EU prepares major shift in sanctions strategy, targeting China and India's energy infrastructure

The author of the Resurgam Telegram channel discussed the issue.

For nearly four years since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Western sanctions have primarily focused on smaller private traders, logistics operators, and shell companies created specifically to circumvent restrictions. These entities were relatively easy to replace, limiting the overall impact on Russia's energy revenues.

That approach began shifting in late 2024, as European and British policymakers increasingly viewed China and India as indirect sponsors of Russia's war effort through their continued purchase of discounted Russian oil and gas.

The EU's 18th sanctions package in July 2025 marked an early turning point, imposing secondary sanctions on India's Nayara Energy refinery—partly owned by Rosneft—and banning imports of Indian petroleum products made from Russian crude starting January 1, 2026.

Britain accelerated the trend in October 2025, targeting significant Chinese infrastructure for the first time. London's sanctions hit major ports in Shandong province, including Jinggang and Haixin, along with the Baogang International Port Company, National Pipeline Group's Beihai natural gas division, and Shandong Yulong Petrochemical Company. These weren't obscure front companies but substantial players in China's energy import network.

Now, as the fourth anniversary of the invasion approaches on February 24, EU member states are negotiating their 20th sanctions package with an explicit focus on pressuring India and China to abandon Russian energy imports.

David O'Sullivan, the EU's sanctions envoy, outlined the strategy: "This is our opportunity to apply maximum pressure on other countries to move away from Russian oil and further hit the Kremlin's revenues." He confirmed that new measures would target ports, refineries, and other energy infrastructure in third countries, adding that current oil market oversupply creates an ideal moment to intensify economic pressure.

This represents a paradigm shift in European sanctions policy. Rather than playing whack-a-mole with disposable shell companies, Western authorities are now willing to impose real costs on major Chinese and Indian corporations—entities that cannot be easily replaced or reconstituted.

Whether EU members can finalize the package by February 24 remains uncertain, particularly given Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's close ties to Beijing and his domestic political calendar. However, the strategic direction appears set: as Russian oil and gas sectors show increasing vulnerability to existing sanctions, Western policymakers believe targeting third-country importers will amplify pressure on Moscow's war financing while forcing buyers to demand even steeper discounts on Russian energy—discounts already at record levels.