How sanctioned Russian media RT evades sanctions by cloning websites

As reported by Insight News, to evade these restrictions, RT uses tactics like cloning its content across multiple domains, targeting international audiences in languages such as Spanish, German, and French, especially during elections and politically sensitive times.

RT redirects users from old addresses to "friendly" new websites. These sites replicate RT's design and messaging while slightly altering domain names. Despite efforts to shut them down, RT continues to flood the digital landscape with its propaganda.

List of RT domains:

• actualidad-rt.com
• annurtv.com
• dert.online
• dert.site
• dert.tech
• es-rt.com
• esrt.online
• esrt.press
• esrt.site
• esrt.space
• esrt.tech
• esrt.website
• freedert.online
• leitertv.com
• rt.com
• rt.rs
• rtarabic.com
• rtbrasil.com
• rtde.life
• rtde.live
• rtde.me
• rtde.site
• rtde.team
• rtde.tech
• rtde.website
• rtde.world
• rtde.xyz
• rteam.tech
• rtenafrique.tv
• rtenfrance.tv
• rtnewsde.com
• rtnewsde.online
• rtnewsde.pro
• rtnewsde.site
• rtnewsde.tech
• rtve.es
• rurtnews.com

Target languages and audiences

RT’s cloned content primarily targets Spanish, German, and French-speaking audiences. These regions hold significant sway over elections and policy decisions due to their size and political importance.

Spanish-language RT

RT has focused extensively on Spanish-speaking regions, including Spain and Latin America. It uses websites such as esrt.online and actualidad-rt.com to deliver disinformation tailored to Spanish speakers, aligning with Russian foreign policy objectives.

German-language RT

In Germany, RT aims to influence a major European power through sites like RTDE.life, RTnewsde.pro, and RTDE.website. These platforms have been instrumental in spreading Kremlin-backed propaganda during critical political events, including European and German elections.

French-language RT

French-speaking areas, including Europe and Africa, are also targets for RT. Domains like rtenfrance.tv are used to reach these audiences by mimicking the appearance of reputable news sources while promoting a pro-Russian agenda.

Impact on elections and public opinion

RT’s strategy of cloning websites is aimed at swaying public opinion, especially during crucial periods like elections. The network uses its Spanish, German, and French sites to disseminate content designed to polarize audiences, erode trust in democratic institutions, and support political figures or parties that align with Russian interests.

In Germany and France, RT amplifies anti-EU sentiments, stokes racial and immigration-related tensions, and backs far-right or populist groups that support Moscow’s geopolitical objectives. In Spanish-speaking countries, RT often promotes narratives that undermine U.S. influence in Latin America and supports authoritarian regimes that are aligned with the Kremlin.

RT’s evasion of regulatory measures

Despite significant efforts by authorities to limit RT’s reach, the spread of cloned websites has made it increasingly challenging to block its content. Whenever internet service providers take down or block one of RT’s domains, RT or its affiliates quickly launch new clone sites under different names, often hosted in countries with looser internet regulations. This decentralized approach helps RT withstand takedown attempts and continue its operations.

The importance of vigilance against state propaganda

RT’s method of cloning content and launching multiple websites underscores the adaptive strategies used by state-sponsored media to bypass sanctions and continue spreading false information. By targeting major European languages, RT aims to influence regions of significant political, cultural, and economic importance.

This situation spresses the need for stronger, coordinated international actions to dismantle these cloned networks and prevent the further spread of Kremlin-backed propaganda.

• The Center for Countering Disinformation has identified the main propaganda tactics allegedly used by Russia in Poland, including efforts to provoke conflict in Polish-Ukrainian relations.