Moldova's presidential elections: Sandu faces uphill battle as Moscow exploits referendum results

The author of the Resurgam Telegram channel provides an analysis of the preliminary results of the first round of Moldova's presidential elections.

General Election Overview

Although incumbent president Maia Sandu secured 41.9% of the vote in the first round, the upcoming second round remains fraught with risks. The author suggests, “As predicted, the upcoming round will be highly challenging. There’s a chance we may see a repeat of the Korčok-Pellegrini scenario from Slovakia. However, Sandu is in a relatively better position than Korčok was at that time.”

Nevertheless, Sandu's reliance on "foreign mobilization" is evident for the second round, which presents its own difficulties:

• Territorial constraints;
• The participation of the diaspora is unpredictable, with turnout volatility playing a significant role.

Sandu’s campaign also made a strategic miscalculation with the referendum. The author notes that although the referendum was non-binding, her team pushed for it for several reasons:

• To attract younger, pro-European voters who might not otherwise participate;
• To tie pro-European discourse directly to Sandu’s campaign;
• To gauge sentiment for potential parliamentary elections and even justify early elections.

However, none of these goals were fully realized:

1. Youth turnout among voters aged 18-35 remained unchanged at 40-50%, mirroring previous elections. Meanwhile, pro-Moscow socialists mobilized the 55+ demographic, achieving over 70% turnout.
2. Although the referendum helped Sandu achieve a solid first-round result, it won’t serve as a pivotal tool in the second round due to the lack of a decisive pro-referendum margin.
3. Despite winning the referendum, the result is weak enough that early parliamentary elections under Sandu's leadership seem improbable, especially since Moldova operates under a parliamentary system.

The ambiguous referendum outcome will have ripple effects in Brussels, though the EU may downplay them publicly. More critically, Moscow will likely leverage the results to destabilize Moldova through propaganda and intelligence operations, the author warns. Gagauzia, where Sandu received only 3% of the vote and the referendum 5%, will be the primary focus of Moscow’s political efforts. The author points out that they had warned two months earlier about Moscow’s electoral focus on this region, using the results to undermine the situation further.

Now, Moscow’s strategists, led by Stoianoglo, will capitalize on the slim referendum margin (less than 1%) to push a fraud narrative. The message, according to the author, will be: “Come to the second round, vote for Stoianoglo, and fix the situation.”

Meanwhile, Sandu loses the referendum as a tool for the second round. Should she survive this round, Moscow will likely escalate its destabilization efforts through Gagauzia, as the electoral polarization is both deep and dangerously volatile. The author describes the situation as a "tinderbox waiting for a spark."

On a more positive note, the author highlights the vote count from Transnistria. Despite Gagauzia's overwhelming alignment with Moscow (95%), 38% of voters in Transnistria supported the EU, and 20% backed Sandu. The author interprets this as a significant setback for Moscow.

Unfortunately, exact percentages are unavailable because the Central Election Commission (CEC) website was down at the time of writing. The author suspects that Moscow may be behind a cyberattack on the CEC website to reinforce the "stolen referendum" narrative. The site’s failure doesn’t benefit Sandu either, as diaspora votes, where the EU holds an 80/20 lead, were still being counted at the time.