Major Russian arsenal burns near Moscow as Russia’s battlefield losses mount. Serhiy Zgurets' column

51st GRAU arsenal detonates in Russia 

Following Russia's deceptive 30-hour truce imposed on Ukraine, fighting has resumed along the front lines. Russian troops launched airstrikes on Zaporizhzhia and carried out drone attacks on Kharkiv.

One of the largest arsenals of the Russian Ministry of Defense, the 51st Arsenal of the GRAU, is currently on fire. It is likely second in size only to the arsenal in Toropets, which was destroyed in September 2024. Although somewhat smaller, the 51st Arsenal stored a significant amount of artillery shells, missiles of various types — including ballistic missiles — as well as mines and other weaponry.

The arsenal is located near the village of Barsovo, Russia’s Vladimir region, about 530 kilometers from the Ukrainian border and just 70 kilometers from Moscow. Its proximity to the capital suggests it should have been well protected by air defense systems.

According to reports and videos shared on local Telegram channels, a powerful explosion occurred at the site, followed by secondary detonations as additional storage units went up in flames. It remains unclear whether the incident was caused by a Ukrainian drone strike or internal sabotage.

The Russian Defense Ministry claims that the explosions resulted from an ammunition detonation caused by a fire at the military base. Ukraine’s General Staff has not yet confirmed any attack on the 51st GRAU Arsenal. More information is expected to emerge later, clarifying what exactly happened and outlining the consequences of the explosions at this strategically important ammunition and ballistic missile depot.

Frontline situation — Russian losses

Meanwhile, the Ukrainian General Staff reported on the overall situation from the previous day, highlighting ongoing combat activity. A total of 165 clashes were recorded, which falls within the average range. The heaviest fighting took place in the Pokrovsk sector, where Russian forces launched 61 attacks — all of which were successfully repelled. As in previous assaults, Russian troops made extensive use of armored vehicles, personnel, and transport equipment.

OSINT analysts have released an infographic tracking the number of armored vehicles, tanks, IFVs, and other equipment used by Russian forces since 2024. In the graphic, red indicates an increase in destroyed vehicles. Over the past week alone, 1,700 units were eliminated, while the numbers of destroyed armored vehicles (marked in orange) and tanks (marked in blue) remained largely unchanged.

This suggests that Russian forces are currently relying most heavily on a variety of other vehicles. It's even difficult to determine whether the motorcycles actively used in assaults should be classified as automotive equipment or counted among enemy personnel losses.

Notably, several new videos surfaced recently. Among them, Ukraine’s 31st Separate Mechanized Brigade shared footage showing Russian forces attempting to storm Ukrainian positions in several waves, using both infantry and the aforementioned motorcycles.

The 31st Mechanized Brigade, together with the 15th Separate Mountain Assault Battalion, struck the occupying forces using a combination of drones and artillery. As a result, 16 Russian motorcycles and several groups of Russian  infantry were destroyed.

Meanwhile, Ukraine's Defence Intelligence unit Artan shared a reminder of their recent success on the Zaporizhzhia front. Just before Easter, Russian forces launched a major assault involving 300 soldiers, 40 armored vehicles, 3 tanks, and around 10 buggies. Artan showcased how drones and artillery were effectively employed to crush the attack. These two tools remain critical for halting enemy advances and inflicting maximum losses.

Russia seeks ways to strengthen its military-industrial complex

However, when it comes to artillery, Russia is also heavily dependent on this type of weapon. It is known that around 60% of Russia’s artillery ammunition now comes from North Korea. Additionally, there are intentions to source artillery supplies and gunpowder from China, as Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy pointed out last week. Foreign reports also suggest that Russia is seeking to tap into the capacities of European countries to further bolster its defense industry.

For instance, a report by Handelsblatt revealed that a German company, founded in 2006, had been purchasing chromium in Germany and supplying it to Russia, where it was used for defense production. While such schemes are not entirely new, their execution within Germany underscores how Russia is exploiting every possible avenue to reinforce its military capabilities.

Olena Yurchenko, Director of Analytics, Research, and Investigations at the Economic Security Council of Ukraine and a senior analyst at Truman, noted that the Handelsblatt report highlights one of the major cases involving Russia’s supply of chromium raw materials. However, trade data also show that Russia has been using not only Germany but also the Netherlands as export hubs for chromium, primarily in raw form. This case clearly demonstrates that it remains possible to deliver dual-use goods through the EU — goods that can later be used to repair and restore Russian artillery.

Yurchenko also emphasized a second critical point: although the company involved is registered in Germany, it was founded by Russians in 2006, has Russian management, and maintains a branch in Moscow. Moreover, open government procurement data directly link the company to the Russian military-industrial complex. This reveals a broader pattern — businesses in Europe, established by Russians either before the full-scale invasion or around 2014 following the annexation of Crimea, continue to support the Russian defense industry.

Thirdly, Yurchenko stressed that this case is crucial for refining sanctions targeting. Chromium, as noted in the publication, is essential for restoring artillery barrels. Russia today is primarily focused on restoring its Soviet-era artillery stockpiles rather than producing new equipment from scratch. This signals an important shift: the sanctions community and civil society are increasingly turning their attention to other aspects of Russia’s defense industry activities — particularly the repair and restoration of existing arsenals, not just new production.

The analyst highlighted a crucial point: the issue at hand is not the supply of finished chromium but rather chromium ore. While Russia often boasts about the mineral wealth of the Ural region, in reality, it has many "Achilles' heels" in its resource base. These vulnerabilities can be divided into two categories. The first includes resources for which Russia has processing capabilities but lacks sufficient raw materials, such as chromium or titanium. The second group consists of raw materials that Russia possesses but cannot process domestically, leading to their export. This situation presents significant opportunities for expanding sanctions pressure.

Currently, the focus is on chromium, but other critical materials — including beryllium, tantalum, titanium, rhenium, and even lead — are also areas where Russia holds substantial reserves but has limited domestic processing expertise. This opens the door for the sanctions coalition to exert even greater pressure on Russia's defense-industrial base.

The researcher also noted that Russia’s present-day production capabilities are a legacy of the Soviet system of labor division among USSR republics, where no single republic had a complete production cycle — and Russia was no exception. These dependencies persisted after the collapse of the Soviet Union, with Russia now reliant on imports from independent states.

A major challenge for Russia is that many facilities critical to military production were shut down in the post-Soviet period. For instance, production lines for explosives such as RDX and HMX at the Sverdlov plant were dismantled around 2006, with restoration efforts only beginning in 2015. It wasn’t until 2019 that Russia started establishing subsidiaries and expanding production. These compounds — RDX and HMX — are essential components for cluster munitions and solid rocket fuels.

Yurchenko summarized that currently, there is a global boom in orders for various types of steel, metals, and chemical precursors that have any kind of military use. However, due to sanctions, stable supply channels have been cut off — for example, as was the case with Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, which used to supply nitrocellulose to Russia. Naturally, the “last of the Mohicans” that Russia may turn to is China. But again, the higher the bar is raised regarding involvement in military use, the harder it becomes to supply such materials.

It is worth noting that throughout the full-scale invasion, China has maintained a stable position and has not crossed the red line of direct military supplies — the goods involved have always been dual-use items. At this point, we still lack sufficient evidence to claim that China has actually crossed that line.