Russia unlikely to coordinate defense operations along entire frontline 

This is stated in a report by the Institute for the Study of War (ISW).

The announced plans of the founder of the Russian Wagner PMC Yevgeny Prigozhin and the head of the Chechen Republic Ramzan Kadyrov to exchange their units in the area of Bakhmut, which Russians are trying to capture, forced the Russian Defense Ministry to resume the distribution of artillery shells to Wagner mercenaries.

Thus, on May 7, Prigozhin said that he had received a document from the Defense Ministry promising to supply Wagner forces with ammunition and weapons necessary for offensive operations in Bakhmut. He has not published the document, and ISW is currently unable to verify the claim.

"The Russian MoD likely has not fundamentally changed its intention of deprioritizing offensive operations and conserving munitions across the theater," the report says.

Analysts believe that Prigozhin and Kadyrov actually blackmailed the Russian Defense Ministry to allocate resources to Wagner forces in Bakhmut, threatening to withdraw Kadyrov's Chechen forces from other parts of the war theater to replace Wagner fighters in the city.

The report cites how Kadyrov published a letter on May 6 asking Russian leader Vladimir Putin to order Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Rosgvardia chief Viktor Zolotov to authorize the transfer of Chechen Akhmat units from "other areas" to Wagner's positions in the Bakhmut direction.

Experts say that the withdrawal of Chechen forces from other parts of the front line would likely pose a risk to Russian defensive lines that Gerasimov and Shoigu or Putin did not seem willing to take.

Akhmat units have previously been spotted near Bilohorivka on the Svatove-Kreminna line and in the Zaporizhzhia region, and their withdrawal from these positions could undermine Russian defensive efforts in the face of a Ukrainian counteroffensive.

ISW notes: Shoigu and Gerasimov, who have shown consistent loyalty to Putin's orders, could have decided to provide ammunition to Wagner PMC on the Russian president's instructions.

"Kadyrov’s and Prigozhin’s apparently successful joint blackmail efforts further indicate that Gerasimov does not actually control all the Russian forces in Ukraine, despite being the nominal theater commander. Gerasimov likely attempted to assume control over all Russian irregular forces over the winter of 2023 but had failed in that endeavor even before losing favor with Putin in the spring," the report says.

In addition, analysts suggest that Kadyrov could have supported Wagner's efforts to blackmail the Russian military command in order to restore his position in the Kremlin's power circle.

Kadyrov used to hold an influential position in Putin's inner circle until he apparently lost favor, likely because his forces played a limited role in the active fighting in Ukraine in the fall of 2022 and winter of 2023. Putin humiliated Kadyrov during their meeting on March 13, where Kadyrov was visibly nervous when reporting on the role of Chechen fighters in Ukraine. Kadyrov likely took Prigozhin's threats to withdraw from Bakhmut as an opportunity to demonstrate the effectiveness of his forces against the backdrop of Gerasimov and Shoigu's inability to win decisive victories during the winter-spring offensive, the Institute says.

For example, Gerasimov's need to negotiate with Prigozhin and Kadyrov indicates problems in the chain of command in the Russian army that will affect its ability to resist Ukraine's counteroffensive.

"Gerasimov's apparent need to negotiate with subordinate commanders and those commanders’ ability to force his hand suggests that chain of command problems are having a significant impact on the Russian military’s ability to conduct coherent theater-wide operations. The position of overall theater commander should in principle allow Gerasimov to command any Russian unit or ground forces commander in Ukraine, even those in charge of irregular formations such as Wagner and Akhmat," the report says.

While Prigozhin and Kadyrov appear to be able to make largely independent decisions about their forces, this phenomenon becomes more pronounced the longer these forces have de facto control over certain sections of the front line.

"These events raise questions about Russia’s ability to coordinate a coherent theater-wide defensive campaign," experts say.

According to American analysts, the Russian military command is increasingly delegating responsibility for different parts of the front line in Ukraine to different Russian commanders, while the power of the commander of the entire theater of operations continues to decline. Gerasimov's diminished ability to control his commanders is likely to further limit the Russian military's ability to conduct coordinated operations covering different areas of responsibility.

• The founder of Wagner PMC, Yevgeny Prigozhin, wrote a letter to the Russian Defense Ministry announcing his intention to withdraw his mercenaries from Bakhmut on May 10. Later he said that his mercenaries would hand over their positions in Bakhmut to Ramzan Kadyrov's troops on May 10.

• The Main Directorate of Intelligence of Ukraine believes that he made the statements about the withdrawal of his forces due the fact that he could not fulfill another promise to capture Bakhmut by May 9. 

• Later, the Kremlin-controlled leader of Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov, called on the leader of Wagner PMC, Yevgeny Prigozhin, not to leave his position in Bakhmut (Donetsk region) at midnight on May 10.