Colonel Grant: Many of Trump's plans to be undone by unforeseen circumstances

The situation is starting to become clearer. At least we now know who the next U.S. president will be, along with the likely composition of his cabinet. Based on their biographies and professional backgrounds, it seems unlikely we will view many of them favorably. For instance, the potential Secretary of Defense is a Fox News host, while Marco Rubio is set to become Secretary of State. However, we still have two months to prepare for these developments, as we have no ability to influence the direction of our primary military donor.

I think the first thing you need to look at is that, with all these people coming in, most of them are quite intelligent people. They may not have experience in their jobs, but they are quite intelligent, and a lot of them seem to be there for two reasons. Reason number one is that they have loyalty, a deep loyalty to Donald Trump, which they have proven over maybe eight or nine years, and Donald Trump values loyalty. The second thing is that they have ideas that align with Donald Trump's ideas. In other words, they are, you could say, part of the Make America Great team.

Now, what I think people should not do is look at this group of people, many of whom I have never heard of before, let alone have any understanding of who they are, through a Ukraine lens. This is an American election about America and American politics. It is about who governs America.

Ukraine is a side issue. We have been a side issue for the last couple of years with Joe Biden, and I think we will remain a side issue with Donald Trump, because he has bigger priorities in America about money, about power, about his own agenda to become, what do you want to call it, a lifelong head of America? I mean, he has already said there will not be other elections. Let us wait and see how he tries to proceed with that.

But, of course, there will be consequences for Ukraine in everything that changes, because this is about America. People will be more inward looking, less willing to spend money on things outside, and, worryingly, they may go right back, even to before the Second World War, of looking inward at America and not out at the rest of the world, except perhaps for China.

But this has consequences, not just for America, but for Europe and for all the allies that America might need if it fights, if it has to fight China at some stage.

I mean, it looks increasingly likely that China is intent on war because it is backing Russia, it is not stopping North Korea from backing Russia, and it is certainly not stopping Iran from backing Russia. So I think we are in for a difficult time.

And what I think will happen, my guess, is that a lot of Donald Trump's dreams will get smashed sometime in the months ahead. By that great expression, "events." Events will actually overtake this government and force them to face the reality of the world, not just the reality of American politics.

American isolationism has consistently led to major wars on the European continent — a well-established fact of history. With Donald Trump now focused on everything but Europe, there’s a significant risk of emboldening Russia’s ambitions.

At the same time, one figure often underestimated in this context is Elon Musk. Just a few days ago, I discussed Musk with European politicians, and they speculated that he might have a falling out with Donald Trump within six months. However, I am confident that this will not happen. On the contrary, Elon Musk, as a visionary and ambitious individual, has numerous plans and immense potential to exert influence.

Meanwhile, we are witnessing the systematic weakening of the United States’ traditional diplomatic corps — a strong, patriotic middle management tier of government officials who understand and uphold doctrines like Reagan's. It seems Musk will play a role in reshaping this landscape, potentially extending his influence to the American government and its structures. He’s likely to align well with the new Secretary of Defense, fostering collaboration.

What scenarios do you envision unfolding in this area?

You asked a lot of questions there. I think the first thing is that Russia is going to keep going. I do not see anything that anybody is going to do to persuade Russia to stop because, as I have said to you many times before, Putin believes he is winning.

And I will just repeat why I say that. First of all, he has support from North Korea, China, and Iran. That is strong, powerful support in terms of equipment, techniques, technology, and most importantly, weapons. And now, of course, manpower.

So he has good backing there. Secondly, he has infiltrated NATO and the European Union, and that is causing real problems for Ukraine in both of those places. That is powerful for him. So he thinks he is winning.

Let us now look at your second point about Musk. Musk is an unusual figure. We do not really know how ambitious he is. He has all the money he needs, which worries me, because when someone has all the money they need, the only thing left for them is power.

And, you know, he is already the richest man in the world. Yes, a lot of that is debt, just like Donald Trump’s was, but on paper, he is the richest man in the world. So where does he go next?

I hope that Donald Trump has appointed him to try to clear out some of the bureaucracy in the American system because there is a lot of it. It is heavy with people who are doing non-jobs and who are earning a lot of money. It is a huge, self-sustaining industry that, in many cases, does not actually do anything useful or purposeful for the United States.

But the worry is, will Musk, who does not know the bureaucracy, kill things that are actually important? Will he remove things, like the Department of Education, that actually have purpose and deep value for the whole country? I do not know, but what is clear is that America is in for a roller coaster ride.

In the coming years, some of that ride is going to affect us. What will affect us, and how badly it will affect us, I do not know. But I come back to the first point: Russia is not going to stop.

I just do not see anything that Donald Trump is doing or saying that has the power to persuade Putin to get back in his box.

Putin is out, he is running, and he is going to keep going, as far as I can see.

A war could potentially spread to Central Europe as early as next year. In the meantime, some European politicians resemble Kipling’s Bandarl-logs monkeys, restless and short-sighted. But in this case, the looming python isn’t Putin; it is the prospect of a global shift leading to a worldwide conflict.

We must act swiftly, making decisions that are effective and pragmatic, keeping in mind that the continental security system could rapidly transform, especially with Trump’s unpredictable nature and ability to fabricate any justification. While I hope for a positive outcome, we must also consider a critical scenario. What if Trump calls Putin and urges him to stop the war, and Putin refuses, insisting on pursuing his goals?

What happens next? The consequences of such a conversation might never be fully understood, if it even occurs. It is also unclear what Trump could offer or threaten to compel Putin to stop the war. This uncertainty underscores the importance of preparing for every possibility.

Well, the critical scenario is an attack on NATO.

It is not going to be an attack on a non-NATO country, apart from, I could say, Georgia and Moldova, because Georgia has already been taken. Let's be quite clear: Georgia is now part of Russia.

That leaves Armenia next door to it, which Putin will try to take as soon and as quickly as he can, through whatever devious means he can. And then that leaves Moldova, and you can see from the last elections that the balance in Moldova is extremely close between being pro-Russian or pro-Western. It has not fully aligned with the West yet, so he is going to try to do something there. But none of those three would spark the West to take action.

It would need to be an attack on Norway, Sweden, Great Britain, Spain, or somewhere else significant to actually make people sit up and react.

Putin is not going to do that in a hurry because he knows that would change the game. He does not want the game changed. He wants to keep the game as it is at the moment, with slow, creeping change, buying politicians, small attacks here and there to keep everything unsettled. He does not want a major escalation. So I think we are just going to see more of the same. I do not think he will make a major attack because it is not in his interest. And therefore, we will see the weak, "monkey" politicians, as you call them, continuing to be "monkey" politicians.

Now, there is one hope on the horizon, and that is that we get rid of Scholz, who is clearly either working for Russia or loves Russia so much that he is not willing to stand against it. If we get rid of Scholz and get a stronger politician in Germany, that could change the balance, because we need it. Macron is proving to be someone who talks a lot but does little.

We need Germany and France in this effort, working together and working strongly, which means we need a strong Chancellor, not a weak one, as we have at the moment. I watched Scholz's parliamentary speech either yesterday or the day before, and he was talking about what he had not done as if those were accomplishments. It was like he was talking like a spoiled child who, not liking the game of football, takes his ball and goes home. That is what it sounded like. It was pathetic. So the quicker he goes, the better for everybody.

But the West has not woken up. My worry is that they will continue not to wake up until something dramatic happens, either from Putin, which I do not expect, or possibly from America, which is more likely if Trump pulls troops out from somewhere and says, “Get on with it; it’s your business.”

That might wake people up, but even then, I am not 100% sure it will, because the politicians are so weak.

Putin is leveraging the North Korean military as a means to avoid declaring a general mobilization, thereby keeping Moscow and St. Petersburg untouched. These cities are not only crucial to Russia’s functioning but also to its internal stability. Employing North Korean forces sends a provocative message to the Euro-Atlantic community. Currently, these troops are being deployed in the Kursk region. However, it is concerning that a regime like North Korea, with its limited human resources, sees this war as an opportunity—a potential social ladder for its dictatorship.

On the other side of the equation, traditional American generals, such as Milley, the U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, might not fully appreciate the implications of what General Zaluzhnyi, the former Commander-in-Chief of Ukraine’s Armed Forces and now Ukraine’s Ambassador to the United Kingdom, has begun to articulate. While Zaluzhnyi may not have explicitly drawn these parallels, history offers lessons. Submarines, for instance, revolutionized strategies and outcomes in both World Wars, even as major powers focused on building formidable surface fleets. Similarly, we are now witnessing the transformative role of UAVs and drone armies. These technologies can replace missile functions and severely strain air defense systems. 

This shift in warfare is unfolding before our very eyes, challenging traditional military doctrines and reshaping the battlefield.

I mean, Zaluzhnyi is absolutely right in his comment. We have now reached the stage where soldiers do not just look at the woods; they have to look up, because the sky is where a lot of the battle is taking place. From the Russian perspective, they are getting quite clever. They use drones, but they still have not managed to integrate the drones into the Army. So it is a centralized use of drones, with the soldiers working separately to a large degree. However, they are learning and learning very quickly.

The Ukrainian forces, when they are left to operate independently, are performing exceedingly well. When there is control from the generals, they are not doing as well, either in fighting or in logistics.

What we need to do is achieve much better integration in the use of drones—the right drones at the right time for the forces. And frankly, as shown by the troops in Kursk, when they are properly equipped and allowed to fight as needed, Ukrainian forces are much superior to Russian forces. When Ukrainian forces are pinned down and told to defend a particular village or building, then Russia has the advantage of numbers and, crucially, more drones.

The last thing we need to do in the future is fix our troops in place. We need to give them the maximum number of drones we can and let them fight. If we do that, I think we would actually start moving forwards, not just backwards. Pinning troops down is a losing strategy. At the moment, we can see this clearly: when we get pinned down, we get overrun, and we retreat. When we can be mobile with the right amount of drones, we can inflict serious damage.

However, the government still needs to sort out the procurement system. It provides drones but is not supplying enough of the right type for the units that need them. The volunteer movement is still providing a large amount, if not 70 or 80%, of the drones that are needed.

The government has not resolved the bureaucracy surrounding drone replacement. Mavic drones are considered expendable, yet people are still required to file reports on the loss of a Mavic drone. This means that some brigades do not want to receive government-paid drones because then they have to account for their use and face an inquiry if they lose them, which they inevitably will because they are expendable.

The drone war still has a long way to go, especially with the integration of artificial intelligence. With artificial intelligence and drones, we will likely need more, not fewer. This requires a better delivery system, a better production system, and a more efficient technology transfer system. As Russia adapts its drone strategy, we need to respond even faster across our drone capabilities to counter their moves. There is still a long way to go in some areas, but we are moving in the right direction.

Let us hope that the system improves, and that we can deploy the right drones for the right job.

I would like to ask about the command and control system for troops, particularly within the context of continental security. The general staffs of countries like the UK, France, Germany, Lithuania, Poland, and Ukraine need to collaborate to address worst-case scenarios and prepare for them, as such situations could arise within months. While we remain optimistic, the American isolationist doctrine poses a significant threat to Europe.

The Ukrainian army is facing considerable challenges, both internally and on the front lines. Despite this, it has demonstrated resilience, enduring a full-scale Russian invasion and achieving victories against Russian forces in certain areas of the frontline. 

Do you see any shifts in the operational management strategies of states potentially at risk – such as Germany, France, Poland, or Lithuania – that could contribute to the development of a "plan B"? Even if such preparations might be unpopular with the public, it is crucial to ready people for serious contingencies.

I would say we are still on Plan A Plus. I do not see that we have moved to a Plan B. I do not see or hear anything dramatic happening in any of the countries that makes me think these people understand what is actually happening, which is sad. They are all basically just trying to upgrade what they are doing at the moment, but that is not sufficient. Upgrading by just making things a little bit better is not enough; they need to be quite radical and change how they fight.

This is because, as Zaluzhnyi says, it is now a drone war. I have seen three videos from three European countries in the last two weeks showing soldiers training. People are talking about how it is good training, but all the soldiers are still looking downward. They are looking out just as they would have done 20 years ago. Since they are not using drones in training in the same way, they are not looking upward. Some countries even have health and safety restrictions on flying drones, so they cannot fly drones over soldiers. This is a significant problem, and it highlights the politicians' failure to understand that the game has changed. As you say, in Ukraine, the game has changed.

How many officers from these other countries are on the front line, trying to identify how the game has changed so they can go back and make changes in their own armies? My answer is, not very many.

When they do come, it is usually someone who is retired, visiting out of professional interest, rather than someone coming with the intent to return and change the system.

I think we need to go back to your previous question about what kind of shock it will take before people act. There may indeed be a shock, but by then, it may be a little too late.

So we could end up having an even worse time, not just for Ukraine but for Europe as well, unless people actually wake up to the fact that this is a serious game, and it is not going away.

Another pressing issue is human resources, specifically the number of individuals eligible for military service, the staffing of units, and related concerns. It remains unclear how much additional manpower Russia has mobilized or whether it might redeploy North Korean forces, for instance, from the Kursk region to the Kharkiv direction. Such a shift is certainly within the realm of possibility.

Considering the vastness of the front, it might be necessary to reevaluate the current command structure. This could involve introducing additional levels of command or perhaps returning to larger unit formations such as transitioning to a divisional system.

You have seen in the last few weeks all the statements coming from Sternenko, from Butusov, and from me, saying that the management system is key to winning this war. It needs to change, and it does need changing because so many parts of it are still ineffective. In my view, we badly need to bring more civilians into the management systems. The top level is still army-dominated and, I would say, somewhat arrogant, believing that it knows best and that nobody else can do things better, but that is not true. There are many civilians who can contribute. Just look at the production and improvements we have seen at Nova Poshta, or how Silpo manages to keep supermarkets operating right down into the gray zone day after day.

We have to ask, where is that level of logistics management in the defense forces? But there are many other issues. This constant breaking up of brigades and assigning battalions here and there breaks every military rule in the book. Units must be kept coherent. The brigade is the fundamental working unit, and it should be preserved as such. Brigades should only be broken up in the most critical of times, and even then, it should be reconsidered. But we are doing this constantly, and that means people do not get the logistics they need properly, they do not receive proper command, and trust is broken. Trust is broken between units because units work better when they know who they are working with and who is beside them. They need to know the faces and the names. People fight much, much better when they are confident in their commanders.

When you go to a new commander, you do not know how he thinks, how he works, or what he is going to say. He does not know you, does not know how to trust you, and does not understand your capabilities. You do not break up a brigade, yet we are doing this all the time. For me, one of the most effective management changes we can make now is to stop breaking up brigades and ensure that brigades remain coherent, with the best possible commander leading them.

And it does not matter what rank that person holds or where he has come from; he should simply be the best person for the job. We do not have that right now. We have people in command who are not the best, but rather friends of Syrsky. And we have people who have been sidelined into non-essential roles, who should be on the front line because they are warriors.

We need serious reflection on the management and coherence of the entire system.

Is it possible that the enemy is losing offensive momentum during the winter campaign? Or have they set a specific operational objective for the next three months to seize as much territory as possible regardless of the losses, factoring in both recoverable and irreversible casualties?

That is a good question. A lot of people have said that Russia was pushing hard because they believe peace is coming. They may believe that, but I do not think Russia believes peace is coming. You have to remember that for Russia, and really for everyone, a ceasefire is essentially a political action, not a military one. It is used politically to buy time to carry out military activities.

So we are not going to get peace. We all know that. In the West and in Ukraine, we understand that, but there are still many people who think you can force Russia into peace. It is not going to happen.

However, they may still be concerned that Trump will take some drastic action because they do not understand him. They do not know him. The last thing they want is for Trump to put American troops on the ground, for example, or British troops, or the whole of NATO.

They may worry that, based on how Russians think, Trump’s statements about possibly pulling out of NATO are an attempt to trick them. Russians might think that way, so Trump’s words may actually be having the opposite effect of what he intends.

In my view, Putin currently senses weakness in the West and in the Ukrainian government, and he is pushing as hard as he can while he has the opportunity. He does not feel that there is a strong defense against him. That is just my opinion.