Russia’s military power deteriorates: losses and shortages in March 2025

Oleksandr Kovalenko, a Ukrainian military and political observer with the Information Resistance group, analyses Russian monthly losses.

The Russian army is trying to continue offensive operations despite lacking standard equipment for its units and relying on unspecialized components. As a result, the territory captured is minimal, and there are high losses in several categories, directly linked to the current nature of the Russian occupying forces' offensive actions.

Personnel losses

In March 2025, Russian forces suffered significant personnel losses — 41,160 — despite making only limited territorial gains in Ukraine, though this was not a record.

For comparison, Russian forces lost 45,720 personnel in November 2024, 48,670 in December 2024, and 48,240 in January 2025.

However, the key factor in the current situation is not just the number of personnel losses but their ratio to territorial gains. As of March, Russian forces had captured 130 km², resulting in losses exceeding 315 soldiers per km².

In February, Russian troops captured 188 km² of Ukrainian territory, with an average loss of over 190 soldiers per km². In 2024, this figure averaged 128 soldiers per km², and in January 2025, it was 150 soldiers per km². This indicates that in March, Russian personnel losses in proportion to captured territory reached a record high.

These developments align with previous analyses by the observer from 2024, which projected that by spring 2025, Russian occupation forces would rely primarily on manpower with minimal efficiency. The current situation reflects those expectations, with no unexpected shifts in strategy or effectiveness.

Tank losses

In March 2025, Russian forces lost 272 tanks, maintaining the average rate observed since July 2024. This indicates that the deployment of main battle tanks, including the oldest and most outdated models, has remained consistent since that time.

A country that once possessed the world's largest stockpile of main battle tanks is now entering a phase of acute shortage.

AFVs losses

In March, Russian forces lost 607 armored fighting vehicles (AFVs), maintaining the average rate recorded since December 2024.

This trend is driven by the same challenges affecting main battle tanks — namely, the inability of Russia's military-industrial complex to compensate for losses within a month, whether through new production or restored equipment.

Artillery losses

In March 2025, Russian forces suffered a record loss of 1,644 artillery pieces.

This increase is driven by the lack of armored vehicle fire support for assault operations, forcing artillery to assume this role. The majority of Russia’s artillery consists of outdated Soviet-era towed guns, which have extremely low mobility, accuracy, and range.

As a result, Ukraine’s counter-battery warfare, using both artillery systems and other strike assets, significantly outperforms Russian capabilities.

MLRS losses

In March 2025, Russian troops lost 43 multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS). While not a record, this is the highest loss rate in this category since August 2024.

As with artillery, the increased use of MLRS is due to the lack of full fire support for advancing infantry units from armored vehicles. As a result, artillery plays a key role in this regard, leading to rising losses in this category.

Russian forces are increasingly using non-standard MLRS, such as the 122mm BM-21 Grad, 220mm BM-27 Uragan, and 300mm BM-30 Smerch, instead of traditional systems. They have resorted to makeshift solutions, such as mounting rocket launchers on the chassis of MT-LB, BMP-1, T-72, T-80, Ural-4320, and even the gun mounts of anti-aircraft ZU-23-2 and naval bombers RBU-1200, RBU-6000.

Air defense losses

For the second consecutive month, Russian forces have sustained a relatively stable loss rate of 35 air defense systems. Since November 2024, this trend can be attributed to an increased focus on targeting and destroying these systems with specialized weaponry.

Air defense systems remain one of the most challenging assets for the Russian army to replace, whether through new production, restoration from storage, or repairs after sustaining damage.

Vehicle losses

In March 2025, occupying Russian forces suffered their highest losses in automotive transport since the start of the full-scale war, with 3,545 vehicles destroyed.

This is directly linked to the critical shortage of tanks, armored fighting vehicles, and armored cars within Russian forces.

Special equipment losses

In March 2025, the number of destroyed special equipment units of Russian forces fell to its lowest level since January 2023, totaling just 24 units.

This decline is largely due to the lack of equipment worth evacuating from the battlefield. With severe shortages of tanks, armored fighting vehicles, and other heavy equipment, recovery operations have become increasingly irrelevant. Russian armored recovery vehicles are now used less frequently—not only because their numbers dwindled after record losses in the summer and fall of 2024, but also because there is little of value left to salvage.

March 2025 has made it clear that Russia is facing a severe deficit across multiple categories of military equipment. Continued active combat operations are pushing the country into a deep crisis — one more profound than anything the USSR experienced, even during its collapse.

“Vladimir Putin has long lamented the fall of the Soviet Union, frequently referencing it in his speeches. Yet through his own actions, he has accomplished what even Mikhail Gorbachev could not: the accelerated degradation of Russia’s military power,” the observer concludes.