Putin's nuclear blackmail is unlikely to work

The weapons will be Russian, and some of the Belarusian military will allegedly be trained to use them. What does this mean?

1. We read "starting from the end.” The facility is Russian. Lukashenko will not get nuclear weapons at his disposal, but he will be able to talk about strengthening the country's security. In reality, we have a permanent military base on the territory of Belarus. Because it is naive to believe that Russia will authorize someone else to protect its nuclear weapons.

The base is to emerge without signing the relevant documents, bilateral agreements, and understanding for how long and under what conditions it is to operate. And unlike Russia’s Navy's communications center, the locator near Hantsavichy, or the mobilized at the training grounds, it cannot be asked to "get out" quickly. It needs "consultation with Russia" regardless of the outcome of the war in Ukraine.

In other words, Russia is trying to tie Belarus even more tightly to itself, making it extremely difficult for Belarus to drift away from Russia's influence both to the west and to the east (China). Putin, realizing the weakness of Lukashenko's position, is making a bid for Russia's permanent presence as a force of influence, aiming to end the war in Ukraine and influence internal Belarusian processes.

“Russia is trying to tie Belarus even more tightly to itself, making it extremely difficult for Belarus to drift away from Russia's influence both to the west and to the east (China). Putin, realizing the weakness of Lukashenko's position, is making a bid for Russia's permanent presence as a force of influence, aiming to end the war in Ukraine and influence internal Belarusian processes”

2. This is a blow to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, to which both Russia and Belarus are signatories. Paragraph 1 of the Treaty states that no state that possesses nuclear weapons will directly or indirectly transfer them to a state that does not. Paragraph 2 states that a state that does not possess nuclear weapons will not directly or indirectly take them. That is why the Russian Federation is talking about deployment rather than transfer. And that is why the deployment of a Russian military base in Belarus will mean that it will be on a permanent basis. It is quite possible that the territory for it will be transferred for long-term use.

Such a move is an attempt to raise the stakes in the confrontation with the EU and the US on issues, including the war in Ukraine. And, by and large, it is an "invitation to consult.” Russia is still counting on freezing the war "somewhere in the middle" as a favorable way out of the predicament. That's why Putin names July 1 as the date of "completion of construction" of the storage facility. And he announces further transportation of nuclear weapons. There is no confidence in the likelihood of success in the war, and no confidence in holding the frontline.

The only option is to agree on a "great geopolitical exchange." Moreover, this option will allow Putin's entourage to create a way to win the war against Ukraine that is acceptable to the public.

In this context, China's possible position is interesting. On the one hand, Beijing does not benefit from the nuclear escalation it has been talking about. But it would be beneficial for China to end the war in Ukraine without either side being defeated and with a weakened Russia (i.e., within a year). And it is beneficial when the Kremlin is trying to undermine the foundations of global security. In this case, consultations between the US and China on the new world order become even more relevant: two "adequate" centers of power must agree on how to contain the not-so-adequate aspirations of other countries. Thus, China's threats can be perceived relatively calmly. The actual deployment is more complicated: it is a blow to China's interests and security position, as well as (to a much lesser extent) an attempt by the Kremlin to limit Chinese expansion into the former Soviet Union (Belarus).

“Against the backdrop of the conflict with the West, Lukashenko himself will use statements about the deployment of nuclear weapons in Belarus as evidence of his growing political stability and subjectivity”

Against the backdrop of the conflict with the West, Lukashenko himself will use statements about the deployment of nuclear weapons in Belarus as evidence of his growing political stability and subjectivity. In fact, he does not realize that conversations with him about the future of Belarus (and him in Belarus) will become extremely illogical. The EU and China (in the event of a real deployment) will talk to Moscow, not Minsk. But Russia will be able to do what it wants. Up to and including an operation codenamed "We’ve had enough of this Alexander - let's get a new one."

Will Lukashenko get paid for the base? Most likely not. He will be sold the illusion of his own power. Therefore, even in terms of finances (and payments for similar facilities in the world are very high), he will be left not with money, but with the illusion of his influence.

What's next?

The key factor behind Putin's statements is still an attempt to enter into consultations on ending the war in Ukraine. Let’s recall that Putin has already tried to use nuclear blackmail twice in 2022. He failed. Now, especially after the arrest warrant (as a signal to the West that Putin is no longer considered a partner in the negotiations), the third round is beginning, not just in words this time.

“The key factor behind Putin's statements is still an attempt to enter into consultations on ending the war in Ukraine. Let’s recall that Putin has already tried to use nuclear blackmail twice in 2022. He failed”

The Kremlin is waiting for the start of negotiations. They even set a date.

But the question arises: what happens if the blackmail goes unanswered?

Consultations are unlikely to take place before July in any case, as Ukraine's Western partners will be waiting for the Ukrainian offensive, and based on its results, they will determine the logic of further military and political actions.

- If the offensive is successful, there will be no particular need to talk to Putin again. Then the logic will be to push Russia to withdraw from most of the occupied territories.

- If the offensive fails, then Putin does have a chance. That is why it is possible that the recruited mobilized (who have not yet been allowed to fight) and new contract soldiers will be aimed at restraining the Ukrainian advance in May-June. For the Kremlin, this is a key task. After that, the war risks dragging on for more than a year. And there is already room for political maneuver.

And yet, the likelihood that Putin's blackmail will work is low. What happens if it doesn't? The next stage of escalation is the use of nuclear weapons. But this is a completely different war with different participants, on a different scale. Where, by the way, the new "nuclear weapons storage base" in Belarus will be a top ten target for defeat.

Source

About the author. Ihor Tyshkevych, expert at the Ukrainian Institute for the Future.

The editorial board does not always share the opinions expressed by the blog authors.