North Korea sends regular troops to Russia: threats for Ukraine, battlefield implications

Ukrainian military observer Oleksandr Kovalenko has analyzed the situation in his article for the Ukrainian Obozrevatel media outlet.

The third party

Back in 2022, Russia has made attempts to involve foreign forces in the fighting in Ukraine, when the Russian command began to realize that the war would not be a quick one, but rather the opposite. The high level of casualties even then created a relative problem in terms of the proportion of forces and means needed for defense and offensive.

Today, more than 550,000 Russian troops are involved in Ukraine, which is three times more than in 2022, at the beginning of the full-scale invasion. However, during this period, the advance of the Russian military in the offensive slowed down 80 times, and losses increased almost 10 times.

“This change is due to many factors, the main one being the critical disproportion between the number of forces and their standard equipment - that is, the ratio of units and equipment. The command of the Russian occupation forces will not be able to influence this situation, as it depends entirely on the ability of the Russian military-industrial complex to provide the army with all the necessary means. Therefore, they are trying to cover the shortage of equipment by increasing human resources. But problems have occurred here as well,” the report states.

There is again an imbalance in the proportion of hypertrophied human resources in the Russian army and the capabilities and effectiveness of the offensive, which does not allow the Russian command to intensify hostilities equally along the entire front. And the Kremlin decided to continue to increase the human component not only through mobilization, but also by increasing the number of troops and other processes. But even all this will not produce the effect that the military and political leadership of the aggressor country seeks. The only way out of the situation for them is to involve a third party that would quickly replenish the Russian troops with fresh forces.

The DPRK Army in Russia

As information about the North Korean military already on the territory of Russia emerged last week, one could immediately conclude that these were representatives of infantry units. Let me remind you that earlier I pointed out the deployment of four North Korean infantry corps near the border with Russia - the 8th, 9th, 10th, and 11th - and it would be logical to see representatives of these formations in Russia first.

At the same time, no movement of military equipment assigned to the respective units was recorded. That is, at least for now, only infantry in the format of a marching battalion is being sent to Russia.

“So far, this does not allow us to answer whether North Korean units will soon be equipped with equipment from the DPRK or will receive equipment from Russia. Although, in my opinion, they will remain exclusively an infantry component - marching battalions with minimal equipment. The reason for this is at least that Russia cannot fully equip its army with equipment, and here is an almost modern Russian army corps!” the author notes.

Let me remind you that in 2022, Russia tried to form the 3rd Army Corps, spent four months on it, and brought it into the combat zone undermanned - instead of 15 thousand personnel, a little more than 11 thousand. The occupying command will not wait four months now, so the introduction of North Korean infantry into the combat zone will take place in the near future. But in what direction and with what function?

The role of North Koreans in the war against Ukraine

Perhaps, the first wave of North Korean military personnel is now being verified, which will be followed by additional ones. Therefore, these 12,000 bodies may be just the beginning. But let's look at their possible role and impact on the battlefield.

“I think the attention should not be paid to the language barrier and the problems of communication and interaction that will arise in the units on the battlefield. Everyone is well aware of this. Even in the Russian army, there are problems with this - especially in the Kursk region, where Russian armored personnel carriers are driving at Ukrainian tanks and being destroyed by direct fire,” the author believes.

In the face of intense offensive and assault operations, constant, uninterrupted communication plays a crucial role. I have serious doubts that North Korean units will be exemplary in this regard.

So, 12 thousand. Let's just say that this is an under-formed army corps (AC) by Russian standards. This raises the question: where will it be used and how? Will this formation be deployed in one section of the front, in its area of responsibility, or will they be dispersed to different areas?

If this North Korean AC is responsible for a certain area, then in the absence of regular equipment, it will not provide any efficiency at a particular location, and even more so, it can quickly fall apart. But other options are possible.

This army corps can be used to cover the border between Russia and Ukraine in the Bryansk, Kursk, and Belgorod regions of the Russian Federation. In fact, it is now larger than the Bryansk group of troops. Or, these “internationalists” can be used to strengthen the Kursk or Belgorod group, which can temporarily solve Russia's problem of lack of human resources in these areas.

The second option is to replace the Russian units in the deep rear of the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine that perform the functions of holding the territory, supervising and repressing. Meanwhile, the released Russian units from the deep rear will be redeployed to the front line to strengthen their offensive potential.

The third and most frequent version that comes to mind is, of course, the direct participation of North Koreans in combat operations along the front line as assault units. The appearance of such a large number of personnel in a particular area could be a serious boost to Russia's offensive capabilities.

For example, if the North Koreans are concentrated in the Kurakhove direction, they will do their job as a penetrating manpower, methodically throwing bodies at Ukrainian positions. If the North Korean AC is divided into battalions or, say, infantry regiments, the effectiveness of such use will be reduced, and they will quickly dissolve into the mass of the Russian forces.

The author believes that depending on these options for the use of North Korean nuclear weapons, the situation will have different consequences for Ukraine, but the negative effect of a one-time increase in the number of Russian troops in one or more areas of the front will remain unchanged. During the last six months, Russia distributed its mobilization resources depending on losses, and the combat zone was mostly compensated. In this case, a fresh inflow of 12,000 troops will receive an even distribution of resources to compensate for losses.

“In a sense, the possible simultaneous increase in Russian occupation troops by 12,000 is exactly what I have been saying for quite some time: in 2025, Russia will fight mainly with human resources in hypertrophied numbers, and Ukraine should prepare for this and adapt. The emergence of the North Korean army corps is about the same stressful situation for the Ukrainian army that Ukraine's borders and defense lines would experience in 2025 as the human component becomes overwhelmingly overstretched. And this will be the first test of strength,” the report says.

It is possible that the Russian army will be supported by North Korean units during the transition period to increase its army by 180,000 and accumulate its own resources. This suggests that the current transfer of 12,000 may not be the last.

There are different ways to assess the training, experience, motivation, level of communication, and adaptation of the North Korean military. No matter which of the above options is considered, they all have only a negative factor for Ukraine. An additional 12 thousand in the projection of monthly losses and their compensation in the Russian army is not a drop in the bucket, the report concludes.

If such transfers from the DPRK become monthly, regular (at least for 3-4 months), then there are high risks for those areas where North Korean units will be concentrated.