If Putin doesn't lose power after de-occupation of Crimea, war will drag on for a long time - Yakovenko

Putin and his entire war-criminal clique held an extended meeting of the Ministry of Defense. The key issue is a fundamentally new phase of the Russian-Ukrainian war. In particular, it is said that they are going to increase the number of mobilized people to 1.5 million. The so-called goals of the war, apart from the destruction of the Ukrainian presence in the certain territories that Russia would like to occupy, they did not announce.

As before, Shoigu says that instead of an army of one million, there should be one and a half million, and instead of 400,000 contract soldiers, 600,000 are needed. This kind of inertial approach is an attempt to fill Ukraine with corpses. The size of the armed forces in the present war is, of course, important, but not decisive. Because for HIMARS it doesn't matter how much cannon fodder it will destroy if it comes to fighting in the current war. That is, this is another attempt to overwhelm the enemy with corpses. This attempt had some effect during World War II, but now the war is very different. In fact, we are really seeing a completely different type of war, which will probably be studied a lot by military analysts and historians. But it is already clear that the ratio of manpower is not decisive. Therefore, what happened at the recent meeting of the Ministry of Defense shows that Putin, let alone the Minister of Defense, is actually clueless about what is happening in the war…

Now it seems that Shoigu and Chief of Staff Gerasimov are not such important people because new favorites have appeared. Prigozhin seems to be starting to lead a whole direction. But all the same, Putin "saves" both Shoigu and Gerasimov.

As for Putin's bet: he will obviously not give up either Shoigu or Gerasimov, because that would mean a public admission of defeat.  About Prigozhin, first of all, it can be said that this is a real Oprichnina (a state policy implemented by Russian tsar in 16th century which included mass repression of Russian aristocrats, including public executions and confiscation of their land and property - ed.), when the existence of such an out-of-system player as Prigozhin, for example, became not only noticeable, but also decisive. After all, Prigozhin has his own private army, he has absolutely unique powers, such as coming to prisons and kicking the doors open, that is, taking away any number of criminals, mainly recidivists, murderers, serial killers, professional hired killers, taking them to his private army, and exempt them from punishment. This is a unique authority of a private person, not prescribed in any law, because Prigozhin does not have any official status. He got such opportunities. First of all, this is explained by the fact that from the very beginning of the war it was clear that the Ministry of Defense could not cope with this war, and was unable to fight effectively in any way. This became clear literally in the first days of the war. If you remember, from the very beginning Prigozhin was not allowed to join this war, he was not called up for this war, although he had been fighting on the side of Russia in Donbas, Syria and Africa for a long time. But for some reason he was not invited. In the first days, it turned out that the Russian army could not fight, in particular, that is why Prigozhin was invited. His PMC, that is, gang formation, is one of the most effective parts of the Russian army. At the same time, for example, in the fight for Bakhmut, where he tried to take the city for several months, he ran into professional soldiers of the Ukrainian army and suffered defeat.

It is clear that Putin does not care about the death of his fellow citizens, he will probably be ready to throw corpses in the style of Marshal Zhukov. As a sociologist, what are the main trends you see now, if we talk about support within the Russian Federation? Is this a scenario of a big war, a long war, or the possibility of a war with the help of some propaganda tricks?

Firstly:  in totalitarian fascist regimes, such as Putin's in Russia, there can be no survey sociology at all. The data of any sociological surveys have little significance. After all, when a person in the Third Reich, or in Stalin's USSR, or in Putin's Russia is asked on the street or on the phone how they feel about the politics of Adolf Hitler, Joseph Stalin, or Vladimir Putin, it is natural that they answer: of course, good, of course, we support, Comrade Major, let me go, Comrade Major. That is, it is a completely obvious reaction, and we see it. It is difficult to distinguish sincere support from demonstrative support. There is very eloquent data: more than 90% of respondents refuse to answer the sociologist's questions. They refuse to answer. And what is the value of the remaining 5% is unclear. Because this is another question that is going on in the minds of those over 90% who refused, and sociologists do not know about it.

So let's forget about mass polls. There is indirect evidence that is quite convincing, sociology in Russia is possible, but it is not a survey. There is indirect evidence, such as, for example, what is called "demonstrative behavior", i.e. wearing signs. During the occupation of Crimea, the ribbon of Saint George was a symbol of support for the occupation of Crimea. I saw this ribbon in huge numbers in the subway - on shoulder bags, in loops, in girls' hair, on briefcases, handbags, and on cars. In huge numbers. It was truly a symbol of support. "Crimea is ours" was a mass epidemic. As for this war, its symbol is the semi-swastika "Z". I haven't seen this semi-swastika either in the subway or on cars. Most of them are in administrative buildings, there are a lot of them there. That is, this war did not have such support as the occupation of Crimea.

And the second indicator is the ratio of mobilized people and people who went in the opposite direction: 320 thousand mobilized people for about a million people who simply took and left abroad. Fleeing from mobilization, i.e. in the opposite direction, can be evaluated in different ways, it is a separate story that in the minds of those who fled from mobilization, there is a reluctance to kill Ukrainians or a greater reluctance to die in the Ukrainian black soil, but in any case it is not supporting the war.  According to various indirect signs, it can be said that the ratio of support for the war and non-support leans in the direction of non-support. In the public space now, there is mostly hysterical support for the war, and the supporters of the war are the most grimacing, mocking and foolish, and this is evidence that the public space is completely monopolized by the state, propaganda, and information war, where its participants appear.

Putin, Shoigu, Gerasimov and all this criminal group hope that the war will last as long as they need - a year, two, three. What things can affect and in general what number of killed Russian soldiers is needed for the Afghan scenario to repeat itself?

I can confidently say that Putin will not order the withdrawal of troops from the territory of Ukraine, at least I do not see such a possibility.  There is quite unpleasant news for me: Russian public space, Russian television, and Russian authorities practically did not react to the liberation of Kherson. I thought it would be a pretty powerful blow. Russian TV and the Russian authorities withstood this blow quite easily. Now the question is about Crimea, how significant the impact of its liberation will be. This is an important issue. I think that the Putin regime will still not be able to withstand this blow so easily, because Crimea is an absolutely symbolic phenomenon and the regime will probably not be able to accept the liberation of Crimea as easily as they accepted the liberation of Kherson.

I see two scenarios. The difference betwee is conditional, but still there are two of them. The first scenario: Putin will not withdraw the troops after the defeat, Ukraine can only drive the troops out of the territory. That is, one should not count on the fact that Putin will withdraw the troops under some circumstances.

This does not mean the end of the war.

That's exactly what I wanted to say. The first scenario is that the Ukrainian army will knock out the Russian troops on the 1991 border. If Putin keeps his regime, his power, this does not mean the end of the war. The war will change, and the Russian-Ukrainian border will become the frontline. This huge Russian-Ukrainian border will become the entire frontline. And this war can last a very long time. Rumors that Russia will run out of resources are unconfirmed and, in my opinion, harmful and naive. Russia has a fairly large mobilization resource, officially it is 25 million. General Zaluzhnyi defines it as 1.5-2 million, but it is still a large resource, moreover, it is renewable. Therefore, I believe that the war under such conditions can last quite a long time. It will change its character, but it will be a long, long war.

The second option is still a total defeat (and the de-occupation of Crimea and Donbas is a total defeat for Putin), which will cause the collapse of the Putin regime due, first of all, to unrest in the army. Those people who return alive from the front and do not remain in the black soil of Ukraine will be flammable material for a civil war, for turmoil. This is about the same as when millions of Russian soldiers were taken out of the German trenches during World War I, they came to St. Petersburg and Moscow, took part in the October coup and arranged what became the curse of our country for 74 years. Approximately the same situation is quite possible after a defeat.

I agree, but there is a certain specificity.  During World War I, the losses were in the millions, we are talking about the dead, wounded, deserters and those who surrendered. It was a huge scale. And here this flywheel is only gaining momentum, taking into account Hitler's or Stalin's plans for general mobilization in Russia.

Firstly: Russia, I mean not only the state, not only Putin, but also Russia as a population, has absolute immunity to the number of dead.  What's more, the current Russia is fundamentally different from Soviet Russia – a fundamentally different anthropological type was formed: in contrast to the "Soviet person", this is the "Putin's person". In today’s Russia, it doesn't matter how many were killed - on the contrary, the number of killed is a matter of pride: the more killed, the greater the feat. Therefore, Putin can lose three hundred thousand people, maybe a million in this war - there will be no reaction to it. The reaction will be to the loss of territory. Russia, as an imperial state, is actually a state that serves to protect this vast territory. Russians are proud of their territory, their enormity, and for the sake of this territory they are ready to make sacrifices - of course, other people's sacrifices. Therefore, there will be no reaction to the number of dead.  The reaction will be to the loss of territory, the loss of territory may well cause something in the armed forces, in power structures, despite the fact that from the very beginning the leadership, the generals did not support this war, and they understood that it was stupidity. Putin made - I emphasize and insist on this - a one-man decision to start a war and as a result he has what he has. I think it's a different scenario. This is Russia's plunge into turmoil.  And this is a very real option, which threatens and will inevitably end with the collapse of Russia. This is the third historical stage of the collapse of the Russian Empire, a natural result of the existence of the Russian project in history. As a sociologist, as a researcher of Russia, I claim that in the end this scenario will be realized. Perhaps not immediately, during some period of a long war, but I think the collapse of the Russian Empire is inevitable. It is irresponsible to set deadlines, it is not the subject of accurate forecasts. But in the near future, Russia will cease to exist within its borders. It happens, empires are mortal.  Moreover, especially such empires as the Russian Empire always die suddenly.

There are certain moments that are extremely painful for the Russian regime, including mysterious explosions at strategic aviation airfields. Now something happened that, according to Putin and the Russian air defense, could not happen: drones hit strategic airfields.

One of the first important successes of Ukraine was the destruction of the Moskva flagship cruiser, and it was destroyed precisely by Ukrainian weapons, a Ukrainian-made naval drone. And here it is the same: it was Ukrainian drones that destroyed, or at least damaged, two heavy bombers at the airport near Saratov. The airport, the military airfield, is called Engels-2, and it is a matter of principle. Currently, it is obvious that Ukraine has the resources to destroy military facilities deep in Russia. And the fact that now these warplanes and strategic bombers have been transferred, if I'm not mistaken, to the airport in Murmansk, changes everything. Logistics are much more difficult there, it is more difficult to use them to strike Kyiv, for example. Although these strikes continue and are quite effective, they are largely due to Iranian assistance. Therefore, the situation is becoming more difficult for Russia. The transfer of the war to the territory of Russia is already working, and it fundamentally changes the further pattern of the war.