Ukraine's partners should not be afraid of Russia's “red lines”

In May 2024, Volodymyr Zelenskyy said that every decision of the allies to provide Ukraine with weapons was a year late. Such delays in deliveries have indeed led to the fact that 14 Ukrainian brigades are underequipped and unable to perform combat missions as of early July 2024. A factor that prevents Ukraine's partners from responding quickly and effectively to challenges is likely the fear of escalation of the conflict and a direct clash with Russia. This is exactly what Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba pointed out in July this year.

Since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, Russia has been drawing “red lines” in an attempt to force Western countries to stop supplying weapons to Ukraine. However, crossing these lines did not provoke the promised reaction. On the contrary, the UN General Assembly has repeatedly recognized Ukraine's right to self-defense, given Russia's violations of the UN Charter. At the same time, many countries still do not provide Ukraine with weapons for defense because of fears of further escalation. 

In this material, the Civil Network OPORA analyzed how the position of Ukraine's partners has changed - from reluctance to provide heavy weapons to the transfer of the first F-16 aircraft to Ukraine at the end of July 2024.

A year of discussions about tanks and armored vehicles 

Before Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2022, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz said that his country would continue to pursue a course of escalation prevention and would not supply Ukraine with weapons. However, his position later changed. The decision to supply armored vehicles was announced in February 2023, almost a year after the start of the great war. According to Scholz, this “will not cause an escalation, as Ukraine uses tanks for defense.” 

Instead, Russia has repeatedly emphasized that it would consider the transfer of Western tanks to Ukraine as an escalation and crossing of “red lines.” Meanwhile, the first Leopard 2 tanks arrived in Ukraine from Poland in February 2023, but this did not lead to the realization of Russia's threats to strike NATO countries.

Another problem that Ukraine faced after its partners made political decisions to transfer weapons was delays in their delivery. According to the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), on the eve of the summer Ukrainian counteroffensive in 2023, partners took about 4 months to decide on the supply of weapons. That is, only a part of the necessary equipment arrived before the start of active operations of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and Ukrainian brigades did not always have enough time to train with it.

The storm in Crimea

In 2014, Russia occupied the Crimean peninsula in its first act of open aggression against Ukraine. In 2018, the Crimean Bridge was built, connecting the peninsula with the territory of the Russian Federation and becoming a symbol of imperial claims to lands that Russia considers historically its own. In February 2022, it was from Crimea that Russian troops launched an offensive against southern Ukraine, and the bridge was used to supply their military group in the occupied territory of Ukraine.

Therefore, one of the priorities of the Ukrainian Defense Forces was the destruction of Russian military infrastructure in Crimea. Realizing this, in 2022 and 2023, the Russian leadership repeatedly stated that any strikes on the peninsula with Western weapons would lead to a “nuclear response” and a declaration of direct war against Western countries. Russia's argument was that Crimea is allegedly Russian territory, and such an attack would be an existential threat to Russia.

However, Ukraine's partners recognize its territorial integrity and do not restrict the use of Western weapons in the occupied territories. In 2024, both the Pentagon spokesperson and the UK Ministry of Defense stated that Ukraine could use weapons in Crimea. 

In turn, the Russian Ministry of Defense has repeatedly acknowledged that Ukrainian troops had struck the territory of Crimea with British Storm Shadow missiles. However, there was no direct military response against Ukraine's partners, and the threats remained just threats. 

Protecting Ukrainian skies

Since the outbreak of full-scale war, Ukraine has repeatedly called on its international partners to “close the skies”: appeals have come from both President Zelenskyy and local councils. The lack of modern air defense systems significantly reduced Ukraine's ability to defend its cities and villages from Russian attacks. 

The delivery of Patriot air defense systems to Ukraine in April 2023 was dictated by the need to protect Ukrainian energy facilities from Russian attacks that intensified in October 2022. The decision to transfer the air defense systems and F-16s was preceded by discussions about possible escalation and risks for NATO countries, as well as the need to train the Ukrainian military. 

As for the F-16s, in March 2022, the US administration insisted that the transfer of these aircraft to Ukraine would not change the parity of power in the sky. Nevertheless, in August 2023, the United States authorized the start of training for Ukrainian pilots and the transfer of the aircraft to Ukraine, which is expected to take place by the fall of 2024.

In May 2024, the Dutch Ministry of Defense and the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs noted that Ukraine has every right to use the fighter jets provided by these countries against targets in Russia for self-defense. As for the United States, in July 2024, in an interview with Voice of America, Pentagon spokesman Major General Pat Ryder said that it was up to Ukraine to decide how to use the F-16s on its sovereign territory. 

On July 31, the BBC reported that the first batch of F-16s had arrived in Ukraine. According to the outlet, the process of their arrival took almost a year and a half. At the same time, Ukraine began asking its partners for F-16s as early as 2022. And in the summer of that year, the United States passed a draft law on defense policy worth $840 billion, part of which was to be used to train Ukrainian pilots on F-16s. 

When assessing the risks of transferring weapons to Ukraine, allied countries are likely to take into account the threats that could arise in the event of a direct military clash between Russia and NATO. This leads to restrictions on military assistance and, consequently, to the insecurity of civilian infrastructure in Ukraine. In April 2024, Volodymyr Zelenskyy noted that the Trypilska thermal power plant in Kyiv region was destroyed because “we ran out of missiles to protect it.” In turn, experts estimate that in the winter of 2024-2025, another 5-6 million citizens may leave the territory of Ukraine due to blackouts. According to Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Ukraine needs 25 Patriot systems to completely block the sky from Russian attacks. 

According to the BBC, the cost of one Patriot system is just over $1 billion, so 25 systems cost about $27 billion. Instead, at the public summit “Security guarantees for Ukrainian democracy in times of war” held in June 2024 in Kyiv, experts said that partner countries spent about $46 billion to support Ukrainian refugees. If these funds had been invested in air and missile defense, the critical situation in the energy sector and mass migration could have been prevented.

Self-defense beyond Ukraine's borders

Since the beginning of the full-scale Russian invasion, Ukraine has been politically constrained in the full use of its right to self-defense, including the destruction of military targets on the territory of the aggressor country. A number of Western governments (e.g., the United States, Germany, and Denmark) did not support the idea of using Western weapons to strike targets in Russia. This caution was probably due to fears that the transfer of combat to Russian territory would push the Kremlin to aggress against NATO countries. That is why, on May 31, 2022, US President Joe Biden announced the transfer of HIMARS missile systems to Ukraine, but with a restriction that allowed them to be used only within Ukraine's borders. 

Subsequently, the rhetoric about Ukraine's right to self-defense beyond its borders began to change. One of the first such statements in May 2023 was made by British Foreign Secretary James Cleverly, but some partners still adhered to the policy of restrictions. 

In 2024, Poland, France, Sweden, the Netherlands, Canada, Estonia, Denmark, Norway, Finland, and Latvia opposed restrictions on Ukraine's use of Western weapons. These countries believe that strikes on military targets in Russia are a legitimate part of Ukraine's self-defense strategy. 

Also in the first half of 2024, Russia attacked Ukrainian power plants, destroying about 9 of the 18 GW of power generation that Ukraine had been using to get through the winter of 2023-2024. At the same time, the Russian army tried to open a new front in the northern Kharkiv region - since Ukraine could not strike at the Russian territory, Russia managed to concentrate troops in the border regions.  

As early as May 2024, the White House recognized that Ukraine has the right to strike Russian military targets near the border. However, there is still a restriction on strikes deep into Russian territory, including most of the military airfields from which attacks on civilian targets in Ukraine are launched. Recently, US officials have said that if Russia tries to expand the front, Ukraine will be allowed to fire at a greater distance.

And yet, in July 2024, after another Russian attack on civilian targets in Ukraine, including the Okhmatdyt National Children's Hospital, the United States and Germany emphasized at the NATO summit that their position had not changed: Ukraine "cannot use Western weapons deep into Russian territory." The UK Ministry of Defense also confirmed the existence of the restrictions, although on July 10, Volodymyr Zelenskyy claimed that Ukraine had received permission to use Storm Shadow missiles against military targets on Russian territory.

Conclusions

As we can see, the "red lines" established by Russia to slow down the supply of weapons to Ukraine remain only threats, and they are quite flexible - after decisive actions by partners, they are pushed further and further away. For example, in October 2022, the Russian Foreign Ministry stated that providing Ukraine with modern heavy weapons, long-range weapons, or powerful means of destruction would be a "red line" for Russia. However, Ukraine received the weapons, and there was no Russian reaction against the countries that provided them.

Another tool Russia uses to exert pressure is nuclear blackmail. According to the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), the Kremlin is seeking to force the West to stop military support for Ukraine, but it is unlikely to use nuclear weapons on the battlefield in Ukraine or elsewhere.

Some high-ranking officials of the allied countries also speak about the inconsistency of Russia's statements. For example, in February 2024, the then British Foreign Secretary David Cameron noted that "the dangers of escalation are illusory. Britain was the first to provide everything from anti-tank weapons to artillery to tanks and now long-range fires like Storm Shadow missiles. Each time Putin has rattled his saber about escalation — and each time it has been empty rhetoric." 

Today, not only Ukraine's ability to defend itself, but also the border between the democratic world and the world of dictatorship depends on the promptness of arms supplies. Therefore, Ukraine's partners should focus their policy on strategic goals rather than short-term political interests. 

Exclusively for Espreso

About the author. Kateryna Mikhalevska, junior analyst at the Civil Network OPORA

The editors do not always share the opinions expressed by the blog authors.