Why is detention of Shoigu's deputy bad for Ukraine?

1. A detention of this level could not have been carried out without Putin's approval, and the decision itself could not have been initiated without Patrushev's direct involvement. Unfortunately, the version that I expressed more than a month ago that a "mini-coup" took place in Russia, as a result of which fanatical hawks won over mere hawks in an intraspecific struggle, is confirmed. And now it is they who are dictating the agenda.

2. Ivanov's arrest is a demonstration of the new rules of the game, which haven't yet crystallized, but are already being written during the game. So far, we can say that the new rules definitely contain the following points:

• all previous agreements are canceled, everything starts from scratch;
• the FSB is moving from covering up corruption to controlling corruption;
• loyalty is no longer enough, something more is needed (no one understands what exactly).

3. It is still difficult to predict how the flywheel of repression will turn. They may stop with Ivan (similar to the Khodorkovsky case, when after his arrest everyone understood everything) or, on the contrary, they may detain several dozen more high-ranking officials.

I repeat: this is not important. The main thing is a complete change in the rules of coexistence in the elites.

4. The opposition, unfortunately, again fails to meet the expectations of the people. The statements of the FBK that the authorities listened to them are ridiculous. In fact, we should have expected the opposition to say that this is not a fight against corruption, but an imitation and a distraction from the deterioration of life. Or something similar.

5. For Ukraine, this means that Patrushev and Ushakov's ideas about prolonging the war until the Yalta-2 conference are now completely dominant.

Amid this , it is worth paying special attention to the sharp intensification of Russian activity on the Chinese direction and two important decisions: Norilsk Nickel has decided to move its copper plant to China, and Gazprom is giving a 28% discount to Chinese companies until 2027 (both decisions could not but be authorized by the Kremlin).

China has recently begun a certain drift toward possible negotiations, and the Russians are trying to reverse this trend. This will determine whether there will be a theoretical possibility of negotiations in 2024.

Source

About the author: Vadym Denysenko, political scientist.

The editors don't always share the opinions expressed by the authors of the blogs.