How to defeat Vladimir Putin strategically

Since the beginning of the Russian invasion in 2014, Ukraine's goal has been to recapture the territories seized by the enemy, restoring its 1991 borders, The Economist reports. 

However, even if the Ukrainian army is successful, Russia may regard such a result as such a humiliation that it would be worth using nuclear weapons to stop it. That is why the goal is much more hazy: Ukraine must inflict as many fatalities as possible while gaining as much territory as possible in order to enhance its position and weaken Russia. From this vantage point, breaking the land bridge between Russia and the Crimean Peninsula, or getting near enough to threaten Russian installations in Crimea, would be a desirable outcome. Most Western officials, though, anticipate more modest advances as Ukraine recaptures and retains less strategic area lost last year, but at the very least demonstrates that it can still move on the battlefield.

Three scenarios for the Ukrainian counteroffensive

“The first involves the Ukrainians breaking through, a collapse of Russian forces, perhaps with Ukraine even threatening Crimea. This might result in Mr Putin’s losing power. To some that is the best way to restore peace in Europe. But assessing Russia’s capacity to maintain discipline among its troops is hard; gauging the brittleness of Mr Putin’s regime is harder still. Nuclear worries are not entirely gone. Still, some American officials are less worried about Mr Putin’s use of nuclear arms than they are about Russia’s descent into chaos and a concomitant loss of control over its nuclear arsenal,” the publication writes. 

A second one involves more limited Russian losses and the possibility of additional defeats if the war continues, which may be enough to punish Russia and weaken Vladimir Putin. 

A third, more bleak scenario would be a stalemate in which Russia retains the majority of what it has taken. This would erode Western trust in Ukraine and encourage Putin. Despite Russia's military failures, the Russian leader does not appear to have abandoned his objective of subjugating the entire country, annexing additional territory, and putting a puppet government in Kiev.

Vladimir Putin may believe he can still do this by prolonging the conflict, rendering Ukraine inefficient and depopulating it. His air force and navy are mostly intact, and he can mobilize more troops, but doing so risks inciting popular unrest in Russia. He'll want to wait it out in the West, possibly thinking that elections there will provide him relief.

He will be yearning for Donald Trump's return to power in America's presidential election next year. Mr. Trump claims that America has squandered billions of dollars on Ukraine, diminishing its own weapons and prolonging a terrible war. If elected, he believes he can end the conflict in 24 hours, although he doesn't describe how. There is also the chance of Marine Le Pen, a far-right leader who openly supports Russia and vows to pull France out of NATO's integrated command, winning the French presidential race in 2027.

How may a protracted war be avoided? 

One expectation is that Ukraine will inflict such a humiliating military defeat that Vladimir Putin will be forced to negotiate, especially if the war is prolonged and other defeats are anticipated.

Some Western leaders are hoping that the battle in Ukraine's counter-offensive would be followed by peace talks shortly. Others warn that Putin is unlikely to be ready for real negotiations unless he suffers a humiliation. Even if negotiations do take place, Russia's participation could be merely a stalling tactic. Genuine diplomacy may have to wait till Russia suffers another setback next year. 

Meanwhile, many are seeking methods to give more legitimacy to the West's vows to help Ukraine for as long as it takes.

“Eric Ciaramella of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a think-tank in Washington, argues that Western leaders should set out plans for Ukraine’s reconstruction and integration with the West, not least through security arrangements enshrined in law. Hitherto some Western leaders thought such matters would best be left until after a cessation of hostilities; but Mr Ciaramella argues they would help bring the fighting to an end by denying Mr Putin’s hope of winning a drawn-out conflict,” Economist reports. 

The security 'assurances' granted to Ukraine in the Budapest Memorandum in 1994 in exchange for its agreement to remove Soviet-era nuclear weapons from its soil proved illusory. Ukraine and its eastern European allies say that only NATO membership can defend Ukraine against further aggression. 

Western allies are split. Germany, in particular, claims that a country with unresolved territorial disputes, particularly one at war, cannot join NATO (to which others respond that West Germany joined NATO despite the partition of German land during the cold war). Still, it is hard to imagine Biden providing a nuclear guarantee to Ukraine in the near future, considering his reluctance to send US troops to its defense now. 

Mr Ciaramella proposes a five-point plan to provide Ukraine with less than Article 5 but more than the Budapest Memorandum: “This includes legally codified commitments to help-Ukraine defend itself, inspired in part by those that America gives to Israel and Taiwan, to ensure they endure regardless of who is in power in America and Europe. He also advocates multi-year commitments to arm Ukraine; support to rebuild Ukraine’s arms industry; mechanisms for political consultation like NATO’s Article 4; and a clear path to EU membership. All this would not be an alternative to NATO membership, but a bridge towards it. The goal, much like those hoped-for territorial gains in Ukraine’s counter-offensive, would be to demonstrate to Russia that there is nothing to be gained by prolonging the war.”