Trump to seek Ukraine deal that prevents future Russian pressure - diplomat Bryza

Russia has taken an extraordinary step by launching an intercontinental ballistic missile – a potential nuclear weapon. This act is clearly a symbolic geopolitical maneuver, signaling a deliberate and unsettling message from Putin to the West. However, we trust that our allies in the Euro-Atlantic community are ready to respond decisively to any further escalation from the Kremlin.

Yes, this is a very serious signal from President Putin. From my perspective, it is a continuation of his attempt to instill fear about nuclear weapons or a nuclear power plant related event to intimidate the United States, NATO allies in Europe, and to drive a wedge between non-nuclear European allies and the United States. He underscored this objective when he altered or updated Russia's nuclear weapons doctrine. In one of the paragraphs, possibly the tenth article, he notes that if a non-nuclear NATO member state is involved in an attack that includes weapons from a nuclear armed state, then that non-nuclear European country will be treated in terms of Russia's retaliation just like the nuclear armed state. This is an attempt to intimidate European countries, but it is not working.

He has made similar threats before. Using an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of carrying nuclear warheads is indeed a serious demonstration of his intentions. For instance, during the Second Karabakh War in 2020, Russia or Armenia, with Russian collaboration, launched two Iskander missiles into Azerbaijan. These missiles are nuclear capable, and the act was a signal to Baku. Putin likely wanted President Aliyev to halt his offensive against the Armenians.

In the current context, this missile launch is undoubtedly a significant signal, but I do not expect it to alter Ukraine’s actions or the permissions granted by the United States and now the United Kingdom to use longer-range missiles deeper into Russian territory. Clearly, this is a negotiating tactic by President Putin. He knows that former President Trump has pledged to pressure both sides to end the war. Reportedly, Trump has already called Putin, urging him to find a ceasefire acceptable to President Zelensky. Putin’s missile launch seems to signal that he is not yet ready to be reasonable.

The Kremlin appears to be setting a course for escalation in the near future, aiming to shape the narrative before President Trump’s inauguration. This could position the new U.S. president as a leader of peace and diplomacy. However, the primary concern lies in the Kremlin’s growing ambitions. I encourage you to monitor potential developments closely, as there are signals from individuals close to the Trump administration. Even his son has claimed that the Biden administration is pushing the world toward World War III by authorizing strikes on military targets in Russia. It’s possible that Trump might use this to criticize his predecessor’s administration, presenting himself as the architect of a peace plan to avert global conflict.

I do not think that what Donald Trump's son said in this case matters, because he has no understanding of how diplomacy works in general, let alone diplomacy involving such incredibly high stakes. So I would not worry too much about that statement. Frankly, it is a politicization of an extremely serious geostrategic situation. When President Trump assumes office, as happened during his first term, his pre-election promises on foreign policy often have to change according to new realities.

You may recall that during his first term, he initially expressed a desire to avoid confrontation with Russia and President Putin. However, he became the first U.S. president to approve the transfer of Javelin anti-tank missiles to Ukraine, which was absolutely essential in stopping Russia's initial attack on Kyiv back in February 2022.

Criticizing the Biden administration in this context is unproductive. In reality, had the Biden administration provided tanks, HIMARS, ATACMS, expanded-range ATACMS, and F-16s earlier—two years ago, for instance—this war could already have ended, with Russia forced to make peace.

No matter what Donald Trump's son says, the reality is that both Ukraine and Russia are currently trying to inflict as much damage on each other as possible in anticipation of President Trump pushing both sides to reach a ceasefire agreement once he takes office.

What actions might the current Biden administration take in the remaining time before Trump’s inauguration? There is still an opportunity for significant decisions, such as deploying specific weaponry or increasing the range of arms supplied to Ukraine. The Biden administration likely aims to solidify Ukraine’s position before handing over the reins to the incoming president. In other words, Biden may be keen to end his term on a strong note of support for Ukraine, making it more difficult for Trump to abruptly reverse course or “shut off the tap” of aid.

The Biden administration is undoubtedly trying to allocate as much of the funding approved by the U.S. Congress to help Ukraine as possible before Trump assumes office. Just this past week, another 1.6 billion dollars in weaponry was transferred to Ukraine. The administration’s priority is to ensure that as much of the allocated money is spent for Ukraine and by Ukraine before Trump takes office.

When it comes to additional military and technical support, Ukraine’s primary request has been to expand the range of U.S. missile systems, including ATACMS and other HIMARS-launched systems. However, I think the Biden administration will not be eager to take further steps in this direction. The focus now is on countering the joint Russian-North Korean assault reportedly being planned against Ukrainian troops in the Kursk region.

From what I understand, the range currently permitted for the use of ATACMS, as approved by the Biden administration, is deemed sufficient for Ukraine’s needs in this scenario. I would be surprised if the administration encouraged further escalation by enabling Ukraine to strike deeper into Russian territory.

The Biden administration has consistently maintained a conservative approach, often resisting the provision of new weapons requested by Ukraine and limiting their operational scope to reduce the risk of escalation. At this point, I do not expect the range of U.S. missiles to be increased. However, it is difficult to predict what the current thinking might be within the White House, the Situation Room, the Pentagon, or other decision-making centers in Washington.

Ukraine’s restrictions on key military products are sending a clear message. There is the official agenda presented in diplomatic discussions, and then there is the unofficial narrative being pushed by certain emissaries. On the surface, everything may appear positive, but there are individuals who might advocate for scaling back assistance to Ukraine. Their rationale could be that, through the suffering of the Ukrainian people, Ukraine might adopt a more conciliatory stance. I fear this could be the path ahead – a scenario I deeply hope will not come to pass.

Of course. I often think about my former colleagues and friends who are currently in the White House making these monumental decisions and how difficult and frightening their situation must be.

I personally think that the Biden administration has been too slow in delivering the weapons Ukraine needs to achieve victory. It seems they have never fully committed to ensuring Ukraine wins the war or even defined what "winning" means, which I believe is a significant mistake.

That said, it is easy for me to criticize while sitting here in comfort, with no government responsibilities. If you are in a position of responsibility, and there is even the slightest chance that Russia might resort to using nuclear weapons, the decision to provide Ukraine with full support becomes much harder. The U.S. intelligence community and the executive branch of the government reportedly assessed about a year and a half ago that there was a fifty-fifty chance Putin was seriously considering using a tactical nuclear weapon on the battlefield.

I take your point, Mr. Borkovskyi, about the risks of insufficient support for Ukraine. If Ukraine cannot secure a decisive military victory on the battlefield, it could become more vulnerable to manipulation and pressure from Russia over time. That is the real danger. If that were to happen, where would Putin stop? Would he continue to take more of Ukraine? Would he threaten NATO members such as Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, or Poland?

I firmly believe that Putin must be stopped. However, I also respect the caution of the Biden administration, even though I feel they have been overly cautious. I am hopeful that President Trump, despite his apparent affinity for Putin, will focus on what he loves most — making a deal. He understands that if the deal is too harsh on Ukraine, it will not succeed because President Zelenskyy and the Ukrainian people will not accept it. Therefore, I believe the deal Trump seeks will likely aim to avoid the scenario you outlined, where Ukraine feels forced to concede and remains vulnerable to future pressure.

What do you think the new administration under President Donald Trump will look like? On one hand, there is an expectation that any new U.S. administration may be weaker than its predecessor. On the other hand, we are seeing some unusual figures, many of whom lack substantial competence but remain largely loyal to Trump. Meanwhile, those not aligned with him, such as Elon Musk, seem focused on envisioning a new global order. What is your perspective on the incoming administration, and how do you imagine Trump 2.0 might take shape?

Well, we do not know, right? Personally, I feel very uncomfortable about the choice of Secretary of Defense, who has absolutely no qualifications for the position. Yes, he served in the U.S. military, but he has never managed any large organization. Depending on how you view it, the U.S. Department of Defense is either the largest organization in the world or one of the largest, with 2.8 million people and a budget in the hundreds of billions of dollars. Leading such an organization is a tremendous management challenge, and Pete Hegseth has no relevant experience. He lacks expertise in thinking and acting strategically or geostrategically and has no understanding of how politics, security, and economics intersect, which is an essential competency for leading the Department of Defense.

Similarly, Tulsi Gabbard, the nominee to be the next Director of National Intelligence, has no experience in intelligence whatsoever. Moreover, her past interactions, relationships, and views regarding figures like Bashar al-Assad, Vladimir Putin, and Xi Jinping raise serious concerns. She has a history of echoing Kremlin talking points and seemingly accepting them as truth, which at best could be described as the behavior of a "useful idiot."

I am not confident that these two individuals will be effective leaders in their respective roles. Ultimately, it will be up to President Trump to make the big decisions. Because these appointees lack the necessary expertise, they are unlikely to play a meaningful role in decision-making.

What remains unclear is the extent to which career professionals, who are the individuals that truly run any government, including the U.S. government, will have room to operate. Will their expertise and experience be valued and utilized, or will it be disregarded? At this point, there is no way to know.

The new Trump administration lacks the long institutional memory typical of dictatorships. If Trump has a plan, it likely involves a strategy designed to halt the Russian dictator, but it would only work if Putin were willing to accept Trump’s terms. However, Putin has his own plan that is more apparent, including escalating military personnel and threatening the use of intercontinental ballistic missiles against Ukraine. In other words, there is an abstract plan on one side and the harsh and uncompromising realities of the world we face today on the other.

One of the most common clichés in geopolitics, security studies, and military operations is that every war plan only survives until the first encounter with the enemy. In other words, President Trump may have his plan, and his advisors may be thinking through the steps of what they will pressure Putin to do or what they will pressure Zelensky to do, but all of that will change as soon as the plan begins to be implemented and President Zelensky and Putin react.

Yes, President Trump reportedly has many executive orders prepared across various areas of the economy, government, and foreign policy, with something like 130 already drafted. These are essentially decrees that he plans to issue on his first day in office. However, that is only the initial push. When it comes to diplomacy with Kyiv and Moscow, whatever his plan may be now, it will likely look very different once negotiations begin. I know this from my own experience negotiating with Azerbaijan and Armenia to try to end the Karabakh conflict, or negotiating with Georgia and its separatists in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as well as with their patron, Moscow. We all have plans going in, but reality inevitably changes them.

What gives me some reassurance is the belief that, at the end of the day, Donald Trump cares most about his own image and looking good. He sees his success in terms of being a brilliant dealmaker, and he is smart and shrewd enough to understand that if the deal he proposes is unacceptable to the people of Ukraine, the fighting will continue. Hopefully, his advisors are reminding him of Ukraine’s history and tradition of guerrilla warfare, which can be incredibly costly for the enemy over many years. If Ukraine is maneuvered into a very difficult or hopeless situation, resistance is likely to persist.

How can the current situation be articulated in writing? It is essential to reach agreements on issues that cannot easily be addressed in the public sphere. On one side, there is the Russian ultimatum, while on the other, we have the stance of the democratic Euro-Atlantic community and Ukraine’s own position. How do these differing approaches to what is referred to as negotiations align with one another? Moreover, how can Ukraine’s security guarantees be effectively established and formalized?

We do not know. These are the kinds of issues that emerge from negotiations. We remember President Putin's goals before February 2022, which were utterly unrealistic. For example, he demanded that NATO pull back its military forces from Eastern Europe, where they had been deployed after Russia's initial invasion of Ukraine in 2014. He also suggested that some countries should leave NATO entirely. These extreme and unacceptable demands were, of course, rejected by both Ukraine and NATO. As a result, Putin embroiled his country in a devastating and costly war, a monumental strategic mistake that has set Russia's development back by decades and caused hundreds of thousands of Russian soldiers' deaths, not to mention countless Ukrainian lives.

If Putin persists with such unacceptable demands, the war will only be prolonged. Regardless of what President Donald Trump says, I believe Ukraine will continue fighting if it considers the terms of any agreement unacceptable. I agree with you that a security guarantee for Ukraine is essential. Without one, any ceasefire would simply give Putin time to rebuild Russia's military and prepare for future aggression. There must be some form of peacekeeping deployment to ensure long-term security.

The best security guarantee for Ukraine would be NATO membership. However, leaders like Olaf Scholz and Joe Biden are currently not in favor of this, making it difficult to see when it could happen. Whether Donald Trump would support Ukraine joining NATO remains unclear. Trump has previously described NATO as "obsolete," so his position in power could be unpredictable.

Some Eastern NATO members, such as Estonia, have suggested that if NATO as a whole cannot act, individual member states could deploy their troops as peacekeepers. That might be a feasible option. On the other hand, Chinese peacekeepers seem unworkable; it is hard to imagine Ukraine agreeing to such a proposal. Ultimately, it will be up to Ukraine to decide.

I do not believe Trump will push Ukraine into accepting a security guarantee that is insufficient. He is likely smart enough to understand that this would only guarantee the war's resurgence. That being said, Trump currently appears distracted by other matters, such as Elon Musk, nominations for cabinet positions, and internal battles over key roles like the Attorney General, who will face a contentious confirmation process in the U.S. Senate.

At this point, it is unclear what Trump’s final plan will look like. However, it will need to be acceptable to the Ukrainian people. While it will likely be painful and fall short of Ukraine’s full aspirations, it also will not fully satisfy Putin. The specifics remain unknown, but there is no doubt that a strong security guarantee is absolutely crucial.