Trump and scenarios for Ukraine

Many people have fallen into various extremes, from "we're doomed, let's dig a grave" to "the war will end by spring, elections and economic growth are coming." Fortunately, any hype quickly fades, so it’s time to figure out which scenarios are realistically possible.

I emphasize that the range of scenarios was outlined in an article published at the beginning of the year and hasn’t changed since. Therefore, the following analysis will be based on that framework, which includes three main scenarios:

• War of Attrition,  
• Coalition of Victors,  
• Frozen Conflict.  

First, let’s separate what we know from what we don’t and cannot know.

What do we know?  

First, Trump's focus will primarily be domestic policy, as his voters demand it. In foreign policy, he will promote the tried-and-true doctrine of mercantilism: trade advantages above all else. This means protective tariffs and support for domestic producers—in other words, isolationism.  

Second, if Trump does engage in geopolitics, his top two priorities will be China and the Middle East. "Let Europe deal with its own problems" remains a consistent Trump motto. For Trump, Ukraine is secondary and largely unclear. The "peace plans" from various Republican politicians are mostly performative, aimed at showcasing themselves while waiting for possible appointments in Trump’s administration.  

That’s what we know—and beyond that, we know very little. Trump himself doesn’t know either. His foreign policy team hasn’t been selected yet, and those seemingly chosen might not pass confirmation. Any claims about Trump’s policy direction are entirely speculative. For now, the level of uncertainty is quite high.

What scenarios arise from this?  

Scenario 1: The U.S. largely disengages from events in Europe, including the Russia-Ukraine war. Trump makes statements that Europeans must start paying for their own security (which, incidentally, is true). The American administration views Russia primarily through the lens of its China policy. Europe faces the challenge of taking responsibility for its own security—a challenge that is, in fact, unavoidable.

Sub-scenario 1.1: Europe proves incapable of meeting this challenge. Germany remains politically stagnant until June (due to elections and government formation). France is indecisive and potentially awaiting Le Pen. Brussels sympathizes with Kyiv but has limited authority. Hungary and Slovakia disrupt EU consensus politics.  This leads to the negative War of Attrition scenario (see the aforementioned article). At the same time, Ukraine has secured financial assurances for 2025, meaning the primary factors for its resilience—or lack thereof—are internal (and well-known). As for 2026, it is currently beyond the visible horizon.

Sub-scenario 1.2: Europe struggles but forms a coalition of capable and willing countries. This coalition consists of nations that better understand the situation, have more stable governments, and perceive greater threats (these traits often overlap). Key players in this scenario include the United Kingdom, the Scandinavian-Baltic Eight, and Poland.  

“Europe can indeed do a lot for our victory even without the U.S. and in the absence of internal consensus. Key capitals know well what should be done (stricter sanctions, trade restrictions, tanker oil shipments, export controls, preventing sanctions circumvention, etc.).”

By the way, the U.S. is always ready to sell weapons and military equipment for money—if the money is there (and there is money in the form of frozen Russian assets, provided there is political will).

Sub-scenario 1.3. Europe quickly comes to its senses and consolidates. Highly unlikely, but favorable for us.

It’s worth noting that Ukraine’s importance to Europe is becoming increasingly clear, at least from a security perspective.

Scenario 2. Trump decides that the war in Europe is a good stage to showcase his strength and negotiation skills early in his term. He finds time to engage in the war in Europe and tries to bring the parties to the negotiating table on his terms. These terms are unlikely to mean Ukraine’s capitulation, as there is a certain level of support for Ukraine in American society and among members of the Republican Party, which cannot be ignored. Thus, some form of 'freeze' is likely.

Sub-scenario 2.1. The freeze conditions are acceptable to both sides, and a temporary truce is signed, resembling the Minsk agreements. This creates a window of opportunity for Ukraine to engage in domestic political processes, elections are announced, and then a critically important fork in the road described in the article emerges.

“Let me emphasize once again: any freeze is temporary. Russia may agree to balanced freeze conditions if Putin decides he needs a break, time to rearm, and to build up strength for a second strike.”

(If, at this point, millions of Ukrainians leave the country, the Ukrainian territory will likely have to be adjusted to the size that can be defended by those who remain. This is an unpleasant truth that must be faced.)

Sub-scenario 2.2. Putin rejects Trump’s terms and demands Ukraine’s effective capitulation: demilitarization, “denazification,” etc.  An enraged Trump promises Putin a harsh response and declares “coercion to peace.” While unlikely, this scenario exists. (Strangely, a significant part of Ukrainian politicians and citizens believe in the high probability of such a scenario, forgetting that in the “negotiator–KGB officer” pairing, the latter wins not through confrontation but deception, exploiting the former’s belief in fair agreements.)

“There’s a high likelihood that Putin might decide continuing the war is more advantageous than freezing it, as transitioning from war to peace could cause severe social and economic shocks for Russia.”

However, Putin is more likely to toy with Trump than engage in direct confrontation. There are also psychological issues: Putin’s main goal is to avoid what he sees as humiliation by the U.S.

This scenario could also include endless fruitless negotiations that portray Trump as weak and provoke him into action. I doubt Putin would push this far.

Sub-scenario 2.3. Under the guise of peace proposals, Putin offers Ukraine a de facto capitulation, which Ukraine refuses. Trump accuses Ukraine of derailing the negotiations and shifts his focus elsewhere, refusing to provide further aid while calling Ukrainians warmongers and Putin a peacemaker.  If Ukraine manages to stabilize internally, 2025 will likely be manageable. As for 2026, it’s too early to predict, and this scenario doesn’t significantly change Ukraine’s position compared to the pre-election period. Future developments depend on Europe’s stance—see Sub-scenarios 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3.

Could Trump side with Putin and pressure Ukraine unilaterally? Theoretically, yes, but practically it offers him no advantage and risks portraying him as weak from the outset. In any case, Ukraine’s priority is to get through 2025, where the main challenges are internal.

It’s also worth noting that Trump thinks in short-term horizons. For him, a ceasefire, a peace agreement, and the end of the war are almost synonymous. If hostilities resume shortly after, he won’t consider himself responsible—he will claim success and shift the blame to others.

“Let me add that Trump’s convincing victory in the elections did not bring the expected benefits to Russia. Putin had bet on conflict and disorganization in the U.S., but things turned out differently.”

Ukraine’s progress toward NATO cannot be halted because we have not been actively moving toward membership. No one will invite us to NATO until the war ends or until a coalition of victors forms. The path to EU membership, however, continues. It has become a technical process, albeit a lengthy one (estimated at 6–10 years). This is Europe’s prerogative.

“If we are asked to commit to not joining NATO for 20 years, we can confidently agree, as the situation will be completely different in just a few years. Either NATO will cease to exist, we won’t exist, or Russia won’t exist.”

I’ll also add that China is unlikely to show significant activity at this stage. It may assist Trump in bringing Putin to the negotiating table (as it has leverage over Russia and an interest in demonstrating to Trump its readiness to cooperate early in his presidency). However, China is not playing chess but *Go*—it is creating a space to secure its own gains.  

Conclusions

1. The main scenarios for the development of the situation remain the same; the scenario space has not changed with Trump’s election. A catastrophic disaster or a sudden miraculous victory are both impossible.  
2. Ukraine’s primary problems now are internal, and they must be urgently addressed. These include human capital and leadership in the Armed Forces, the defense industry and economy, democracy, and social cohesion.  
3. It’s essential to continue shaping the image of a victory for America (an American victory, not just a Ukrainian one). What benefits will the U.S. gain from Russia’s defeat? There are many, but they need to be clearly communicated and explained. How is Russia's defeat linked to the U.S.-China confrontation?  
4. However, the main focus should be on building a "coalition of the willing" in Europe. This is our primary area of work for the coming year. Strengthening diplomatic personnel and maximizing the use of other types of diplomacy—parliamentary, cultural, civil, academic, ecclesiastical, entrepreneurial, and others—is crucial. Europe is not America; there are dozens of countries and a significant amount of work to do.  

What should we do specifically? The same as before: either you are in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, or you dedicate all possible efforts to supporting them. Before making any decisions, Trump will look at the current map. This is why Putin is in a hurry.  

And most importantly: do not repeat Russian propaganda narratives, even if you feel tempted.  

Once again, I’ll emphasize: Putin’s strategy is to divide Ukrainian society during a difficult winter and force it to demand capitulation. So, don’t help him.

Source

About the author. Valerii Pekar, lecturer at the Kyiv Mohyla Academy.

The editors don't always share the opinions expressed by the authors of the blogs.