The New York Times reports that the three-week battle near Vuhledar in south-eastern Ukraine resulted in what was the largest tank battle of the war and a setback for the Russians.
It is noted that Russia attacked in columns: the Ukrainian military studied the roads, then hid and waited for them from ambushes. This was Ukraine’s signature tactic at the beginning of the full-scale invasion, and the Russian army made the same mistake that cost Moscow hundreds of tanks at the beginning of the war.
“Blown up on mines, hit with artillery or obliterated by anti-tank missiles, the charred hulks of Russian armored vehicles now litter farm fields all about Vuhledar, according to Ukrainian military drone footage. Ukraine’s military said Russia had lost at least 130 tanks and armored personnel carriers in the battle,” the NYT article said.
According to the journalists, the Russians were also affected by their lack of experience. Many of their most elite units were destroyed in previous battles and replaced by newly recruited soldiers who were not trained in Ukrainian tactics of ambushing convoys. One sign that Russia lacks experienced tank commanders is that Ukrainian soldiers claimed to have captured a medic who was reassigned to drive a tank.
In particular, the weapons used by Ukrainian defenders were also mentioned.
“Anti-tank teams hiding in tree lines along the fields, and armed with American infrared-guided Javelins and Ukrainian laser-guided Stugna-P missiles, powered up their weapons. Farther away, artillery batteries were ready. The dirt road had been left free of mines, while the fields all about were seeded with them, so as to entice the Russians to advance while preventing tanks from turning around once the trap was sprung.”
According to Lieutenant Vladyslav Bayak, the tank column becomes most vulnerable when the shooting starts, the vehicles panic and try to turn around and drive to the mined roadside. Then the exploded vehicles act as an obstacle, slowing or stopping the convoy. At this point, the artillery opens fire, hitting new armored vehicles and destroying the occupiers who crawl out of the disabled vehicles.
“Chaos and explosions begin,” he describes, adding that the Russian command sent armored columns forward because it had no other options against properly fortified Ukrainian positions.
On February 2, Petro Andriushchenko, adviser to the mayor of Mariupol, said that the Russian military told residents of villages near the city that they had received orders to take Vuhledar and Zaporizhzhia in February.
Maksym Verbovskyi, deputy mayor of Vuhledar, believes that Russians are trying to seize the town to disrupt the logistics of the Ukrainian army in the Donetsk region.
Oleksii Dmytrashkivskyi, spokesman for the Tauride Defense Forces, said that Russian troops stormed Ukrainian positions near Vuhledar 43 times on February 22.
On February 23, it was reported that Vuhledar had come under heavy fire the previous day: presumably, Russia was preparing for another offensive in the area.
Later, UK intelligence claimed that Russian marines suffered serious losses in the Donetsk region, near Vuhledar, as the leadership assigned the military to some of the most difficult tactical tasks.