Russia's war effort failing — former Finnish intelligence chief

The world is, quite literally, on the brink of a Third World War. We understand that the old order, the traditional system of deterrence, has effectively broken down.

We see very serious risks stemming from the possibility that the United States may not only question Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, but could even withdraw from NATO’s structures altogether. These are real threats, and we understand that the Russian Federation is eager to exploit them for its own criminal purposes.

I am an optimist, but the situation is genuinely alarming. That is why I would like to ask how you assess the current moment and what, in your view, the options are for a joint military response in the event of critical scenarios. How likely is this, when we speak about Europe and Ukraine?

​​Well, you have to remember that President Trump is not the United States.

"The vast majority of Congress (some estimates say over 80% of members) supports US membership in NATO."

That is why, after Mr. Trump’s first term, Congress passed a law stating that a president cannot unilaterally withdraw the United States from NATO. It is not his decision.

Congress understands that it is in US interests to have a strong, well functioning NATO that supports both the United States and, on the other hand, Europe. So yes, it is possible that President Trump may pull some troops out of Europe. But again, in the current National Defense Authorization Act (the US defense budget), Congress has also put limits on that, making it more difficult for Trump to withdraw troops or remove US officers from the NATO command structure.

So, talk of NATO being in crisis, or NATO being about to lose the United States, is far too early. I do not think that is going to happen.

And NATO as an organization is working better and better because the member countries are putting more and more effort into defense. They have new capabilities, new troops, and new weapons systems coming in, and the number of exercises is increasing.

In fact, the other day NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte spoke here in the European Parliament. He was very adamant that NATO is functioning, and that it is ready to counter any possible threats and military attacks by Russia, while at the same time doing more and more to support Ukraine.

I would like you to outline the situation. Do you see any possibility of de-escalation? Or, if we look at Russia’s preparations for 2026, do they instead point to preparations for a further prolonged war?

We understand that there are a number of indicators, including the way Russia is budgeting for the war, which suggest that the Russians intend to continue fighting in Ukraine at least throughout 2026. At the same time, it is possible that they may have additional resources to carry out a military provocation against Estonia, Lithuania, or Latvia, and possibly even against Finland.

Russia is definitely preparing for a long war. Its economy is essentially a war economy. Everything else is suffering and declining, except war material production.

They have been trying to create new strategic reserves in order to be able to confront NATO as soon as possible. However, lately they have run into major problems because of Ukraine’s strong defense. Russian forces are suffering bigger and bigger losses.

Again, Secretary General Rutte said the other day that Russia is losing around 20,000 to 25,000 soldiers killed in action every month in Ukraine, not just wounded, but killed. That prevents them from building up larger reserves. 

"But the fact remains that Putin is preparing for a confrontation with NATO."

NATO’s chiefs of military intelligence have been very clear about this. They believe that even though Russia does not have the capability to threaten NATO militarily in any major way, it still has the capability to challenge Article 5. That means conducting a small and limited operation against a single NATO country, and then trying to blackmail NATO with nuclear threats, warning that it would use nuclear weapons if there is a counterattack, and hoping that NATO cracks and refuses to defend one of its members.

That is what they may be preparing to do, and it is a very possible scenario in the near future.

We are talking about a common European response, yes. But at the same time, we understand that different countries have different levels — not so much of financial readiness, and not so much of personnel training.

What we are really talking about is Europe’s and Europeans’ willingness to shift from a normal pacifist way of life to a wartime mode in the event of a Russian provocation and Russian aggression. Over the past month, Russians have several times, at the highest level, made rude and brutal statements directed at Europeans. Putin called them “piglets.”

Yes, this is unprecedented rhetoric from Putin. He previously did not allow himself anything like this. Then they began to walk back and adjust their statements, and once again Russia is threatening war.

So, if we are talking about the psychological dimension and Europeans’ readiness to defend their shared European home — what potential problems do you see, and what, in your view, needs to be done as quickly as possible?

"Russian threats are nothing new. They might be new for people living in Western Europe, but not for those who live close to Russia. We know the Russians."

It is also a clear sign that Russia is getting nervous. They are afraid. They see that the war is going badly and that the economy is crumbling, and therefore they are trying to make more and more noise, becoming more threatening in order to scare Europe into stopping support for Ukraine. That is not going to happen.

At the same time, Europe is working very hard on two things. First, we are building up our defense industry so that we can produce equipment not only for ourselves, but also for Ukraine. Second, we are strengthening our own defense capabilities.

There are clear decisions in place on how NATO members, for example, will increase defense spending to 3.5%, plus an additional 1.5% on other defense related areas, including protecting civilian society, by 2035. Many countries are already moving toward that goal.

And it is not only about building future industrial capacity and future forces. Current forces are also training extensively. For example, in Finland, in the far north, NATO troops are essentially exercising every month in Finnish Lapland. Similar activities are taking place across Europe, and these exercises also focus on how to deploy NATO forces to the eastern flank as quickly as possible.

So we are getting ready on both tracks, in NATO and in the EU.

Putin is now resorting to an extremely criminal practice against Ukraine’s civilian population. Russian forces are deliberately destroying our energy infrastructure. Ukraine is experiencing unprecedented frost and extreme cold. People are suffering and people are freezing. The Kremlin has done this knowingly and intentionally. At the same time, Russia carried out a strike using the Oreshnik missile, a potentially nuclear capable system, targeting the Lviv region.

We understand that the Kremlin is signaling its willingness to use this type of ballistic weapon, potentially even against European Union countries. This is a deliberate show of force. I would like to ask you how serious the risk is that Russia could use one form or another of nuclear weapons.

Again, this is a clear sign that the war is going badly for Russia. The only thing that makes Russia “important” nowadays is not its economy, because it does not have significant economic power.

It is also not its conventional military, because it is not something they could use to seriously threaten Europe. The only thing they have left is nuclear weapons.

The use of Oreshnik is a good example of that. They are trying to scare Western societies and Western countries into stopping support for Ukraine by showcasing a platform developed to carry nuclear warheads. At the same time, they use propaganda to claim this is a new weapon system, a “silver bullet,” supposedly impossible to defend against, totally undefeatable, and so on. These are the same kinds of narratives Hitler used at the end of the Second World War, when he kept presenting so called Wunderwaffe, miracle weapons that would supposedly turn the war in Germany’s favor.

Putin is doing the same. And his “Wunderwaffe,” his miracle weapons, are about as effective as Germany’s were in the Second World War.

There is nothing fundamentally new here. Oreshnik, like much of Russian military technology, is based on Soviet era foundations. It is old technology, slightly upgraded, and it is not even fully operationally ready yet.

So this is not something the West should be afraid of. On the contrary, it shows weakness. 

"Russia is doing its best to intimidate Western countries through threats like this, while using such systems to commit criminal acts against the Ukrainian people, acts they will one day have to pay for."

I cannot help but ask you about Greenland. It is sovereign territory of the Kingdom of Denmark.

At the same time, Donald Trump has repeated his threats. And unfortunately, we understand that the level of escalation could rise if this were to turn into a confrontation within the Euro Atlantic community. We also know that NATO forces are present on the island, including US troops.

And if, God forbid, some unforeseen situation were to unfold, we could see direct contact, for example, between Danish border guards and US Marines. And as the saying goes, that would be a recipe for serious trouble.

Overall, do you see any realistic prospects for defusing this situation and addressing these American ambitions toward Denmark, so that we can return to the situation as it was before?

"The whole Greenland crisis has been created by President Trump."

He talks about how important Greenland is for the defense of the United States, but at the same time there is an agreement from 1951 that already gives the United States the right to station military forces in Greenland as it sees fit. During the Cold War, the US had around 15 bases and thousands of soldiers there. Now, it has one base and only a few hundred troops, by its own decision. So this is not really about the defense of Greenland.

This is about expansion. In this sense, Trump is a little bit like Putin. He wants to enlarge the United States territorially, and he believes Greenland has valuable resources such as minerals, oil, and gas that the US should control. Again, economists point out that these resources are not easy to extract through mining or drilling, and that it may not be cost effective or profitable. But nevertheless, we have a problem on our hands.

As you may know, tomorrow there will be discussions in Washington, DC between European leaders and the US Secretary of State about how to resolve this. According to the news, Trump has reportedly given orders for the armed forces to plan an operation. The military has pushed back, because it would not be legal.

A president does not have the authority to attack a NATO ally. Congress would have to be involved, and I am very sure Congress would not give that permission.

So now they are talking about buying Greenland instead, and trying to drive a wedge between Denmark and Greenland, hoping Greenlanders would agree to join the United States. But I do not think they are willing to do that.

I think that, on the European side, many are trying to play for time, knowing that after the midterms the US Congress may become much stronger in constraining Trump’s actions if Republicans lose seats. Trump knows that too, and it seems like they want to push the Greenland issue as fast as possible.

But at the same time, the US has many other priorities on its plate. There is Venezuela, there is Iran, there are internal political problems, and there are serious economic issues as well. So it is genuinely hard to say how this will develop.

"The most important thing is to avoid any military conflict between NATO countries, especially between the United States and Denmark, because that would have severe consequences for NATO’s ability to maintain a united front."

What concerns me about the Greenland situation is that advisers to US President Donald Trump have relied not only on geopolitical and economic arguments, but also on historical ones. And when historical narratives replace legal reasoning, we immediately recognize the kind of messaging we usually hear from the Kremlin.

The Kremlin has long argued that, from a historical perspective, certain territories should belong to Russia or fall under its control. We may soon hear, for example, that Finland once formed part of the Russian Empire, and that Russians used to call Helsinki “Helsingfors,” right?

Unfortunately, this sense of historical grievance in Russia is reinforced by a clear willingness to resort to aggression and expansion.

So if we talk about the prospect of forming direct military and defense alliances on the European continent, do you believe this is a realistic path forward?

Because we have Ukraine, and we also have countries like Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Finland, and Poland, in other words countries that could face a direct and immediate threat. After all, Russia has been very explicit in defining the list of its potential enemies.

We all know that Russia has this old idea that any land a Russian boot has ever stepped on is forever “holy Russian land.” Putin himself has spoken in those terms. Well, we strongly disagree.

Helsinki, for example, is still called Helsinki for us. It is a Swedish name, and Finland is a bilingual country. “Helsinki” is what we use, while Russians tend to say “Khelsinki.”

"Finland has the strongest willingness to defend its country in Europe by far, and it is even significantly higher than Russia’s willingness to defend Russia."

We are prepared. So Russia can feel free to try to conquer Finland. It is not going to happen.

But we do see the threat. And for the Baltic countries, our smaller neighbors, the situation is much more difficult. They have smaller forces, and they are less defensible than Finland is geographically. They also have the painful experience of being occupied by the Soviet Union after the Second World War.

So yes, we have more and more joint cooperation on defense matters. We are all NATO members, but within NATO we also cooperate closely at the regional level, especially between the Nordic and Baltic countries.

And NATO is a big organization, made up of many countries with many different security threats and interests.

Countries in the southwest, like Spain and Portugal, do not see the Russian threat as directly as we do in the northeast, in the Baltic states and in Finland and Norway, for example.

What we are increasingly seeing is a kind of “northeastern bastion” forming: the Nordic countries, the Baltic states, Poland, and even Germany. These countries take defense much more seriously and cooperate more closely within NATO in order to stay prepared.

So I do not think we need a separate defense alliance, but we will see regional cooperation increasing in the areas that are most threatened by Russian activity. And that is a good thing, because it means we have well trained troops from different countries operating in the region on a daily basis, and we have readiness to act even before NATO as a whole can make a formal decision.

Even if the North Atlantic Council cannot agree quickly, for example if Hungary tries to sabotage a decision, I am confident that these regional arrangements and close cooperation will ensure that NATO countries will still take action to defend one another. Everyone understands that if NATO, or even parts of NATO, fail to respond when Russia attacks, then nobody is safe.

How do you see the possible scenarios of Russian aggression against Ukraine in 2026? More broadly, if we talk about Russia’s concept of a wider, global confrontation, what do you see as its key defining features today? What, in your view, might Russia be preparing for in its ongoing confrontation with Ukraine?

And do you see any realistic prospects for reaching a strong agreement that would genuinely protect Ukrainian interests, one that includes real and credible security guarantees for Ukraine? Who, in your opinion, should be responsible for providing those guarantees?

"When it comes to Russia, its main problem is that it wants to be a global power, but it no longer is one."

Its economy is crumbling, so it is not an economic powerhouse. Its conventional armed forces have turned out to be very weak. They cannot defeat Ukraine, even though they have been trying for four years.

And Russia’s ability to conduct operations globally is also limited. We have seen what has happened to Russia’s allies: Assad is gone. The Venezuelan president is gone. The Iranian leadership is now in trouble, and Russia cannot really do much to support them. So Russia is not going to be a true global power, but it still has this ambition of creating a multipolar world.

Russia wants to move away from the current system, which is dominated by the United States, toward a multipolar order. Of course, if the United States becomes weaker, Russia could rise in the rankings, so to speak, and play a larger role. But because the war has depleted Russia, it is instead becoming more and more of a vassal of China.

Russia does not have strong global capabilities anymore, so it is concentrating more on Europe because Europe is still the one place where Russia can remain influential.

But again, Russia does not have the conventional forces to take Europe.

That is why it is putting more and more effort into hybrid warfare, because that is something it can do. And it has been doing it quite successfully for over a decade in Europe, especially by trying to break the unity of Europe, NATO, and the EU in different ways.

For example, Russia has supported certain political parties and individuals, such as Viktor Orbán. We have also seen Robert Fico in Slovakia, who appears to be playing into Putin’s hands.

And with many elections coming up across Europe in 2026 and 2027, Russia will do its best to use information campaigns and other hybrid tools, including corruption and bribes, to help empower people who will weaken European unity from within. That is a very credible threat.

"I am not as worried about the direct military threat Russia can pose to Europe, but I am much more concerned about the threat of hybrid warfare and Russia’s ability to undermine us from the inside."

When we talk about Ukrainian security and security guarantees, everyone now finally seems to understand one key point: Ukraine cannot make peace unless there are credible security guarantees in place. We all know that Russia lies, breaks agreements, and will attack again unless there is a system that ensures Russia would lose and be punished severely for violating any peace deal.

Europeans have finally understood that they need to play a much bigger role. Previously, many were waiting for the United States to take the lead. Now Europeans understand that they have to step in.

As Secretary General Mark Rutte said in the European Parliament, the first security guarantee is the Ukrainian Armed Forces. You are the best and most seasoned battle tested army in Europe.

So Europeans must support Ukraine in a way that ensures Ukraine has a strong defense industry able to supply what is needed. We will provide more equipment, more funding, and support with training, even though in many areas Ukraine is already far ahead of European armies today.

"The goal is to help build a Ukrainian army that is even more effective than it already is."

Second, there have to be European guarantees. And we have finally seen that major European countries, especially the United Kingdom and France, are willing to commit forces. It would not be a massive force, but hopefully at least 20,000 to 30,000 European soldiers in Ukraine, sending a clear signal that if Ukraine is attacked again, Europe is involved too and there will be consequences.

That is why it is important that this “coalition of the willing” now involving about a dozen countries makes a strong commitment in Ukraine, with troops on the ground and a visible demonstration of European unity.

And of course, the United States also has to step in. The results of the negotiations so far have been positive, because half a year ago Trump did not promise any US security guarantees. But now the US side appears willing to provide some guarantees as well, which is important.

Historically, the Russians, and Stalin in particular, stopped their aggression against Finland only because the Finns stopped them by force.

Stalin calculated what the likely scale of his losses would be, and that became the decisive factor. It is a highly telling and instructive historical lesson.

But on the other hand, we also have to consider the issue of the US military presence in Europe. I have reread the updated US National Security Strategy several times, and it has genuinely alarmed me. Many European politicians were shocked as well, because it could, in principle, point to a possible reduction or withdrawal of the American contingent. And we understand that if US forces were no longer present on the continent, that gap would have to be filled by European troops in sufficient numbers.

If real security guarantees for Ukraine were to become a reality, this would also require a significant increase in Europe’s ground forces manpower reserves in the context of supporting Ukraine. This is simply the arithmetic of war, and a question of resources.

So how do you assess the situation today?

I am worried about this as well, especially from a European perspective, where Trump is challenging the EU. But when we talk about the US withdrawing forces, the United States has roughly 80,000 troops in Europe. And if you look at pure combat capabilities, those forces are not as decisive as many people assume.

US combat brigades represent only about 3% of the combat brigades in European NATO. The US Air Force presence represents around 10% of NATO’s air forces in Europe. So, in principle, Europe can fight without those American combat forces. We would prefer to have them, but their withdrawal would not dramatically reduce Europe’s overall defense capability.

The most important issue is not the number of troops, but the high-end capabilities the US provides. The United States is the main provider of command and control, intelligence, and targeting capabilities. It also has major long-range capabilities, including precision-guided weapons for long-range engagement.

In addition, the US provides strategic airlift and strategic air refueling capabilities, which Europe does not have at the same scale. So the real risk is not losing a few tens of thousands of soldiers. The real risk is losing the capabilities needed to effectively employ the 1.5 million European NATO troops.

Again, as mentioned, Congress has put it into law that Trump cannot reduce US forces in Europe below 79,000 troops without congressional approval and consultations with allies.

At the same time, Congress has also secured the position of NATO’s highest military commander, which has traditionally been held by an American general or admiral. That position cannot be transferred to a European officer without congressional approval. So Congress is doing its best to maintain US engagement in Europe and limit unilateral decisions.

"But in the longer term, we can see that the United States will be challenged by China in the Pacific sooner or later, probably sooner."

And even if the US would like to continue supporting European defense, it may not always have the capacity to do so.

That is exactly why Europe is working to strengthen its own defense.

One of the biggest problems for Europe’s national defense, and also for providing Ukraine with troops on the ground after a potential peace deal, is manpower.

Even though Europe has around 1.5 million soldiers, the ready and usable combat forces are quite small.

For example, the United Kingdom has plans that if there is a ceasefire or peace arrangement in Ukraine, it could send around 7,500 soldiers. That sounds small, but the entire British Army is only about 71,000 soldiers. They simply do not have enough personnel, and they also have global responsibilities. The situation is similar for France.

That is why European armed forces are expanding. Germany is planning to reintroduce conscription, because it sees the need not only for professional soldiers but also for much larger reserves. Sweden is doing something similar, and many other countries are moving in the same direction.

So Europe’s forces will grow, but it will take time to build the manpower that is needed. And that is the biggest limitation.

But I always remind people that wars are not fought with armies alone. Air power matters.

European air forces have more than twice as many fighter aircraft as the Russian Air Force. These are also newer and more modern planes, including many F-35 fifth generation stealth fighters.

European pilots are better trained, with stronger support systems, and they can generate far more flying hours than Russian pilots can with their equipment. So even if Europe deploys only a “token” ground force of, say, around 30,000 troops in Ukraine, those forces would be backed up by European air and naval power and that would be a major game changer.