Why Vladimir Putin changed Russia's nuclear doctrine

Putin had announced possible changes to Russia's nuclear doctrine in the summer. However, it is evident that the signing of the decree, coming after Ukraine finally received permission to strike Russian sovereign territory, marks another significant moment in the Russian Federation's use of nuclear threats to intimidate Western countries.

It is important to note that the new point added to Russia's nuclear doctrine is directly tied to the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian war and Western support for Ukraine. It stipulates that Russia reserves the right to respond to aggression from any non-nuclear state if that state is supported or involved by a nuclear power.

Of course, what is implied here is that Western countries are strongly denying their direct involvement in the Russian-Ukrainian war, insisting that they are only providing support to Ukraine in its resistance to Russian aggression. However, Putin seems to be telling them, "No, you are not just supporters; we consider you parties to the conflict precisely because you are aiding Ukraine in its war against the Russian Federation. At any moment, we can reclassify your participation as direct aggression against Russia."

This, in essence, captures the core of the recent changes in Russia's nuclear doctrine. Another key adjustment in response to the current war is the assertion that nuclear deterrence could be employed if a potential adversary deploys air defense systems, medium- and short-range missiles, precision non-nuclear weapons, or attack drones.

It can be argued that any event in the war with the Russian Federation could be seen by its military and political leadership as a pretext for the use of nuclear weapons against the enemy. After all, we are well aware of how many instances have already occurred that could, in theory, justify the application of Russia's nuclear doctrine.

However, many questions remain unanswered even after Vladimir Putin signed this document. One of the key questions is: "What exactly does Putin and his entourage consider to be the territory of the Russian Federation?" The Russian leadership's reaction, in the form of changes to the nuclear doctrine, is now tied to the permission to strike what they claim as the sovereign territory of the Russian Federation—territory that the West recognizes as sovereign.

From the perspective of the Russian Federation, sovereign territory encompasses all areas outlined in the Russian Constitution. In other words, Vladimir Putin, the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, and Russian citizens should have no doubt that, according to the constitution, the Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia regions, as well as the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the occupied Sevastopol, are considered part of Russia, not Ukraine.

But the Armed Forces of Ukraine have repeatedly targeted these territories, including with Western-made missiles. For instance, the missile attack on Sevastopol is a notable example. This raises the question: How will Moscow characterize certain actions by Ukraine or any other country against the Russian Federation when the sovereignty of its claimed territory is not universally recognized?

There is Russian territory from the perspective of international law, and in this context, the allies' approval for Ukraine to use their missile weapons to strike occupied territories is quite logical. On the other hand, there is Russian territory from the viewpoint of Russian constitutional law, where Russia perceives regions like Crimea and Donbas as part of its sovereign territory. In this framework, the Russian response to strikes on Crimea or Donbas should be the same as if they were attacks on the Kursk region or any other area of Russia, whose affiliation with the Russian Federation is indisputable. There are territories under actual Russian control and those that Russia claims as its own based on changes in its constitution. This includes parts of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia regions of Ukraine that are not currently under Russian control. President Putin continues to demand the withdrawal of Ukrainian troops from these territories as a condition for negotiations to end the war with Ukraine.

How will Moscow characterize the aggression of any other state against it when it cannot even define its own perception of its sovereign territory? This is not merely a question designed to expose the deceitfulness of Russian propaganda; it is a question that highlights how Putin himself has maneuvered into so many political traps that escaping them in a state of sanity is virtually impossible. Perhaps this is why the Russian leader has ultimately lost his grip on reason.

Therefore, the West will now only speculate on whether this is genuine nuclear blackmail by the Russian Federation, or if it represents a real decision by the Russian president to use nuclear weapons at some point—along with Putin's search for justifications to do so.

But against whom? Against Ukraine or against this nuclear power, which has given Ukraine the ability to fire missiles of its own production at the sovereign territory of the Russian Federation?

In other words, we are talking about whether Vladimir Putin is truly ready for a real conflict with NATO member states.

There is no realistic answer to all of these questions, but it is absolutely clear that nuclear blackmail, which Putin has strategically institutionalized at this moment, will likely be used by the Russian leader in his initial telephone conversations and contacts with the newly elected President of the United States, Donald Trump. The aim would be to make sure Trump understands that if he does not yield to Putin, it will not just be a Russian-Ukrainian conflict, but a real nuclear war—something, as we know, Trump and his entourage will want nothing to do with.

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About the author. Vitaliy Portnikov, journalist, winner of the Shevchenko National Prize of Ukraine

The editors do not always share the views expressed by the blog authors.