Kursk-Pokrovsk information battle

In this information battle, we are still losing to Russia - as always, because it has a well-thought-out plan of information campaign, means of promoting the information it needs, and centralized management of "information troops," while we hope that "the truth will show itself." But no, it's time for everyone who is sane to realize that we are dealing with another and very unusual information battle, and it's time to get involved in the process, recognizing this.

So, the initial disposition of the parties before the Kursk offensive:

• The Russians are facing a severe resource crisis. First, they are running low on certain types of "iron," with some supplies expected to last only a year, while others may run out in six months. Second, although they still have enough "meat," replenishing it is becoming increasingly difficult and costly.
• Ukrainian deep strikes have not yet drained the Russian blood economy, but they have already become a significant factor in shaping both the export supply and the domestic market for petroleum products; elementary extrapolation shows that in a year the world's second army will simply have nothing to refuel the "iron" that remains operational.
• At the same time, the resource and reserve crisis that our enemies are clearly facing—and that their commanders are fully aware of—is still looming. Meanwhile, our mobilization is only gradually beginning, leaving us at a stalemate on the front lines. The enemy is advancing in Donbas at great cost and has already set its sights on Pokrovsk.
• The Ukrainian rear-guard society is in a deep depression, the Russian narrative about "the invincibility of the Russian Federation in a war of attrition" has successfully settled in the minds of the populace (contrary to facts, figures and expert estimates), and all sorts of sociological offices are already manipulating "polls" around "compromises" and "acceptable conditions" for our surrender.
• In the West, the situation is even worse: the narrative of Russia's "invincibility" is accepted almost without alternative, and their media have already completely "buried" us and are openly bending us to a fatal freeze.

In these circumstances, the Kremlin is adopting a very wise strategy: to accelerate the offensive in the Donbas as much as possible (at any cost, sparing the last of the reserves - because time is short, if you move slowly, the offensive will still be choked due to lack of resources, and then the collapse of the army with all the consequences will begin), to squeeze the most out of this offensive (which in reality is no different from similar offensives in the same Donetsk region in the summer of 2022, winter and spring of 2023, winter and spring of 2024), presenting it as "decisive," and have time to push us into a deadly freeze for us and a life-saving freeze for the Russians. To do so before the lack of resources and reserves of the Russian army becomes apparent, and then they will no longer be talking about the freeze and our surrender.

The Kremlin's calculation is not stupid and could well work. For our enemies, this is the only saving grace scenario; under all other scenarios, the picture for them will be bleak in six months, and most likely catastrophic in a year. Therefore, dealing with us in the next couple of months is the only chance to avoid losing the war. Accordingly, all resources, including military, information, and political, are being thrown at the realization of this chance.

And then suddenly Ukrainian soldiers entered the Kursk region. Putin's entire plan is bursting at the seams and practically nullified - unless we make a fatal mistake now.

The first weeks of the operation have already yielded obvious and extremely remarkable results:

• In the West, the mood and tone of the media has completely changed, the thesis about the alleged "obvious invincibility" of Russia has been completely debunked, on the contrary, everyone is amazed at how clay feet the hyped colossus has turned out to have and how vulnerable and inept Russia really is; the conversation has shifted sharply to how Russia can and should be defeated, what resources and capabilities are needed for this, and how we can provide them.
• Those who wanted to make us freeze have suddenly frozen themselves and are still sitting quietly (although, of course, we will hear their insidious voices more than once).
• The thesis about red lines, after which Putin would allegedly press the Dreaded Red Button and the world would plunge into nuclear apocalypse, has been completely disavowed; it turned out that just as "disruption happens not in lavatories but in people's heads" (c), "red lines" are not mapped out but exist only in the imagination of leaders like Biden. We have occupied territory belonging to a nuclear power without catastrophic consequences, and the red button remains a tool for television war used by figures like Kiselyov and Solovyov.
• In Russia itself, intriguing processes are unfolding. For one, the capture and death of children - conscripts - are perceived very differently from the deaths and captures of adult "volunteers in the special military operation." Additionally, there is a growing recognition that the regime is exposed as incapable of defending not only the newly annexed territories but even its "indigenous and original" lands. The realization is dawning that the leadership is neither able nor interested in defending its own failing state.
• As a bonus, for the first time in the war, we are close to parity in the number of prisoners.
• And finally, as Ukraine's operation unfolds, Russia is increasingly facing a lack of reserves, and after a desperate attempt to stop us with conscripts and mercenaries urgently recalled from Africa, it is forced to to gradually withdraw units from the front one by one - first from the "calm" Zaporizhzhia sector, then from Kharkiv region (which our defenders are already taking advantage of - see the news from the 3rd Brigade), and the other day the first units finally started to move from Donbas.

In general, we have achieved the greatest military success since the fall of 2022 and continue to consolidate and develop this success.

Of all the above, the most important for us is the change in the international situation, because the help of our wonderful allies directly depends on such an uncertain factor as their faith in our ability to win and the internal processes we have launched in the country.

But the former will be significantly weakened, and the latter will not have time to produce a significant effect at all if our operation ends in the coming weeks and looks like a brilliant raid or assault: We found the enemy's weakness, caught them by surprise, and then returned home, because when the Russians started fighting for real, who would have been able to withstand it... - and again the same song about "the invincibility of Mordor in a long war" will be played from all the irons with all that it implies.

It's a completely different story if we get a foothold there for a few months, settle down, advance as much as we can (Lgov looks very attractive, and Bryansk is not far from Kursk), and then organize a defense and repel the enemy's attempts to take us back beyond the edge.

In such a scenario, each shipment of zinc from the "native Russian land" will enhance the "naked king" effect. We need to understand the psychology of Russians: they forgive their tsars and secretaries general for any atrocities and crimes as long as they demonstrate strength; they never forgive weakness. And every day of our Kursk operation demonstrates the Kremlin's weakness much better than any of our successes on the front inside Ukraine.

I am not the only one who understands these obvious things - Pu and his team know them much better than I do.

And so, after the first shock, the Kremlin has thought out a strategy to get out of the situation. A strategy that is very risky, but not without a chance of success. And the key element of this strategy is you and me - the Ukrainian society in the rear.

The Kremlin has accepted the fact that they do not have the reserves and resources to quickly throw us out of the Kursk region by purely military means - except at the cost of stopping the offensive in Donbas and redeploying the most combat-ready units from there. However, the "victory" in Kursk, achieved at such a cost, is not a victory for the Kremlin, because we should remember that our enemies have no time to play for the long haul, and after the "liberation" of Kursk at the cost of Donbas, the collapse of the occupying army along the entire front is inevitable.

And so, amid a military situation that is disastrous for the Russians, a well-thought-out and coordinated information operation is unfolding.

The operation was aimed at downplaying the scale and significance of the events in the Kursk region and at exaggerating the role and significance of the offensive on Pokrovsk.

While our troops are reshaping the contact line and erasing the mythical "red lines," we are being fed a distorted narrative. In this narrative, "some Sudzha" is portrayed as insignificant, while the potential loss of Pokrovsk (which would require significant effort and numerous casualties from the enemy) is depicted as a strategic victory that could almost end the war and leave us with no choice but to surrender.

Everything about this picture is misleading. As for the true significance of our Kursk offensive, it's not necessary to reiterate what's been said before. Instead, it’s important to clarify the situation regarding Pokrovsk. According to Russian propaganda, Pokrovsk is endowed with almost sacred significance.

• Yes, the Russians are advancing faster in the Pokrovsk direction than before, which is absolutely logical, given that they have chosen a strategy of "last and decisive battle": to push us back immediately, at any cost, because it will be too late.
• Yes, it is very problematic to keep the defense in this area in an open field under guided bombs and with the enemy's numerical superiority, and we have to retreat - sometimes thoughtfully and organized, sometimes haphazardly due to the loss of positions.
• Yes, the Russians will most likely come to the outskirts of Pokrovsk in the coming weeks, it is almost inevitable. So, unfortunately, we are losing Pokrovsk as a living rear city, and the population has to be evacuated.

Does this mean that Pokrovsk will soon fall into the hands of the invaders? Absolutely not.

Let's recall Chasiv Yar (much smaller than Pokrovsk), the outskirts of which the Russian army reached 4 months ago. During this time, they managed to crawl through about two-thirds of the city at the cost of heavy losses, and our defenders still hold a third. The enemies came to Toretsk more than a month ago, almost in a parade march (there was an unfortunate breakthrough of the front line in one area), and have been fighting on the eastern outskirts of the city for a month now, without even moving deeper into the streets.

Let's think of Soledar, Bakhmut, and Avdiivka. We have always been and remain stronger in defense in urban areas, where every house and basement is a "natural" fortification. Fighting for each block is not like an offensive in the field and results in incomparably higher losses for the enemy.

The Russians took 10 months to take Bakhmut and paid such a price that after this Pyrrhic victory, the Wagner mercenaries rebelled. Much smaller Avdiivka was taken for 4 months, and with such losses that the military commander present there shot himself in despair. Now the Russians are facing Pokrovsk, with the prospect of similarly long and exhausting street battles. Only the Russian resources are not the same as they were then…

Ultimately, even if we assume the worst—that Pokrovsk will face a fate similar to Lysychansk, Bakhmut, and Avdiivka—it would be difficult and disheartening but not fatal.

It's strange to have to remind you, but this is not a war for the city of Pokrovsk. Similarly, in the spring of 2022, we were not fighting a war for the city of Kyiv. There are battles for different settlements, from Sudzha to Mariupol, but there is only one war, and the stake in it is the existence of our entire country. And if, in order to win the war, at some point it would be worthwhile to let the enemy come to Kyiv and fight them on the streets of the capital, it could also happen, and this in itself would not be fatal. Only a lost war would be fatal, either for us or for the Kremlin.

I really don't like sports comparisons in describing the war - it's unethical, because we are talking about the deaths of our people, not points, scores and rounds.

But it is still worth remembering that war is a terrible and bloody resemblance to a chess game, where you have to sacrifice pieces and it only matters who ends up checkmating. We are living in such a terrible chess game, where you have to sacrifice not wooden pieces, but living people, units, and cities. This is terrible, but it is worth remembering that the price of a lost game is the existence of all our cities and all of us.

Could our units, which are currently marching victoriously through Kursk, have stopped the attack on Pokrovsk? Unfortunately, no. Could they have slowed it down a bit? Yes. But what would it have done for us in the end?

If the creeping Russian offensive in Donbas were to continue to be the only daily event in this war, we would have only one prospect: a freeze on Russian terms, i.e. surrender, a little earlier or a little later. And the fact that Pokrovsk would have lasted a month longer would hardly have canceled it.

Instead, Kursk—following the failed offensive of 2023—has opened up a real prospect for Ukraine’s victory. This victory may not come tomorrow, but it is within reach in the not-too-distant future.

And if the price of this is that the fighting in the Pokrovsk urban area will start a couple of weeks or even a month earlier than it would have been if we had moved all our troops to this area, it is a high price, but an acceptable one. And it is incomparably less than the enemy is paying for this advance.

I was a soldier in a trench, repelling a superior enemy, and I know very well what a tired soldier feels when he is denied reinforcements. Of course, it seems to him that the reserves that he needs so much in the trench next to him and that are "walking" somewhere else are at least the ineptitude of the command, if not treason.

But that is exactly why no war is commanded by heroes in the trenches or even by combatants or brigades. That's why wars are fought by generals, unheroic people who don't risk themselves every minute and give their orders from deep in the rear.

They also have complete information on the entire front. And not only on the front, but also on the enemy army, the enemy country in general, and the allied countries.

And having all this information, they put it together to form a holistic picture that neither a soldier in a trench nor a Facebook sofa rear does not have.

And having a holistic picture, they make terrible and necessary decisions, including where to send reserves and where they are currently lacking, how to distribute scarce ammunition, and so on.

I'm glad I'm not in their shoes, because it's a terrible responsibility and a very unhappy job. But it is this work that leads to victory in the war - if it is done correctly. Or to defeat, if the rear interferes with this work and begins to demand unwise, instead of "obvious" solutions.

But let's return from the real front to the information front.

So, Putin's entire strategy is based on one thing: the intention to win our minds much more effectively than his army wins our lands.

We have to fall for the "unimportance" of Kursk and the "strategic importance" of Pokrovsk. We have to despair again and recognize the "invincibility" of the Russians on the battlefield - after all, they are "all the way" to Pokrovsk, and we are "only" fighting in the Russian rear.

We also have to force our command to withdraw the Ukrainian Armed Forces from Kursk. Yes, we are the ones who have to do it, because the Russian army has failed to do it.

Through various agents, you and I and our allies are being fed two supposedly opposing messages:

• The Kursk operation failed because its purpose was supposedly to distract the enemy from Pokrovsk, but this did not happen;
• The Kursk operation was a brilliant success, but it has already yielded the maximum possible results, so it should be wound down and "triumphantly" returned home before the Russians bring in significant forces and things get worse.

These messages are designed for different audiences - the first one is for the dumber and more pessimistic, the second one is for the smarter and more optimistic. However, the result is the same-whether we win or lose, we are supposed to get out of Russia.

Even if there was no other information (and there is a lot of it!), this alone should show all thinking people that our stay in the Kursk region is the Kremlin's biggest problem.

The Kremlin is worried, and they are well aware that every day we stay in "native" Russia is a ticking clock that counts down to the end of Putin's regime.

Propaganda efforts can offset this problem on the scale of weeks, but not on the scale of months. Therefore, it is extremely important for us to stay in Russia as long as possible, while it is the opposite for the Kremlin.

Anyone urging us to withdraw from the Kursk region now—whether claiming we’ve done enough, that it’s futile, or suggesting it’s to save Pokrovsk—is effectively working for the Kremlin. They are participating in an information operation aimed at rekindling Russia’s dwindling hope of defeating us.

Whether this person realizes this or is a useful idiot is irrelevant, because the result is the same. So our reaction should be tough, and not tied to thinking about the motivation of the agitator.

The slogan "Zelenskyy, withdraw your troops!" should be equated with "Putin, bring in the troops!"—both are part of the same narrative pushed by our enemies. Anyone promoting this message is effectively working for the Kremlin.

As this story unfolds, it will be intriguing to see who reveals what and how. Already, some interesting details have emerged—about certain Western media, individuals who are supposedly "good and not that Russian anymore," and FSB agents posing as "Ukrainian experts." The Kursk information operation serves as a crucial moment of truth, a litmus test that reveals the true identities and affiliations of those involved.

But the main thing is not the register of agents (although it is also important), first of all, we must not lose this battle.

• We have to stop the narratives about Russia's "invincibility" in the war of attrition that have been imposed on us in our information space (and, unfortunately, very successfully imposed on the backdrop of fatigue and despondency).
• We have to take the red pill and see the enemy as it is now - huge, ruthless, still strong and very dangerous, but extremely exhausted and bleeding.

Victory may not come tomorrow or in "two or three weeks," but its light has already appeared at the end of a long tunnel.

It came from under Sudzha, albeit from the candlelight of burning oil depots, and even from the trenches near Pokrovsk that our units had lost, but had previously been covered with enemy bodies.

This light is getting stronger and closer, but fatigue and despondency prevent us from seeing it. If we see it now and begin to behave accordingly, we will live to see the time when even a blind man will not be able to see it.

If we don't, we will fall for the false picture painted by the FSB illusionists - the lights may go out because we will "deflate" before the enemy.

This "deflating before the enemy" is the only chance for victory for the Russians, the last chance, after which our victory will be only a matter of time.

So, once again, in this war, the fate of victory is largely in our hands, the Ukrainian rear-guard.

I hope we will behave properly and not allow our civilian hands to give the enemy the victory for which our defenders laid down their lives.

And yes, "go Kursk!". Glory to Ukraine!

* Published with the author's style preserved

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About the author. Yevhen Dykyi, scientist, military officer.

The editors don't always share the opinions expressed by the authors of the blogs.