Russia's summer offensive: major risks emerge along key frontlines. Serhiy Zgurets’ column

Trump-Putin talks: fighting returns to the battlefield

So, Russia refuses a ceasefire and continues to bet on gains on the battlefield and concessions from Ukraine and the West. This is the main takeaway from talks between Trump and Putin and the statements that followed the phone call. After speaking with Putin, Trump said that Russia and Ukraine should immediately begin direct negotiations and agree on ceasefire terms between themselves. In turn, Putin started talking about “eliminating the root causes of the conflict” and a supposed memorandum with compromise solutions. But we know that this is impossible, because Russia believes that Ukraine as an independent state and Ukrainians as a nation should not exist.

Thus, everything once again returns to the battlefield, where the fate of both Ukraine and European countries is being decided. The future depends on the combat capabilities of the Ukrainian Defense Forces, their development, and the optimal approaches and practices of active defense by the Armed Forces, from strategic to tactical levels. Through careful planning, effective command, and the proper use of forces and resources, the enemy must suffer maximum losses, significantly greater than what it can replenish through contracts and new waves of mobilization.

Development of the defense industry of Ukraine and EU

Regarding our defense capabilities: in addition to developing internal potential, there are new practical advances in relations with the European Union. Today in Brussels, EU defense ministers met to discuss further military support for Ukraine and strengthening Europe’s own defense capacity. Following the meeting, as early as May 21, EU representatives are expected to formally approve the creation of a new credit mechanism called the Security Action for Europe, totaling €150 billion. This fund will provide loans to EU countries and other states, including Ukraine, for the development of the defense industry. It involves the procurement of weapons using EU credit resources.

On May 20, Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov stated that the priority for Ukraine is the procurement of drones and artillery shells using credit resources. According to him, Ukraine, together with its partners, is developing the capability to produce over 1 million 155mm shells annually. These are the first figures of this scale publicly shared by the Ukrainian side, in addition to the 2 million shells the EU plans to supply to Ukraine this year under its own initiatives. Ukraine is also interested in cooperation in other critical areas: artillery systems, electronic warfare equipment, and air defense systems.

Creating an advantage on the battlefield is not just about having more drones, shells, and artillery, it’s also about what our military has long been implementing. One example is fortification. Its purpose is to stop the Russians and protect our soldiers. The number of fortifications is significantly increasing, as confirmed by satellite imagery and photos showing major progress in many directions.

Notably, Ukraine is adapting to changes in enemy tactics: Russians increasingly rely on infantry instead of armored vehicles. That’s why anti-tank ditches now also serve an anti-infantry role, with barbed wire laid alongside them to hinder the advance of Russian troops. But all of this is just part of an overall tactical approach. What’s crucial now is that all these elements form a cohesive system capable of containing the enemy on the battlefield.

Frontline situation

Currently, the intensity of fighting along the front line remains high. Over the past day, 177 Russian attacks were repelled — a very significant number.

Victor Kevlyuk, a military expert at the Center for Defense Strategies and a retired colonel of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, believes that the start of Russia’s summer offensive campaign is marked by the deployment of the 20th and 150th Motorized Rifle Divisions of the Russian 8th Army in the Toretsk sector. There is no reason to believe the Russians are capable of any radical changes in their military tactics.

In his opinion, we should expect frontal pressure along the entire offensive line, combined with attempts to encircle or capture more or less tactically significant settlements. At the same time, we should keep in mind that the recent appointment of General Mordvichev as commander of Russia's ground forces could lead to the spread of the experience of the Center group of forces, which is currently leading the offensive in the Pokrovsk sector, across other ground units. This may manifest itself in certain peculiarities of assault operations.

The military expert noted that the advance between Pokrovsk and Kostiantynivka will not be the main event of the summer-autumn offensive campaign. Over the past two weeks, the Russians deployed the main forces of the 20th division and part of the 150th division, which broke through the first defensive line of the Khortytsia grouping in the directions of Vozdvyzhenka–Malynivka and Baranivka–Novoolenivka. Russian troops have penetrated the front up to 10 km deep and up to 5 km wide. Russian forces have steadily captured several settlements and reached the line of Novoolenivka–Oleksandropil and Malynivka–Novopoltavka.

This way, the Russians have established full control over the Pokrovsk-Bakhmut highway section in the Malynivka-Novoolenivka area. The command of the Russian 8th Army is intensifying efforts: its advanced units are attacking along the highway in the directions of Novoolenivka–Stepanivka and Oleksandropil–Yablunivka. Russian invaders are trying to break through to Kostiantynivka from the southwest. Meanwhile, intense fighting continues in Chasiv Yar and Toretsk, significantly hindering Russia’s further advance toward Kostiantynivka and overall not bringing the campaign closer to its climax — the assault on the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration. It is possible that the Russian command may take an operational pause to straighten the front line southwest of Toretsk.

A reserve colonel of the Ukrainian Armed Forces spoke about the situation in the Sumy region, noting that within the Russian North grouping, which is stuck in Kharkiv, there is the Kursk group of forces. It has significant strength: two airborne divisions, an airborne assault regiment, two airborne assault brigades, two marine infantry brigades, three marine infantry battalions from various brigades, two motorized rifle regiments, and up to four brigades of North Korean armed forces. In total, the Russians have gathered up to 65,000 troops in this direction, of which approximately 10-15,000 are assigned to cover the state border. In this area, Russian forces have about 160 tanks, 480 armored combat vehicles, 660 artillery pieces and mortars, and 180 multiple rocket launchers. During April-May, the Kursk group command conducted significant redeployments: North Korean troops were pulled back to the second echelon, deeper into Kursk region, and likely the 76th airborne division and the 155th marine infantry brigade were replaced by the 18th motorized rifle division of the 11th corps, which was transferred from the Vovchansk sector.

According to him, the advanced units of the 18th division were immediately engaged in fighting along the Veselivka – Vodolahy – Zhuravka – Bilovody directions to reach the Novomykolaivka – Yablunivka line. Currently, the Russians have managed to advance between the villages of Vodolahy and Bilovody, cutting the road and capturing part of Bilovody, and are fighting on the outskirts of Vodolahy. The Russian 83rd airborne assault brigade has launched several attacks in the Basivka – Loknya direction but has failed to break through to Yunakivka. The overall depth of Russian advances in the border area of the Sumy region is about 9 km toward Novenke – Loknya and about 7 km in the Zhuravka – Bilovody direction. Additionally, Russian invaders hold two small areas north of Volodymyrivka village and near the Oleksandriysky Geological Reserve. Despite the significant number of troops in the Kursk group, their capabilities do not allow for a large-scale offensive operation. Russian occupiers lack the resources to attack everywhere they claim.

The officer believes the Zaporizhzhia and Kherson sectors should be seen as secondary in Russia’s summer campaign. In the Zaporizhzhia region, the Russians will try to reach artillery range to shell the city, thus creating leverage over the Ukrainian delegation in any negotiations. As for the Kherson region, Russian invaders clearly lack the forces and resources even for meaningful tactical actions. The right flank of the Russian Dnepr group will support a slow advance in the Zaporizhzhia region and also serve as a source of reinforcements for the forces there. Russia’s task in the Kherson region will remain the destruction of Ukrainian-controlled territory.

Victor Kevlyuk added that the frontline situation reveals likely Russian attack directions, while the actions of the Russian army’s aviation and missile forces show their interest in the rear areas of Ukraine. Accordingly, measures must be taken to adapt Ukrainian air defense forces to the occupiers’ new tactics; the electronic warfare component needs to be strengthened; and a reserve of surface-to-air missiles must be secured. Additionally, to counter Russian strike drones, short-range air defense systems must be deployed near critical objects that require protection. Urgent solutions are needed for the unification of the production and supply of ammunition for strike drones. We must continue striking Russia’s main airfields and defense enterprises. And finally, a strong information-propaganda campaign must be launched to support mobilization in Ukraine.