How North Korea exploits leverage in financial negotiations with Moscow

1. The Russian social contract surrounding this war primarily revolves around financial incentives. Russian society is effectively divided as follows: 30% are fervent supporters of the war, 23% identify as liberals, and the remainder are apathetic. However, it is clear that at least half of the population favors ending the war without any preconditions. Consequently, this entire framework is heavily reliant on the payments made to contract soldiers.

2. As has been repeatedly noted, the anticipated shift has occurred. The number of individuals willing to exchange money for their lives has dwindled to levels below what is necessary, particularly in light of the increasing frequency of "meat assaults" and the initiative to recruit approximately 12,000 contract soldiers each month. This comes despite a current shortfall of 30,000 soldiers, with an average deficit of 3,000 to 5,000 per month

3. Based on the above, Putin needs to find at least 150,000 soldiers in 2025 in addition to the current data.

4. Until now, Kims have never sent 150,000 or 15,000 people abroad. Not even a thousand. In North Korea's logic, a military man is a bearer of a terrible secret. That's why they have never sent them anywhere. Will anything change now? This is still an open question.

5. The munitions contracts from Russia allowed the Kim regime to move away from Chinese influence. And everything he does on the border with South Korea is a demonstration of subjectivity. Kim is now experiencing what may be his finest hour. But his main goal is definitely not to create a mercenary army for Russia.

6. Russia's main goal is to buy "live meat" without obligations. The example of Iran has shown that as soon as it comes to real military promises (not a limited contingent, as in Syria, but substantial military support), the Kremlin tries to keep quiet and step aside. This is clearly not exactly what Kim would like. Moreover, he understands that in future negotiations with the West, Putin will try to sell not peace in Ukraine, but the fact that he can stop Pyongyang from future wars.

7. Major financial negotiations are currently underway, with Kim open to proposals from Russia. He recognizes the urgency for Putin to find personnel, which gives Kim the leverage to dictate his terms. I am inclined to believe that, as a result, the Korean army—especially at such numbers—will likely not exist in the short term, and in the medium term, its existence is even less probable. However, the key issue remains the price. Putin has the capacity to meet this price this year, which is extraordinarily beneficial for Pyongyang, while for Russia, a sum of $10-15 billion is not critical.

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About the author: Vadym Denysenko, political scientist.

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