Russian memorandum: Putin’s attempt to lure Americans with hollow offers

1. First, about the goals. As seen from Ukraine’s memorandum, the goal of Ukraine and its allies is an unconditional ceasefire. In contrast, Russia views a halt to the war (even temporary) only as an additional reward Ukraine would receive for capitulation.

Putin’s goals have remained unchanged for many years: recognition by the West of the Kremlin’s rights over Ukraine, Europe, and parts of the world it considers its own. This can be achieved either through negotiations with the U.S. (the recognized leader of the West, at least until recently) or by war. In the latter case, the war with Ukraine, mass killings, and destruction of Ukrainian cities are meant to signal others: if you do not want this to happen to you, you must obey the Kremlin’s orders.

Ukraine’s resistance does not fundamentally change Kremlin plans but forces a tactical adjustment. That is why the Russian memorandum mentions a plan B: if Ukraine refuses voluntary withdrawal from Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, and Kramatorsk, Russians will be satisfied with stopping military aid from allies, including Starlink, and the withdrawal of foreign specialists from Ukraine.

In other words, Putin’s tactical goal is to disarm Ukraine and halt weapons supplies from allied countries. Since supplies from the U.S. play an important role, Putin is courting the American administration and will continue to do so. He will not leave the negotiation process himself but will “feed” the Americans with trifles perceived in Washington as progress.

2. Russia views negotiations as a prolonged process. There is the example of Korea, where peace talks lasted years while the war continued with varying intensity. The armistice agreement was signed only after Stalin’s death. Medinsky’s statement about 21 years certainly sounds frightening, but at the current intensity of hostilities, Russia simply won’t have enough people.

A telling example is the transfer of 6,000 bodies of fallen soldiers to Ukraine. Although this is outlined in section III of the memorandum as step number three, Russia proposes moving to it immediately and without additional conditions. This can be explained by the sharp rise in Russian losses during the summer offensive. They simply have nowhere to store new bodies of fallen soldiers and want to free up morgue space.

Therefore, Putin is ready to fight and simultaneously conduct negotiations for a long time, but he lacks the resources for this.

3. If looking for positives, it may be the mixing in the agreement of unrealistic points with those that look more or less acceptable for Ukraine. It is also worth noting that the Kremlin apparently realizes the futility of insisting on the withdrawal of the Ukrainian Armed Forces from non-occupied territories and allows the possibility of plan B — a ceasefire along the actual frontline.

Regarding the “realistic” points: some have already been implemented by Ukraine a long time ago. For example, “denazification” in the form of the law banning Nazi ideology was enacted in 2015. And the ban on foreign military bases is already contained in Article 17 of the 1996 Constitution of Ukraine (although, as shown by the example of the Russian base in Sevastopol, this did not become an obstacle). So, part of the conditions, if Russia really wants to exit the war, Ukraine has already fulfilled. Theoretically, an agreement could be signed with points acceptable to Ukraine and convincing for the internal Russian audience. Although this scenario is extremely unlikely, it at least appears in the documents.

4. Separately, it is worth mentioning Russia’s insistence on presidential elections. As can be seen, Russia expects to have its candidate elected who will sign the “final settlement” agreement mentioned in section I of the memorandum. I doubt they really believe in the chances of a pro-Russian candidate winning soon, but they Zelenkyy makes them nervous.

Obviously, according to Kremlin expectations, the “final settlement” agreement should be signed not by Zelenskyy but by the next president. That is, in the election campaign, a certain candidate should promise to conclude a capitulation agreement — and voters should support it. The absurdity of these expectations needs no comment.

5. Everyone awaits the U.S. response. Publicly, an increase in sanctions is expected, although this is unlikely to be priority number one. Sanctions from Lindsey Graham’s bill, which has gained 82% Senate support, indeed look threatening. But the question remains: how will the U.S. apply them against China, India, or Turkey? So Americans have chosen a tactic where the threat of sanctions is more important than their actual implementation.

In any case, while sanctions are important, military and economic support are much more important for Ukraine. We have a European coalition led by France, Germany, and the UK, which allows expecting greater consolidation of allies. Aid from the U.S., ordered by the previous administration, also continue. Increasing this aid could be a key factor in ending the war. Hopefully, discussions on expanding it are already underway between Ukraine, Europe, and the U.S.

The internal political and economic situation in the U.S. is such that Trump will not be able to refuse new arms supplies to Ukraine funded by Europeans. It will be difficult to explain this to voters, who continue to support Ukraine according to polls, to Republicans in the Senate, and to American defense companies, which Trump would effectively deprive of billion-dollar contracts. The only question is how quickly this will be implemented and whether the Russian memorandum will be the trigger that launches a new wave of support.

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About the author. Mykola Knyazhytskyi, journalist, member of the Ukrainian parliament

The editorial team does not always share the opinions expressed by blog or column authors.