Shift in Russian ambitions: Putin sets sights on the Baltics

The Estonian Defense Minister stated that it is unlikely that most of the 600,000 Russian soldiers currently focused on the war with Ukraine will return to civilian life. Considering the difference in earnings between Russian mercenaries and civilians not serving in the Russian Armed Forces, it is more likely that half of these soldiers could be redeployed to Russia's borders with the Baltic countries.

The large-scale military exercises conducted by Russia and Lukashenko's Belarus near the Baltic countries' borders this year may indicate Russia's focus on the potential invasion of the Baltic states, even if these countries remain NATO members.

Many in Ukraine often conclude from such statements that Western countries are not interested in a ceasefire in Ukraine, at least because Russia might be ready for wars on the European continent in the near future. And this, as is known, is not only said by the Estonian Defense Minister, but also, for example, by the head of German intelligence, who earlier emphasized that Russia will need about two years to re-equip its army for war with European countries' forces.

However, I believe this is not entirely a logical interpretation of the situation. In reality, Europe fears not just a ceasefire itself. Europe fears a humiliating truce between Russia and Ukraine that would demonstrate Washington's complete indifference to the terms on which the Russian-Ukrainian war ends.

A ceasefire that creates conditions for Russia not only to gain control over Ukrainian territories but also to establish, without a fight as demanded by the Kremlin, its control over the territories of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia regions currently controlled by the legitimate Ukrainian government, of course, brings Ukraine closer to the possibility of becoming a Russian protectorate.

Moreover, the United States is currently showing no interest whatsoever in discussing security conditions for the country. Even in the humiliating draft of the so-called minerals deal, which is now under consideration by the Ukrainian government, there is no real mention of what the security conditions should be for a country where American corporations are planning to operate.

And this once again shows that the main goal of Donald Trump's administration is not so much to put an end to the war in Ukraine as it is to avoid falling out with Russian leader Vladimir Putin's administration. This aligns with the U.S. administration's task of finding ways to detach Russia from cooperation with the People's Republic of China. At the altar of this illusory idea, which is adhered to by the current U.S. president and members of his inner circle, of course, one can sacrifice the very idea of European security and the willingness of the United States to defend European countries in the event of an attack by Russia, whether declared or, even more so, a hybrid attack.

In this situation, Europeans, especially representatives from countries that share a border with Putin's state, draw a simple conclusion. If the Americans, after three years of the Russian-Ukrainian war and their own investments in Ukraine's defense, are not planning to do anything to force Russia to abandon its war while preserving Ukraine's sovereignty, then why should they be willing to help the Baltic states or, say, Poland? Or other European countries that Putin's army will try to aggress against?

A humiliating ceasefire and truce could allow the Russian leader to test what NATO’s Article 5 might mean. This is especially true in a situation where Donald Trump is in the Oval Office.

At that point, an invasion of the Baltic states by the Russian armada would be virtually inevitable. And this territory — I’m not even mentioning the population of Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, or the number of military personnel ready to defend the country from Russia — is certainly not the same as a war with Ukraine, with its territory and demographic potential. I think no one would even compare Ukraine to the Baltic states.

But we must always remember that a humiliating truce is not only a problem for the Baltic states or Poland. It is also a problem for Ukraine itself. Anyone who claims that European countries are not interested in ending the war because they fear that, after a ceasefire, they will become the next target for the Russian army or the Kremlin needs to realize that the situation could develop in a different direction. Russia may decide to attack not Latvia, but to launch another attack on Ukraine.

Especially in a situation where a large part of Ukrainian territory will not be under the control of the Ukrainian government and will be occupied. This means that effective mobilization measures can be carried out on this territory. After all, the Russian mobilization system, in terms of its repressive nature and effectiveness, is incomparable today to the Ukrainian system.

Thus, it must be remembered that a ceasefire in the Russian-Ukrainian war, if not accompanied by real security guarantees for our state and is, say, a temporary measure to appease Donald Trump's ambitions, even if we imagine that such a ceasefire could be achieved in the near future, could be both a gateway to a large war in Europe and a gateway to a new large war on Ukrainian territory.

There could also be a hybrid scenario, where parts of Ukrainian territories controlled by Russians would be used as a springboard for a renewed attack on Ukraine, while some Russian forces, relocated closer to the borders of the Baltic countries, would be used for an attack on those countries' territories.

No one has said that Russia does not have more ambitious plans to exert pressure on Europe than the situation that arose with the attack on Ukraine on February 24, 2022. Since then, the international situation itself has changed. And this means that Russian ambitions, their content, and the Kremlin’s perception of the role Russia should play in Europe in the near future could have changed as well.

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About the author. Vitaly Portnikov, journalist, laureate of the Shevchenko National Prize of Ukraine.

The editorial team does not always share the opinions expressed by blog or column authors.