
Russian helicopters downed in Belgorod, new details emerge in Ukrainian ammo deal. Serhiy Zgurets' column
Four Russian helicopters were taken out in Belgorod thanks to a precision op by Ukraine’s special forces, intelligence, and military. Ammo meant for them—part of a $600M defense deal involving a Polish middleman—has now sparked a deeper controversy
Situation in Belgorod region
First of all, there is good news that two Ka-52 attack helicopters and two Mi-8 transport helicopters were destroyed in the Belgorod region. This is the result of the skillful actions of the Ukrainian Special Operations Forces in cooperation with the Defence Intelligence of Ukraine and the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The strike was carried out with the help of the HIMARS system using high-precision GMLRS projectiles with a range of 70 km. The site where the helicopters were destroyed is located at a distance of about 55 km from the state border. This story shows the high quality of interaction between the receipt of operational data from the SSO and the almost instantaneous response of Ukrainian weapons.
The Russians are using these helicopters to attack the positions of the Ukrainian troops in the Kursk region and to localize Ukrainian attacks in the Belgorod region, where Ukrainian units are penetrating into Russian territory. This section is in the area of Demydivka, possibly Popivka and Grafivka, which are located in a straight line about 16 kilometers from the village of Guievo in Kursk region, which is still held by the Ukrainian Defense Forces.
Kursk direction
These actions in the Belgorod region, of course, are aimed at making it more difficult for the enemy to redeploy troops from the Kursk region to other areas and create uncertainty for the Russians about Ukraine's future plans for active defense in these areas.
Ukrainian Armed Forces Major Valeriy Prozapas said that the situation is not as intense now as when Russian troops tried to surround Ukrainian troops in the Kursk region. The Russians failed to do so, and Ukrainian units retreated to their own territory. There were no major breakthroughs by the Russians, as reported by Russian publicists and propagandists. Border fighting continues at a low intensity compared to last year in October and until the beginning of spring this year. There are defense lines where Ukrainian defenders are ready to meet Russian forces. It would be interesting to know whether the Russians will use North Korean soldiers on the territory of Ukraine, as this could affect the further course of the war. After all, then another state will enter the war on the territory of Ukraine on the side of the Russian Federation. But so far, there is no information about the presence of DPRK troops on the territory of Ukraine, although the Russian occupiers are trying to put pressure on the border settlements.
Ukraine Russia war live map, March 15-22, Photo: Espreso
The officer added that the number of Russian soldiers in the Kursk direction is not decreasing. They are concentrating and trying to regroup. However, it is not yet known whether this means that the invaders will try to push further.
Prozapas noted that we need to draw conclusions from what has been happening in the Kursk region over the past month. We have to realize that the Russian army is making progress: the occupiers have learned to take control of logistics connections quite effectively, not at the front line, but deep into the Ukrainian army's lines. The Russians have gained serious strike capabilities, including fiber-optic drones, and they also have powerful aerial reconnaissance and superiority in frontline aviation. Accordingly, all of this must be analyzed in order to further plan not only Ukraine's offensive, but also its retreat, taking into account the Russian capabilities.
The serviceman noted that we need to pay attention to the engineering equipment of firing positions and the protection of vehicles moving along or to the front line. In addition, pump-action rifles have proven to be a good option, as they can effectively hit Russian FPV drones on firing positions or vehicles. However, these weapons are used by both the Armed Forces and Russian forces. After all, the war has now become technological, and almost every week new means, methods, and tactics appear that the Ukrainian Defense Forces use to achieve more effective results. But the Russians are doing the same. All these intelligence and strike capabilities do not allow for quick operational breakthroughs, let alone strategic ones. That's why we are in such a tough, exhausting fight against the occupying Russian army.
The major emphasized that without personnel, fortifications do not solve the situation, because the war is not won by fortifications alone, or by aviation, or by FPVs, or F-16s - there must be a whole range of work to adequately counter such a military power as the Russian army. We need to be honest about the problems we have, and the failed mobilization is showing. This should be recognized not only by the soldiers, but also by the officials who made many mistakes in the information sphere, which made people hate the Territorial Centre of Recruitment. That is, there should be a comprehensive approach, truthful information, effective and efficient decisions, readiness for a long and exhausting war against the Russian occupiers - all this is the key to our success.
Summarizing Valeriy's point that we should draw conclusions from any stage of the war, I think that conclusions should also be drawn from the procurement and supply of weapons for public funds, because it seems that we are systematically moving along the rake we have already stepped on more than once.
Fraud in shell procurement for Ukraine's Armed Forces
Perhaps some people have already forgotten the story I wrote about last year, when in November 2024, UAH 23 billion was transferred from the Ministry of Defense budget to the State Border Guard Service to purchase ammunition for the Armed Forces through a Polish intermediary, Lechmar. At the time, the leadership of the Ministry of Defense and the State Border Guard Service actively explained this unusual transfer of funds for the urgent supply of ammunition to the front and the alleged availability of this ammunition from the intermediary company Lechmar.
Let me remind you that these were, among other things, scarce Soviet 122-caliber ammunition and new 155 mm ammunition. I wrote that the negative consequences of this deal for the interests of the state were almost guaranteed. Why? What was so strange then? For example, the requirement of 100% prepayment against the background of a promise to quickly supply new ammunition in large quantities. Fast is, of course, more expensive. Other details also raised questions.
However, at the time, there were many refuting statements from the State Border Guard Service and Lechmar, who claimed that everything was happening within the law and that the Polish company had been providing the State Border Guard Service with everything it needed for ten years. In other words, they are longtime partners, and everything is going according to plan with these supplies, for which UAH 23 billion from the Defense Ministry budget was redirected.
In January of this year, the Polish company Lechmar announced that the military goods under the contract with the State Border Guard Service had already been inspected by a military commission and were being prepared for shipment to Ukraine. This message was spread by Ukrainian media in January.
It seemed that the company was really fulfilling its obligations. But the sensation is that the State Border Guard Service responded to a request from MP Yaroslav Zheleznyak, which he sent to the State Border Guard Service on March 10. The request concerned the exercise of delegated defense procurement authority from the Ministry of Defense for UAH 23 billion at the end of 2024.
The response states that Lechmar has debts to the State Tax Service of Ukraine amounting to more than UAH 26 billion, or UAH 26.6 billion to be exact. In particular, the receivables with violation of delivery terms amount to almost UAH 1.7 billion. If there is such a colossal debt, exceeding even UAH 23 billion, it is likely that the promises to supply ammunition and additional orders have simply not been fulfilled.
And the question arises: what arguments will Lechmar now give to explain its debts to the State Border Guard Service? And, most importantly, what explanations will the heads of Ukrainian structures have when they talk about the urgency of supplying ammunition to the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the need for 100% prepayment for the purchase of large volumes of ammunition? By the way, the response to the request states that the administration of the State Border Guard Service is carrying out systematic work to reduce the amount of budgetary debt.
So, this is the interim result of this deal. And I think there is something to pay attention to, first of all, the president, because it is not only about the late receipt of shells, but also about the lost territories and lives of our military due to the lack of mines and shells as a result of undelivered ammunition.
All of the above-mentioned ministries and responsible persons should be held accountable for all of these transactions. And that's the story of these expensive shells, which we will probably detail in our publications on this explosive topic later.
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