Conclusions regarding bridgehead deployment of Ukrainian Armed Forces for a counteroffensive on left bank of Dnipro River are rushed. Serhiy Zgurets column
It is too early to talk about the deployment of a bridgehead on the left bank of the Dnipro River, Kherson region. The occupied territory will be recaptured in a rational way
Training of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in Great Britain
The Ukrainian military is being trained in Great Britain. Several thousand soldiers who, after training for combat operations in city, forest, and field conditions, will receive the necessary equipment, return to Ukraine, become the basis of future brigades and fight the enemy on all areas of the front line. So, I think, we will see the results of their training on the front line.
Svatove - Kreminna zone
Let's examine the front line from the Luhansk region to the southern Kherson region. This section of the front is about 500 km in total, and important events take place on each kilometer. Let's start, first of all, with the Svatove - Kreminna section, which is well known to everyone, because the most interesting events are brewing here. The enemy pulled up a significant number of mobilized troops along the Svatove-Kreminna line and built 50 km or more of "dragon’s teeth".
But now the situation here is demonstrative. We repelled the attack on Ploshchanka, the area where we are trying to break through the P66 highway and move on to Krasnorichensk. This means that there are important hostilities taking place there. First of all, I wanted to mention Chervonopopivka, because we marked it on our map as recaptured. The settlement is located on the P66 route itself. The General Staff is quite careful with publicizing this information, but we understand that the dynamics both in this area and around Kreminna are quite indicative. Taking into account that the ground has frozen, all prerequisites for the development of an offensive on both Chervonopivka and Kreminna are here, which is a decisive moment for establishing control of this line and the development of a further offensive on this part of the front line.
We are moving towards Bakhmut and around it, where the most difficult part of the front line is, considering the current events. If we look at the map now, Bakhmut is an area of 6 by 6 km. The front line around it is only 15 km of the 500 km I mentioned earlier. This 15 km is the hottest compared to other parts of our defense line. Both sides are leading a typical war of attrition here. The enemy is trying to break through to the outskirts of Bakhmut and, on the other hand, bypass it from the east and south directions.
From the military point of view, the attack on Bakhmut is not logical for Russia, because, after the defeat of the Russian group in the Izyum zone, there is no way to create a movement of two opposing military columns. But the advance to Bakhmut has a political meaning so that the enemy can demonstrate at least some victories of the political leadership. It is extremely difficult. If we pay attention to the messages of our General Staff this morning and evening, then such settlements are named, which were previously discussed as being connected to the enemy’s blockade. In particular, Kurdyumivka, Andriivka. We said just a couple of days ago that the enemy is trying to encircle Kurdyumivka, and now we see that the enemy has been knocked out of the settlement.
Actually, only Ozaryanivka remains under Russian control. Kurdyumivka and Klishchiivka, located south of Bakhmut, are under Ukrainian control. This is a pretty good indicator. In eastern Bakhmut there are attempts to enter the city, and its suburbs. There, the enemy is trying to hold a group of high-rise buildings, but I think that this is a temporary occurrence. Let me remind you that the battles for Bakhmut have been going on since June, and in 6 months the enemy has advanced to a limited section of the front line, which can be measured in hundreds of meters or kilometers. I think that in view of the expected reserves, the situation around Bakhmut will be completely stabilized and the enemy will not have any opportunity to capture this city, although they want to.
Avdiivka and Maryinka
Basically, no qualitative changes occur in the situation related to Avdiivka and Maryinka. The enemy is still trying to encircle Avdiivka through Krasnohorivka, to launch attacks from Opytne. We see red arrows on the map, but this does not affect the front line in any way. Similarly, the enemy is trying to attack Pervomaisk and Nevelske traditionally. There are no changes, which indicates our sufficiently effective and dense defense in this area.
Vuhledar and Pavlivka
Next, moving south, there are Vuhledar and Pavlivka. A marine brigade was destroyed in Pavlivka. Now the enemy is trying to pull forces there in order to continue advancing from Pavlivka to Vuhledar. This is primarily due to the fact that the enemy is trying to push our troops away from Donetsk, Vuhledar, in order to defend against the strikes of our artillery from Volonovakha. If we look at the infographic, Volnovakha is located in the upper right corner of the map. Actually, the route that goes from Luhansk, Donetsk and further to Mariupol and Melitopol goes through Volnovakha, is the only one that allows supplying the Russian group through rail connections. Now Volnovakha, Pavlivka, and Vuhledar are becoming a priority for the enemy since the strikes on the Crimean bridge significantly complicated the supply of equipment and weapons to the southern grouping of the Russian army, and we can expect Russian troops to attempt attacks in the direction of Pavlivka. But, at this point, we know of Ukrainian counterattacks on Pavlivka. I think there will be an illustrative result leading to the significant Russian losses in Pavlivka, which has become another point of grinding the enemy's manpower.
Counteroffensive on the left bank of the Dnipro River
Another nuance is related to the left bank, the South, the installation of the Ukrainian flag on the left bank of the Dnipro River, demonstrated by the Ukrainian Special Operations Forces. ISW reported that a bridgehead is indeed being established on the left bank of the Dnipro River. There is no need to make such hasty optimistic conclusions now because the left bank of the Dnipro is an extremely difficult location to secure a military bridgehead. Indeed, the SOF can operate and entrench themselves, pose a problem for the enemy, but the deployment of a full-fledged bridgehead on the left bank, opposite Kherson, where it is extremely difficult both to cover and to provide logistic support, is more of an expectation than a possibility. I think it is absolutely normal to talk about the SOF operations, but it is premature to rush to the conclusion of the deployment of a bridgehead. The offensive associated with the recapture of the left bank from the enemy will be carried out in a more rational way than the deployment of a bridgehead in the area indicated by ISW.
Ukrainian radio monitoring systems
When it comes to combat operations, we must remember that we need strategies and weapons that allow us to act effectively within the limits of the AFU functions. Talking about weapons, we usually mention foreign models. However, we should also mention the impressive developments of Ukrainian defense companies.
Defense Express expert Anton Mikhnenko said that the Infozakhyst defense industry company made a gift to the Return Alive charity in the form of 15 sets of a small tactical complex, and almost all of them went to the Armed Forces. The essence of radio monitoring systems is to provide a basic set for any tactical intelligence unit to monitor radio air. There is a receiver, a mast, antennas, cable assemblies necessary to deploy a radio intercept point and monitor airwaves, intercept digital and conventional signals. It is a basic kit for performing the basic tasks of tactical units on the front line. The military can understand what is to the left, to the right, which units of the enemy are operating in front, but it is about the base stations that are in those units that are in front. Regarding more modern means that have encrypted messages, then these are different cases. But we must understand that these systems were created on the basis of the conclusions made after 2014-2015, that is, how the enemy acted then, how to monitor airwaves. It's plain, simple enough, but effective and gets the job done. We should also dwell on modern and advanced technological solutions of the companies Kozak, Plastun, Khortytsia. These are more modern radio-electronic intelligence complexes that provide monitoring of the airwaves in the short-wave range, analysis of messages, that is, you can pick up a lot of interesting things from the radio airwaves and identify enemy plans, and then act accordingly. Thanks to the Khortytsia complex, it is possible to monitor airwaves in the short-wave range, i.e. ultra-shortwave. There is a certain distance, it can cooperate with other complexes of the same company. Basically, it allows for solving many different tasks. The most important thing is that our units will understand the actions and intentions of the enemy. This means having information, anticipating the actions of the enemy and making counterattacks. Besides UAVs, which can visually confirm, radio-electronic intelligence complexes that monitor the radio airwaves and make it clear what the enemy is doing and planning are very important.
Sixth generation aircraft
Technology means victory, but there are solutions and ideas that shape the future when it comes to the military part. Such solutions rarely occur. But a historic event took place in the US, where the new B-21 bomber developed by Northrop Grumman was presented. This is the first UAV of the 6th generation.
The former head of the Antonov aircraft manufacturer and the captain of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, Oleksandr Los, explained that the 6th generation aircraft is an element of a global network-centric system. It combines 2 indivisible functions - reconnaissance and combat. It is also an optionally manned or unmanned aircraft. For example, MS1 is an unmanned aircraft. B21 can handle integrating with allies and the UAV can integrate or work as part of a group. Mandatory for the 6th generation is the maximum possible reduced radio thermal noise visibility. For example, the B21, the prototype of American and Chinese fighters of the 6th generation, does not have a tail, that is, it is just flying wings. Machine intelligence systems are also mandatory for reconnaissance, aiming, and aircraft control in automatic and autonomous modes. What is directly related to systems technology is the open architecture of avionics. That means it is possible to change electronic equipment, software without affecting the basic architecture of the computer. The B-21 will not undergo block upgrades but will be seamlessly incorporated through agile software upgrades and built-in hardware flexibility, imperceptibly to the user.
The only thing missing for the MS1 complex is a developed system of satellite radio technical means of information exchange, which would allow MS1 to be attributed to the 6th generation from the point of view of integration into a network-centric system of global information exchange and control. The B2, MS1, and B21 have an ergonomic scheme, almost undetectable, a combination of reconnaissance and armament. The open architecture of avionics should be inherent in any reconnaissance and combat system today. MS1 is an aviation UAV. The following fighters will be built without tails.
A very important aspect: the US was in a hurry to present the B21 because China is hot on its heels with the same generation H-20 bomber. China is creating a nuclear triad at a frightening pace and is gaining momentum in the production of nuclear warheads. At the current rate, in a few years they will have 1,500 warheads, and, understanding China, it can be assumed that in 10 years they will reach a nuclear conflict with the USA. This bomber is the basis of the US Air Force. Maintaining dominance in the air is on the line.