AFU need 600,000 rounds of munitions for offensive preparation. Military expert Serhiy Zgurets
Russian forces are still attacking the Bakhmut, Marinka and Avdiivka areas, where they have been trying to push through our defense for a long time
In our military update, I would like to address the current presence of enemy forces on Ukrainian territory. On April 26, the Ministry of Defense's press center released data revealing the number of enemy troops and weapons engaged in the conflict against Ukraine. As of now, Russia has deployed approximately 369,000 soldiers and around 6,000 units of heavy weaponry in the war effort. A few days ago, we shared an infographic displaying information compiled by the Pentagon for its leadership, which indicated the presence of 168,000 Russian troops within Ukraine's borders. It appears that the Pentagon's figures only account for the troops deployed along the front line. However, when considering the entire front, the enemy's forces amount to an estimated total of up to 370,000 personnel across various areas. The enemy continues to concentrate its efforts on three particularly intense regions: Bakhmut, Marinka, and Avdiivka, where they have persistently attempted to breach our defenses.
Bakhmut situation
The Bakhmut situation, as assessed by Ihor Lapin, a special officer and People's Deputy, is expected to be resolved soon, but not in favor of preserving Bakhmut at any cost. The situation near Khromove and the maintenance of logistics chains are currently critical. Lapin highlights the poor preparation of the second, third, and fourth lines of defense in Bakhmut, attributing it to the concentration of forces on the first line. He recounts an incident where soldiers requested digging trenches as the enemy approached Bakhmut, but their pleas were largely ignored by higher-ranking officers. Insufficient personnel were allocated for digging trenches, while defense positions were only manned at 50% capacity. Lapin points out the absence of necessary equipment, such as excavators, tractors, concrete mixers, and timber trucks, which would facilitate the construction of secondary defense lines and strengthen dugouts. Consequently, Lapin emphasizes the pressing nature of the Bakhmut issue.
The AFU officer highlighted that the Russians have capitalized on the capture of Bakhmut for political purposes, making it the focal point of their media coverage. The entire narrative seems to revolve around Bakhmut, as if the entire history of the front depends on it. Despite the efforts of the united Ukrainian TV marathon, they have failed to effectively counter Russian pressure regarding Bakhmut.
However, Bakhmut serves its main purpose by depleting a significant number of Russian reserves and Wagner fighters. Some estimates suggest that up to 80% of these units have been neutralized. Bakhmut places a heavy burden on the Russian group, creating opportunities for counteroffensives in other directions. Lapin mentions that the Russians are constructing two or three lines of defense in the southern direction, allowing them to establish themselves elsewhere in case of retreat. He believes that it may be necessary for us to eventually withdraw from Bakhmut.
Lapin also expresses concerns about the potential danger looming over other cities in the Donetsk region, such as Kostyantynivka, Kramatorsk, and Slovyansk. He cannot say whether we have control over the commanding heights in those areas, considering that our defenses in Bakhmut are mainly concentrated in high-rise buildings and basements.
The officer reports that while there are many prepared lines, there are also challenges in terms of equipment and materials. Lapin suggests utilizing techniques like "Big Construction" and reinforcing our defensive echelons with concrete.
How many shells do we need for an offensive?
Shifting to another relevant subject, the issue of ammunition procurement remains critical, particularly in light of recent events where EU countries failed to reach an agreement on joint procurement for Ukraine. The next round of negotiations has been postponed to Friday, April 28. It is evident that the readiness of our units and brigades to fulfill combat tasks, both defensively and in preparation for large-scale offensive, heavily relies on a steady supply of ammunition.
As of today, April 26, American specialized publications have disclosed data regarding the amount of ammunition transferred to Ukraine throughout the course of hostilities up to the present. Up to March, we have received a considerable quantity of 1.5 million standard 155 mm ammunition from the USA. Additionally, 7,000 high-precision Excalibur ammunition and approximately 14,000 projectiles for remote mining have been provided. Naturally, a significant portion of this ammunition has already been expended on the battlefield, as our military emphasizes the increasing need for more ammunition.
Now, statistics: it is generally agreed that the Ukrainian army utilizes an average of 90,000 rounds of 155 mm caliber per month, equivalent to approximately 3,000 to 4,000 rounds fired each day. Russia’s daily usage is estimated at around 10,000 rounds, with a certain advantage. We exclusively employ NATO guns for the use of this ammunition. So far, we have received around 350 guns of 155 mm caliber, all responsible for the fire confrontation. Of course, we have Soviet-caliber guns in greater numbers, approximately 1,500, but obtaining Soviet-made ammunition proves significantly more challenging compared to acquiring NATO-type ammunition.
What quantity of ammunition do we need for the offensive? Preliminary estimates suggest that we would need approximately 300 guns, with around 350 guns available, some of which may require repairs. Ideally, we would need about 600,000 ammunition per month for the preparatory stage of the offensive, the offensive actions themselves where artillery will play a crucial role, and for creating reserves.
What are the prospects of obtaining this ammunition? Following the negotiations and the expected visit of the President of South Korea to the USA on Thursday, April 27, the matter of receiving approximately 500,000 shells from South Korea through the USA will be addressed. The United States would lease these munitions from South Korea and then return them to comply with South Korea's non-supply policy of munitions to conflict zones. Therefore, there are potential conditions for the Ukrainian army to acquire a sufficient amount of ammunition for offensive actions in the preparation of our offensive. Additionally, a substantial number of high-precision Excalibur-type ammunition will be included, as their effectiveness surpasses standard ammunition. Moreover, we have the HIMARS system and their air-detonated munitions, which prove effective against enemy forces. There are two backup options available: firstly, increasing the potential supply of ammunition from NATO country reserves, and secondly, deconserving and providing 155 mm cluster ammunition, which the USA possesses in significant quantities. We can anticipate that at a crucial moment, it will be possible to surpass the current "red lines" in the minds of American lawmakers and unlock this component to strengthen the Armed Forces by supplying a large quantity of 155 mm ammunition.
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