does not always share the opinions expressed by the blog authors.