War of attrition. 2025 –?

What has changed?

Essentially, Ukraine and Russia have removed all restraints on striking critical infrastructure. The only remaining red lines seem to be attacks on the oil infrastructure of Novorossiysk and the critical port infrastructure of Odesa.

Why?

The main reason is that the United States appears to have finally decided that its economic goal is to completely push Russia out of the European oil and gas market. The Kremlin’s proposals (from Kirill Dmitriev) regarding the Arctic and rare earth minerals have apparently been set aside — not discarded, but postponed until Moscow decides to negotiate rather than deceive.

Now Washington’s goal is to wage an energy war through others. These “others” are several parties: on one side, Europeans who have decided to accelerate and abandon Russian energy sources by 2027; on another, the Gulf countries, gradually increasing oil production and cutting into Russia’s market share in India and China (as higher output will lower prices and make Russian oil less competitive). And finally, the third “hand” is Ukraine’s strikes on Russian refineries and the transport infrastructure of its oil and gas sector. Ukrainian current capabilities cannot yet halt this infrastructure, but they follow the tactic of a thousand cuts.

Could it have been otherwise?

The turning point, de facto, was Putin’s refusal to accept Trump’s proposals and agree to certain concessions. Putin was genuinely confident he could manipulate Trump.

He also believes he “defeated” Trump by buying himself a few months to act almost freely. His bet — or rather, blind faith — rests on three assumptions: the front will collapse, Ukraine will freeze, and Europe will be frightened. None of this will happen, but he lives within that illusion. Moreover, he has stopped thinking in long-term categories; his planning horizon is just five to six months.

Russian elites and their prospects

The Valdai Forum confirmed the absence of strategy and reliance on myths. One quote from Putin captures it: “No one feels safe. We must return to our roots.” This is gibberish, meaning: accept my terms, which I’ll change mid-negotiation.

In short, the following processes are unfolding in Russia:

• Putin cannot and does not want to end the war, while his entourage keeps sending signals that amount to endless continuation.
• He is told resources are limitless because he likes hearing it, while the elites understand this is a path into an endless abyss. They are preparing for a transition but fear saying so aloud. Everyone knows the “limitless resources” myth is false.

Currently, the most prepared for transition are the Kovalchuk–Kiriyenko tandem, though they likely believe the war must continue for another year — to finish building the “Cheburnet,” strengthen regional influence, and possibly secure more control through the security apparatus. Other major factions will need another year to a year and a half to be ready for the transition.

Interim conclusions

The war has (perhaps permanently) moved beyond purely military logic and entered the phase of postwar economic logic among major powers — a shift seemingly not yet understood in Kyiv.

I still believe that the end of the war will largely depend on negotiations between the United States and China.

Unfortunately, the likelihood of mobilization in Russia is increasing.

Ukraine must prepare for a worsening energy situation.

Most importantly, Ukraine must define what it should become within the postwar logic of major powers, as it needs to be of real interest to negotiators. The “shield of Europe” status is good, but only in the very short term.

Source

About the author. Vadym Denysenko, political scientist.

The editorial team does not always share the opinions expressed by blog or column authors.