The West's position depends on the Armed Forces's success, risks its leaders are willing to take - military expert James Sherr

I welcome you, dear Mr. Sher, to the studio of Espreso TV channel.  We understand that Putin has failed to achieve his strategic goals, and there is a feeling that Russian Federation is preparing to move into a protracted war. Of course, this is a matter of resources, both technical and personnel. On the other hand, it is clear that Putin urgently needs some so-called victories that he could sell to his people and his General Staff. Putin's latest conversations, in particular with Zolotov, show that Putin has nothing to demonstrate.

Something needs to be said first. By Western and perhaps by Ukrainian definitions, Ukraine is winning. By Putin’s definition, it is far from clear that Russia is not winning. Ukraine has suffered very important territorial losses, covering much of the Black Sea coastline, the economic costs have been devastating because the full riggers of the occupation regime are being installed in occupied areas.There have been over a million people deported, including over a quarter a million of children. The economic consequences are devastating, and Western assistance is barely covering minimal economic needs over the longer term. It is far from clear at the moment in Moscow that Ukraine is on a trajectory to win this war, and that has to be understood. The second thing to be understood is that from the time the war in 2014 began Putin was resolved that he would either control Ukraine or rack it, and none of this has changed. This war started because Minsk accords failed to produce the trajectory and a destabilization of Ukraine they were intended to in Russia. And French and Germans who were expected to help, didn’t help. And Zelenskyi, who was expected to be weak and easily manipulated, turned out to be quite the opposite. This was clear from December 2019 in Paris- the Normandy format, where Zelenskyi’s performance was so unexpectedly robust that it made Putin visibly agitated and triggered off camera a temper tantrum by Surkov. By January,  2021 Lavrov issued a clear ultimatum to the West - Make Ukraine behave, or we will do so. And since then we have had a countdown to war. All of the events in the past, months before the war made it clear that there was to be a violent conflict.

Third point which directly answers your question - Yes, of course. The current state leadership in Moscow is resolved to pursue a long war, however long it takes, whatever the costs to Russia, even Russia’s economy is ruined. Even if the current cohort, the Russian Armed Forces pay through the nose, as long as they win, they win. As Stalin said, “Victors are not judged, it doesn't matter what the costs are”.

The West  characteristically has applied a business school metric to assess national interests and how they are calculated. Russia has never done this. Putin in particular believes that if you win a geopolitical struggle, the economic factors will then start to favor you as well. So he is willing to pay any economic price as long as he is in power to bring Ukraine to heel. And my last point, Russians are not now investing in destabilizing Ukraine, they are focused on getting the West to force Ukraine into making dangerous concessions and infirm compromises. 

So I see no  doubt in Moscow about the necessity of waging  a long-term war. And I think it will go on until they are incapable of waging it. And it is entirely possible that collectively we will simply make them incapable of waging that war. That is an eminently realistic objective for us all, meaning the West has to be resigned to the inevitability of a long-term war, and some governments in the West are resigned to it, and others plainly are not. 

Yes, dear James, I agree with you. On the other hand, Putin's recent conversations with representatives of his criminal administration suggest that Putin doesn't look well. At one time, many of our acquaintances talked about the fact that Putin is sick, that he may soon die, unfortunately, this did not happen. However, we see that he, as an authoritarian leader, weakens in the eyes of his own henchmen.

It is wise not to speculate too much about what is going on inside the Kremlin. Certain very senior people are most unlikely to be officially dismissed, because this will communicate to the Russian people that Russia is losing the war. The issue is not so much who remains in what post, who is dismissed and who is not, but it’s the old question of who does Putin really listen to? You mentioned Zolotov, but I would rather not pursue this line of speculation, because this question has always been most difficult to answer. 

It would also be unwise to believe that Vladimir Putin is losing his authority. As long as he is in place, he is going to be obeyed, and he has the means to make people obey. The question is whether at some point the pressures on Russia are such that he decides to escalate this war by employing nuclear weapons or more exotic weapons in Ukraine is not excluded, whatever military purpose they may not have. At such a point, if it were to occur, Putin will have to be very sure of his own decision. My own view is if there were some serious danger presented of war with the West, there is a very high possibility that he would simply be deposed. I do not believe it. It is remotely in his intention to risk a war with the West.

Let’s  understand two things. Intimidation is a principle pillar of Russian policy, and it’s been this way for centuries, but it has also been the case that in terms of assessing strengths and weaknesses, the approach has been very pragmatic. There has been no case that I can think of, when Russia under any regime has gone to war against a state or a coalition of states it perceived to be stronger. Vladimir Putin is no exception to this rule. The more voices, the more emissaries turn up in discrete channels in the West and warn we are backing Putin into a corner, if we don't compromise, if we don’t settle, he will do mad things. There would be a clear indication of a position of weakness and not that they actually intend to do mad things, because it would be contrary to all experiences for the Russians to behave in this way.

As for the issue of nuclear blackmail, in your opinion, dear James, how far can Putin go in the situation with the temporarily occupied Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant? Is this scenario directed purely against Ukraine, or is it a big continental blackmail?

They obviously  want the entire area to be a safe zone from which they can mount long-range artillery and missile strikes, because given the proximity of the plant, the Ukrainian response will do exactly what Putin wants - to persuade the west that it is Ukraine that is creating the possibility of a major nuclear accident in Zaporizhzhia, not Russia. That is the game Russia is playing. We will see if IAEA experts are allowed in and we will see what say about the actual conditions and the level of safety. But this is being used as everything else as a tool of military conflict, and we need to bear that in mind. 

The major  single-minded objective of Russia at this point is to force the West into forcing Ukraine to enter into negotiations. And if negotiations should start before Russian forces are withdrawn from the territories they have occupied since February 24, as those forces will never leave, have no illusions about it. If Russian forces and the territories they have occupied since February are not expelled by force of arms, they will not leave, any negotiations will be used as a way of continuing a war. President Zelenskyi understands that very well.

Some people in the US administration in  Washington also understand that, whereas some others very clearly do not. I am not convinced that President Biden understands that. The time for negotiations to be discussed is after the Russian forces are withdrawn from what they have taken since February. The negotiations on our side have to be pursued in the context of a conflict, which still will not end, because the roots of it, the threat of Ukraine, will not end until Ukraine’s legal internationally recognized borders are restored, and Russian forces leave the territories of Ukraine. That can not be a military task entirely, it requires a combination of negotiation, political, economic and military pressure. But that is the second stage. From the point of view of Ukraine realizing a victory, you have to understand that you are still in the first stage until you get Russian forces out of the territory they have occupied since February. Ukraine is still in the first stage of the conflict. That needs to be understood. And the only way to do it is by expelling them.

So, fear is whether Ukraine realizes full success in Kherson, partial success or a debatable outcome. Whatever the outcome, there is a strong possibility that certain Western governments will say now is the time to have a negotiation.

These are extremely important points, dear James. If we talk about medium-term predictions about Putin's actions in the Russo-Ukrainian war, we understand that he initially counted on the so-called September campaign of the Wehrmacht against Poland in 1939, but such a scenario failed, and now I have a feeling that he is trying to use the military and diplomatic scenarios of the Korean War of the 1950s. But the key question is not what Putin wants, and not what are the plans of his General Staff, but whether they have the appropriate offensive resources. On the other hand, an equally important question is how long will the West be ready in its unlimited military and economic support to Ukraine? And how much can change after the fall elections to the United States Congress?

Issue is not whether Russia will recover the resources to achieve all its initial objectives. The question is whether Ukraine will be sustainable in the condition that it now finds itself in the absence of continued long-term Western support. 

When a Western leader says to President Zelenskyi, “Of course it is up to you to decide whether to negotiate and when and about what”. These words mean more than that. If a person making the suggestion is indispensable to sustaining your Armed Forces, supplying it with what it needs and providing a lion share of economic assistance that is required. Of course the US and the West have a lot of leverage in Kyiv, even if they don’t seem to understand how to use leverage in Moscow, they have it in Kyiv. The most important asset Ukraine has in dealing not just with Russia but with the West is its unity. The unity of the state leadership, of the Armed Forces, the combination of political and military leadership and the unity of the country. And faced with the strong unified Ukraine, the West in my view is likely to continue to support Ukraine larger to the extent required, later that it should, less than it should, but still sufficient. And the main task of the leadership is to maintain leadership of the country, the trust of the Armed Forces who are carrying most of the burden.

Actually, the question is, why less than it should, and why later than it should? We understand that the issue of time and supply of ammunition and powerful artillery systems is a vital one in our case. After all, any counteroffensive of our Armed Forces is impossible unless there is sufficient supply of armored vehicles and aviation.

You are half right in asking that question,but only half right. Don’t forget the other half. The Ukrainian Armed are going through the unprecedented transition between the employment of Soviet weapons and weapons based on those principles and not only Western weapons, but the most up-to-date and technologically advanced Western weapons. This is an exceptionally difficult transition to make. It takes time to train people. It takes time for them to understand the difference. The whole issue of supplying and maintenance are very complex. You can not just transfer to Ukrainian Forces 50 HIMARS overnight in the belief that you are transferring something usable. There are inbuilt limitations here. Nevertheless, within the political constraints laid down by the White House, I am absolutely confident that the Pentagon, US Department of Defense, the armed services are supplying Ukraine with everything they can, as quickly as they can and providing all of the support structures that go with it. I am also absolutely convinced that as in the past, Ukrainian servicemen are becoming very proficient, very quickly in integrating the new weaponry very quickly into Ukraine’s order of battle. 

So, don’t blame the West too much, that’s one half of it. The other half as I said is that there is an unhealthy degree of fear of Russian escalation in some quarters, not everywhere, in the US and elsewhere. The way you respond to these Russian threats of escalation is to immediately increase the level of support given to Ukraine, as well as the risks that will be taken. Afterall,  there are now limitations imposed in the US on the ranges and characteristics of certain highly capable weapons supplied. There is no reason for these limitations. At the beginning of the war, Zelenkyi and others had a bargain with the West, which was very simple. Give us the tools we need to fight, and we will manage on our own, and you will not have to enter this war. And I would say we have fulfilled that bargain to 75%  and belatedly.

If certain steps we are taking now, certain categories of weapons we are supplying now have been supplied when they were first requested, Ukraine would be in a far stronger position than it is. The condition of the country would have been better than it is. The West would have been stronger than it is. The Russians would have learned earlier that they can not intimidate us. And there is no reason for the Russians to be able to intimidate us. Compared to the so-called collective West, Russia is, by any category of measurement, the weaker party, considerably weaker. What the Russians have is the willingness to take risks.

But they are not being reckless. We have no choice, but to rise to the level of risk inherent in the situation. Risk and the danger of escalation are inherent part of war, and they have to be accepted.   

We understand that Ukraine is a victim state of unprovoked aggression and we see that the West not only sympathizes with us, but helps us greatly, but perhaps there are some other steps our leadership should take in the near future in order to wake up the West even more?

Putting pressure on Ukraine’s Western partners is not helpful. Such pressure is expected in Washington and elsewhere, it arouses enormous irritation, and what happens is people stop listening. So it is not a good idea. What does impress and will impress people in Washington and Berlin, in London and even in Paris is, as I said, a clear demonstration of Ukraine’s unity, resolve and determination to do all that it takes, Ukraine’s refusal to be defeated. And Ukraine’s refusal to accept a defeat on the battlefield or on a negotiating table. Ukraine’s determination to keep fighting. The reason this is important is that as long as this cohesion is there, then it is not possible for anyone in the West to betray Ukraine without making it clear - we are betraying you. This is the most important thing. The West needs to understand. Boris Johnson said that nothing will be solved unless Russia is defeated and it seems to be defeated. The object of the war is not to have a negotiation, but to defeat Russia. As the US Secretary of Defense, Ostin, said, “to make it impossible, at least greatly diminish the ability of Russia to do anything like this again to anybody else”. If the governments of the West in Washington, London, Paris, Berlin understood this, they would do more for Ukraine, and for this war than supplying another ten HIMARS.

One has to understand the political goal, political steps and reality - they are always more important than the military. Because if you don’t know what your course is, or what are you doing then any good arms are not going to enable you to do something you don’t believe and don’t understand. We need this clarity from Ukraine, which is there, and we need clarity from the West, which is not clear at present. And Russia sees this absence of clarity, this equivocation, this constant stress on negotiation, constant worry about escalation as weakness - pure and simple. And this prolongs the war. You asked earlier why Russians perceive they are winning? It is precisely because of this. Because we suggest by the things we say, and the things we do, and the things we don’t say, and the things we don’t do, that we are afraid of them, and we have no reason to be afraid of them. They have every reason to be afraid of us, and as the weeks and months go by, they will be more afraid of us, unless they stop. And then we will have negotiations. 

Thank you very much, dear James, for this extremely significant and important analysis on air of Espreso TV channel.