Russian army gets used to retreat, learns to dig trenches more often: Serhii Zgurets' column

The active front line, where hostilities are taking place, is more than 800 km. With such a length of the front, Russia does not have enough forces to create an echelon defense in key areas. And with such a wide front, the enemy loses strategic, operational, and in most directions, tactical initiative. The Russian army is already getting used to retreat and is learning, as we can see, to dig trenches more and more often.

The situation at the fronts

The Ukrainian military has been advancing for a long time. Let me remind you that on August 29, there was an offensive in the Kherson direction, and from September 6 - in the Kharkiv direction. And what does it mean? On the one hand, it seems that our units, which have been on the offensive for a long time, need rest and recovery. And on the other hand, such pauses are extremely necessary for the enemy, because Russia wants to somehow gather forces, "fill up" with mobilized soldiers, and at least somehow maintain the existing defense lines. And so it turns out that our Armed Forces should not give the Russian enemy any chance for such a pause and must press further and further. And in fact, in these conditions, our General Staff needs to find the right balance between political and public expectations and clearly take into account its own capabilities, because the potential of the Ukrainian army at the current stage is known only by the General Staff.

Svatove and Kreminna

After the Ukrainian Armed Forces' successful counteroffensive in the Kharkiv region and the Liman area, Ukrainian units are now on the approach to Svatove and directly to the Svatove-Kreminna road, around which the enemy is now trying to build a line of defense.  The front has shrunk, and the invading Russian forces are gathering reserves, including the transfer of mobilized troops without preparation here. They dig trenches and try to conduct some kind of fighting.

Today, as yesterday, according to the General Staff's report, Ukrainian troops struck Russian positions along the Svatove-Kreminna line, as well as military equipment in the Kupiansk direction. It can be expected that our forces will advance to Svatove, with a worked-out concept of covering this city from several sides: either to Kreminna, or with the blocking of the Svatove-Kreminna route. Life will show what scenario will actually be implemented in the near future.

Bakhmut and the Donetsk direction

Russian troops have really increased the number of attacks in the Donetsk region and primarily on the outskirts of Donetsk, but they are concentrating their main efforts on Bakhmut, trying to surround the city. The Ukrainian military repelled attacks on Ivanhorod, Opytne, as well as Vesela Dolyna.

Yesterday, at the Pentagon briefing, this section of the front was mentioned and there were the following explanations: "The Russian forces continue to attack the Ukrainians around Bakhmut, but these successes are very small for them. We see how the Ukrainians are effectively counterattacking to return the land that the Russians previously captured. All these actions on both sides are associated with both the use of artillery and casualties on both sides."

Bakhmut is an important communication node. The Russian forces want to declare that its capture will be certain revenge for Balaklia and Lyman, but it is unlikely that they will succeed. The Russian troops in this direction are dominated by political expediency rather than military, because the mercenaries of the Wagner PMC are operating there. Prigozhin wants to show that he is more effective in this area than in any areas of the front where regular units or troops of Shoigu's Russian Armed Forces operate. 

Kherson region, right bank of the Dnipro

Here, we conduct combat operations aimed both at exhausting the enemy with long-range strikes to cut off supplies, and at using the potential of ground units. The dynamics of change are quite significant, we have reached the front line, which runs between Davydiv Brid and Dudchany in the northeast of Kherson. The Russian forces retreated 20 km to the north in the Kherson region, and are trying to gain a foothold to the west of the village of Milove. Most of the Russian troops on this front line are exhausted units of airborne troops and marines. There is a direct instruction from Putin not to retreat from the right bank of the Dnipro in the Kherson region, and therefore the enemy will cling to the defense, even without having any prospects and opportunities for this.

Yesterday there was information that Ukrainian units launched a counteroffensive in the northern part of the Kherson region, it was confirmed in the Pentagon, but so far our general staff is silent. We see that there is no pause at the front. The more powerful weapons there are, the faster the results related to the liberation of our land will be.

In addition to the Shahed drones, Russia is seeking to purchase long-range missiles of another type from Iran

I asked Leonid Polyakov, adviser to the director of the National Institute for Strategic Studies, and former Deputy Defense Minister of Ukraine, about how serious the risks of scaling up the missile threat from Russia are, even if they run out of their own missile reserves.

Leonid Polyakov believes that this should be taken seriously since Iran had long-range ballistic missiles back in the 90s, and we are talking about more than 2,000 km of different ranges and systems. If they are delivered to Russia, our intelligence certainly already knows what condition these missiles might be in, and we must prepare for this. Unfortunately, such anti-missile systems as NASAMS and IRIS-T may not be enough. Our partners have higher interceptor systems. Mr. Leonid hopes that they will be able to, if not supply, then sell to us.  Because, for example, a system like THAAD, or its naval equivalent Aegis, is more powerful than NASAMS and IRIS-T. Leonid Polyakov hopes that talks about the transfer of more powerful systems to Ukraine have been ongoing for a long time.

Prospects and risks of creating a group together with Russia and "filling" Belarus with Russian troops

Mr. Leonid believes that these events are part of the general range of decisions that the Russian Federation is forced to make at this stage because it does not have enough forces on the battlefield to stop the Ukrainian troops, so blackmail using nuclear weapons and threats against the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant is in progress. In order to maximally divert our forces from the main front line, including, but not only, but the Belarusian scenario is also used. This is even evidenced by the even more hysterical statements of the current leader of Belarus, Lukashenko. Recently, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Belarus, which recalled the ambassador a week ago with statements that we were planning some attacks, was obviously based on the scenario of Monday's terrorist attacks on Ukraine, in order to somehow justify itself. Mr. Leonid does not rule out that this joint group will try, if not to seriously advance in the direction of Kyiv, then at least create some kind of conflict situation on the border in order to pull our troops away from the south as much as possible.

Is it necessary to take into account the quantitative indicators of the group in Belarus, or is it enough to do damage in a small amount, including the use of long-range weapons or Russian Iskanders?

Mr. Leonid answered that despite the informational component of reports about the number of the group, such a discrepancy in the declared number may depend, among other things, on the state of the so-called partial mobilization. The expert thinks that there are many nuances. After all, for example, this incident involving the shooting of mobilized soldiers in the Belgorod region is actually not the first fatal incident. Last week there was a report of the suicide of one of the heads of the military commissariat in the east of the Russian Federation, before that there was a fatal attack on the head of the military commissariat. According to Mr. Leonid, there are other cases that we may not know about. It is possible that at the meeting of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, scheduled for next week, measures to respond to these negative processes during mobilization will be discussed, among other issues.

Russian military - to Belarus, and Belarusian weapons - to Russia. Why are such opposite actions taken?

The first priority of the Kremlin, which governs the occupied Republic of Belarus, is the lack of modern weapons and ammunition on the frontline. According to this priority, they extract everything they can and force Belarus to provide repair and other services. The second priority is the withdrawal of part of our troops, for this, obviously, this joint group is being created, in addition to this they are agitating for joining the so-called Wagner PMC, the Belarusians there are also fighting against Ukraine as mercenaries. And the third priority is the informational one. We hear the statements of Lukashenko himself and the statements of the Kremlin that they will complete the Belarusian attack aircraft to the level of the ability to use nuclear weapons, etc.

What is the concept of pre-emptive strikes against Belarusian forces if it is understood that these units are ready to carry out offensive actions? 

Leonid Polyakov said that in this matter it is absolutely necessary to give priority to the Ukrainian military-political leadership and the leadership of Ukraine's Armed Forces and the General Staff, as this is such a sensitive and delicate balance. If we really have 100% confidence that, for example, Russia wants to launch a strike with tactical nuclear munitions from the territory of Belarus, then a preemptive strike should not be ruled out. In some other cases, it is obviously necessary to balance all the pros and cons.