Frontline needs better support, as war may last another 2-3 years - Colonel Grant

God Save the King and glory to Heroes. They need it at the moment.

It has begun. In the south of our country, powerful counter-offensives of the Ukrainian military are being launched. How important is this area and, in general, how do you assess the degree of readiness of our soldiers to take fire control of the south? We understand that there are minefields and powerful concrete barriers, but at any rate, fire control is extremely important.

First of all, the strategic question of how important it is, arguably depends upon the progress. Because if Ukraine forces managed to break through in the South and maybe get to Melitopol or even better to Berdiansk, then of course it is the most important thing that's happened. If they can't get through, then there will be questions about whether that was the best area to attack because we know that it is the most heavily fortified and the most heavily mined area of the battlefield. But I think that they will get through this. There's no question about it. They will get through this. The big questions are. How long will it take them to get through this? And how many casualties will they take on the way because getting through is one thing if you succeed. But if you succeed and you tire yourself out, because you've lost too much, then strategically that may be a failure. So we have to watch and see what happens over the next weeks.

Berdiansk area. Tokmak area and further down the list. There are fierce battles going on there, our infantry and artillery are working, we lack aviation, but the troops are advancing. The enemy is beginning to use operational reserves to hold their line of defense. How difficult will this August-September southern campaign be?

The possibility is quite high because the Ukrainian soldiers have got the determination and a morale to keep fighting hard. The challenge for Russia is if they can afford to keep pushing everything at the Donetsk area, which is where they seem to be pushing hard and not reinforce the South. What we know is that they are very poor at logistics in many ways, and there's been a very successful campaign by Ukraine to destroy Russian artillery and ammunition. What we don't know and I don't think anybody knows is what is the breaking point on artillery and ammunition in any area because wherever that breaking point is and it could be in front of Donetsk, it could be behind Bakhmut, and it could be south of Zaporizhzhia. There is going to be a point where Russia suddenly can't fight properly. That is where the real strategic breakthrough has to occur or may occur. And so just looking at the South a big question that comes to my mind is what happens in the Donetsk area, the Ukrainian troops are moving forward? What happens if they break into Donetsk? Do we have another 30,000 soldiers available? Perhaps from the territorial army who can go into Donetsk and take it? These are interesting questions at the moment because the battlefield is not clear. Whether the real area is Lyman, whether it's Bakhmut, whether it's Donetsk or whether it's Zaporizhzhia and South. And only in the next two to three weeks, next month it will be clear where Ukraine can actually do the most damage.

Amateurs very often start drawing arrows on maps trying to figure out which movement can be considered a general one, but people who are informed talk about the importance of logistics. Glen, you just emphasized the importance of disrupting enemy's logistics. 

A couple of days ago, I was talking to a serving Ukrainian officer and he said that it doesn't matter how deep they dig their concrete holes in the south, if we destroy their logistics, they can eat each other for the months to come. 

Destroyed logistics means no fuel, no ammunition, and no ability to operate for units that are really dug in very deep. So, if we are talking seriously about destroying the enemy's logistics, we understand that on the one hand, it is about the Kerch bridge, on the other hand, it is about taking under fire control the land corridor from Mariupol to Crimea. And, of course, interruption of communication through the Crimean isthmuses.

Defeating logistics is important. But when you're in a battle like this, what is most important is not so much the strategic logistics, but the tactical logistics. In other words, what is exactly behind the troops that are fighting because that is what affects the most. What affects the most is the gun behind them, not the guns in the distance or the ammunition in the distance. They don't know about this. So to break their morale and break their will as much as possible - this needs to be done by collecting force for the Ukrainian side in front of particular areas, and then destroying the logistics behind those areas so that they have immediate shortages. Because when you concentrate on strategic logistics, you always give the enemy time to move things from one part of the battlefield to another. When you actually attack tactical logistics, in other words the food that he wants to eat tomorrow, the water he needs to drink tomorrow, the ammunition he needs to use today. When you can destroy those, that's when you have the greatest effect on a particular area of the battlefield.

So I think we've done lots on strategic logistics for the last six months, but still Russia keeps coming, and we need to support the frontline soldiers, our frontline infantry by focusing hard on the areas just behind those infantry, the guns just behind so that they don't have any artillery and ammunition to fire back. That is the key to breakthrough.

If we are talking about the enemy's capabilities in the South, we understand that they have certain problems, but they also have certain advantages, including a fairly strong, heavily fortified defensive line reinforced by minefields, fired positions, and a large number of aircraft and artillery. On the other hand, we realize that the key task now is to split the enemy's southern grouping. It can be split not even directly through successful ground combat, but also through fire control that would interrupt normal communication between the two potentially split southern groups. How long could such a campaign last and how difficult would it be? If we are talking about the South, then we will move on to the East.

Let me just say I don't think that that's it for the South because Russia always has the potential to bring more people, more reserves and put them in front of the Ukrainians. The only thing that is going to break the South is if there is a complete unraveling of the frontline. And by that I mean Ukraine breaks through somewhere and gets behind people. The moment they get behind the Russians, they will run.

And the key is to get through, to get a gap and to exploit that gap and effectively surround the Russians from behind. But even then it could be a long hard battle all the way to Berdiansk. It may not actually just come apart that easily. So I don't think you should put timetables on this at all. You just have to accept that the frontline has to be supported as best as we can and that means obviously more drones, more soft-skinned vehicles, more ambulances, everything that the boys need to keep pushing forward because this battle could go on it could go on for another two or three years, don't underestimate the capacity of Russia to throw away everything on Earth in the general direction of Ukraine. We have to be prepared for a long battle and have to be prepared for this breakthrough taking real time. Just steady movement, kilometer by kilometer, which is what's happening at the moment.

But that's why you have to follow principles of war, one of which is concentration of force. Concentration of force is vital in this case if you want to break through.

In your opinion, should we consider the Kupiansk-Lyman, Donetsk and Southern directions as separate fronts or battlefields, particularly when it comes to the enemy's strategy? Are they trying to play in their own way in the three local areas, or does Gerasimov still have the strength to concentrate it all and bring it to the general logic of the military campaign?

That is a big question because they concentrated their efforts on Bakhmut with no success. So I would have said that they would not do the same thing again, but they might. This is Russia, it's entirely possible that they will go and do exactly the same, step on the same rake again and try to do something. But I think that what they are trying to do at the moment is to keep the battle as wide as possible. Because when it is as wide as possible, it forces Ukraine to think very hard about the committing of reserves because there is always somewhere where Russia is advancing. And I think this is a case now of the general staff and they must hold their nerve because it's quite possible that in the Lyman area or even north of Donetsk that Russia might break through and start actually moving forward. That doesn't mean to say they can keep moving forward. It just means that they are exploiting the gaps that Ukraine has got at the moment because Ukraine cannot cover the whole of the front with complete strength as it pushes towards the South. And this is what Russia is banking on that they want to create thrusts in the North that force Ukraine to pull reserves north to Lyman and get them away from the South. So this is poker and it's who blinks first at the moment.

Kupiansk-Lyman area. We understand that the enemy may have good logistics there. It is convenient for them to transport there ammunition, personnel, etc. Fighting is intensifying there. It's hard to say how high the intensity will be over the next couple of weeks, but the enemy is moving a large number of trained military there.

Yes, and I think that they will become more because this is Russia's attempt to change the phase of the battlefield, but the fact is that Ukraine has made its play in the South. And now it has to keep going in the South and keep pushing because if they break open the South, it doesn't matter what happens in the North, because the real prizes in this battle are Donetsk and Crimea. So they need to keep pushing towards those because those are the things that will change the strategic thinking back inside Russia. Those are the things that will change the dynamics of the politics. Lyman, nobody in Russia knows where Lyman is, nor do they care. But they do know where Crimea and Donetsk are. So if either of those two falls, the politics will change in Russia. They have to because Putin will not be able to survive losing something of that importance.

At the same time, we understand that Russia is now trying to commit another crime not only against Ukraine, but also against international maritime law, in particular, Russia's attempt to annex the Black Sea basin, which belongs to Ukraine as well. Accordingly, we see an increase in attacks on Odesa and southern Ukraine, but this is likely to be part of the overall concept of Russian aggression in the Black Sea basin. The NATO-Ukraine Council has been convened, and we understand that extremely serious steps must be taken in response, because the Black Sea basin is a very serious story in terms of international law and beyond. How successful can the strategy of deterring the Russians in the Black Sea basin be now, and what do you think, Colonel, they might be up to, particularly when it comes to trying to attack the South? The South is the South of Ukraine, Moldova, and so on. Do they have the strength to do that? Or is this a kind of red herring?

The first thing, you need to forget about international law. There is no international law in a war like this. Russia has broken every international law to do with war so far. So they're not interested and it doesn't matter whether they break it. The fact is that they've done it. It also appears that the West doesn't care where the laws are upheld or not because they haven't done anything previously. Remember that Russia has been mining the Baltic and those mines have gone into Romanian harbors. Russia has also been stopping ships previously and they stop NATO ships like from Bulgaria and nobody has done anything. So let's forget this law aspect of it. 

Secondly, I don't see this as being anything unusual or different. The fact is that Russia is trying to attack Ukraine in every way that it can and where there is a weakness, they will attack. And there is a weakness because there is no Ukrainian Navy at the moment. And therefore, they have the opportunity to put pressure on Ukraine in the South, to put potential pressure on Ukraine for Moldova and Transnistria, and remember this at the same time as they are putting pressure on Ukraine in the north using the Wagner group. So this is Russia actually moving the pieces on the football playing field into a position that suits them, into a position that causes Ukraine the most problems, and they are causing problems.

But don't forget that almost every action taking place against Ukraine is part of an interior Russian action. And so many of the things that they're doing are there to show that Putin is still a strong man, that he can still put pressure not just on Ukraine, but on NATO, as he is the one putting pressure on NATO and NATO countries down in the Baltic Sea. And he thinks this is good. So you're pressurizing Romania, you're pressurizing Bulgaria and you're pressurizing Turkey. This is a positive win for him in what he's doing internally by showing that he's still the hard man, and he can still do what it is he wants to do.

The relocation of Wagner's criminal organization to Belarus. We understand that their personnel is currently insufficient, but we see how Belarus is gradually being filled with Russian mercenaries as well as with Russian equipment. It is clear that this group is not enough to successfully carry out a military provocation against Ukraine, but they may try to undermine the border with Lithuania and Poland. And they will formally act as an extraterritorial war-criminal group and will not represent the official government of Belarus or possibly Russia. The key story here is how the Euro-Atlantic allies will react in the event of a military provocation that would come under a false flag, not formally from Putin, but from Wagner's criminal organization, and we are talking about Poland and Lithuania. We understand the game Putin wants to play in Belarus, using the Wagner criminal organization there. That is, in response to the military provocation created by the Wagnerites, a strike could be launched on the territory of Belarus. Then other additional security protocols are to be launched.

First of all, with Wagner group, we have to forget everything that's gone on before because it was all theater. It was all theater. It was all games, and none of us actually know the extent of those games and who was really involved in them. We just have to look at Wagner group where it is at the moment. Yes, they are actually not very large. There's not that many of them but they are being reinforced by Russia which means usually when this happens it means that someone is going to be used for something. We have no idea what that's something is. They could even be reinforced to protect Putin, such is the bazarness of Russian politics at the moment.

But don't forget that the Wagner group in its current position not only threatens Northern Ukraine. It threatens Poland. It threatens Vilnius because they're quite close to Vilnius as a capital in Lithuania, but it also threatens Latvia around the side. So they are potential in military terms, just because they're not doing anything. They actually create problems for NATO as well as for Ukraine just by their existence of where they are. They don't actually need to do anything. They just need to exist where they are. 

Now you asked about what NATO would do? Well, let's be clear. If Wagner crosses the NATO border, they will be counterattacked and very very quickly. And then the game is completely different. There is no way that NATO can accept Wagner group crossing the Polish border or Lithuanian border or whatever and not being fought and destroyed. NATO has to do that. Otherwise, the whole purpose of NATO is dissolved.

So I am sure that Russia knows this, Putin knows this and Wagner group knows this. That if they go and do something it's death for them. I don't think that they will be used for that, except in the most stupid and extreme cases. And I don't see them being used stupidly if they're being reinforced. They're being reinforced to do something. And it's more likely that something is Ukraine somewhere.

The criminal Kartapolov, who sits in the Russian State Duma, a couple of days ago revealed state secrets of the Russian Federation in response to his proposed changes to mobilization orders in Russia. He said, of course, we will do this because we are preparing for a long war. And the key story here is how to interpret the concept of a long war in the Russian sense? On the one hand, it is a question of intensity and readiness to use additional human and technical resources, or it is just a delay in time. How do you see Russia preparing for this phase, Colonel, and will they really go for it?

I assess the preparation quite strongly. I mean they're working on their own defense industry. They're working on mobilizing more people, as well as on their relationships with North Korea, China, and Iran. They're working hard to create a stronger Soviet system. I use the word Soviet, not Russian - Soviet system that can actually fight against Ukraine for a long time, and can destroy Ukraine bit by bit by using mass resources. That is what they're doing at the moment and their intention is to keep doing this for as long as it takes until the West gives in.

And in Putin's view, I am sure he thinks that if he keeps this going for another two years, the West will fall and collapse and there will be a peace deal that keeps him with the ground that he's got. The government in Ukraine is making a serious mistake in underestimating the stubbornness of Russia for this war -  by not preparing properly, by not going to war, by not mobilizing properly, by not organizing the defense industry properly. Russia is doing this at the moment, whereas Ukraine is not. This is a serious mistake to rely just on the allies because at some stage the allies will run out of equipment, ammunition and everything else, and Ukraine will be much more on its own and expected to do more on its own. So the country needs to gear itself for the idea that this war could go on for two, three, even four years. Remember the Second World War was five years. First World War almost five years. So we still could have potentially a long way to go yet.

Dear Colonel, what was the British reaction to the resignation of the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Ukraine to the United Kingdom, Mr. Prystaiko? It surprised a lot of people. We have read words of support from, among others, the British Secretary of Defense, Ben Wallace. So, in your opinion, what happened to Prystaiko and, in general, how are we doing in the current phase of British-Ukrainian relations?

In general there's almost no reaction from the public because the Ambassador is not so well known that the public will say, oh, this is terrible. He's obviously known by the political class, and he was well liked by the political class, the politicians, by the British Ministry of Defense. I am sure that they are hoping that someone comes from Ukraine that will be as good as the Ambassador has been. But in general, ambassadors are not seen in most Western countries as something major unless they actually push themselves out into the public view and do a lot. So there are very few ambassadors that are known publicly. They are known politically by their actions and by their words and everything else. There's no public unhappiness about this, most of the public don't even know. But you need another good Ambassador because you've lost one.

We are interested in this because we are concerned about whether the number of Storm Shadow deliveries to Ukraine will be reduced. We understand how important these long-range missiles have proven to be.

Of course, there will be a decrease because as you use them, there are fewer to be used. At the moment industry in general cannot produce more. Or at the same rate that they will be used. So there will be a reduction in missiles like this. That is absolutely guaranteed. And it's something that Ukraine has to understand that it must make its own. It must actually work out how to make its own Storm Shadow and quickly. And there are all the brains and the actual capacity inside Ukraine. This is a matter of government will and frankly someone sensible put in charge of Ukroboronprom and actually starting to make things that Ukraine needs.

Thank you very much, dear Glen, for this frank conversation on Espreso TV. God save the King. Glory to Ukraine 

God Save the King and a glory to Heroes and I must say how wonderful the soldiers in the South are fighting, and what a remarkable job they're doing. They have the respect of every army in the world at the moment for their attitude in the way that they're fighting, and I just hope that they keep going and that the breakthrough comes and comes quicker rather than later.