Mounting issues plague Russia’s IFVs, wheeled armored vehicles

Contents

1. How the Russian forces use wheeled armored vehicles and IFVs at the front
2. What problems the Russian troops have with their armored vehicles
3. How the Russian army is trying to improve vehicle protection
4. Use of light armored vehicles by Russia on the front
5. Use of armored vehicles by the Ukrainian Defense Forces
6. What Ukrainian armored vehicles should be like

The material was prepared in cooperation with the Consortium for Defense Information (CDI), a project that unites Ukrainian analytical and research organizations and is aimed at strengthening informational support and analytical coverage in the field of national security, defense, and geopolitics. The text was compiled by Roman Yavorskyi, Espreso.

How the Russian forces use wheeled armored vehicles and IFVs at the front

Until 2022, the Russian army had standard approaches regarding the use of infantry fighting vehicles, wheeled APCs, and other types of light armor. Before the full-scale war against Ukraine, Russian ground forces primarily practiced “through attacks.” These attacks were supposed to proceed as follows: first, artillery would suppress enemy positions; then, a motorized rifle unit with tanks and APCs/IFVs would rapidly deploy into battle formation, capture the designated positions as ordered, and eventually hold them.

However, the actual use of light armored vehicles in the full-scale war against Ukraine turned out to be the complete opposite of Russian doctrinal developments, according to CDI, and even the Russians themselves now acknowledge this. The primary tactic for the use of IFVs and other light armored vehicles by the Russian troops has now become “cavalry raids” on Ukrainian positions. In such tactics, the Russians mainly use their armored vehicles to quickly transport assault units to the place where they will then conduct combat operations independently. The number of troops per assault group can reach up to 30 soldiers, and they act with the support of one or two combat armored vehicles.

As for armament, the Russians believe that for effective fire support during troop deployment, at least a 30mm automatic cannon is required.

However, they do not use IFVs and other light armored vehicles for firing from covered positions. The reason is the low level of protection of these vehicles.

What problems the Russian troops have with their armored vehicles

The primary problem for the invading Russian forces, according to CDI experts, is the low actual capacity of Soviet-era armored vehicles. In practice, it turned out to be much less than “on paper.” The designers, when developing armored vehicles in Soviet times, did not anticipate that APCs would be transporting troops with full gear and ammunition for several days of combat. As a result, the troop compartment of any type of Russian IFV now fits only four fully equipped assault troops.

“Because it is impossible to accommodate the necessary number of soldiers with full equipment, the Russian army practices transporting personnel to landing points on the roof of armored vehicles. Another factor influencing this practice is the inability to quickly and fully dismount from the troop compartment of Soviet-designed armored vehicles,” the CDI material states.

Another problem is the lack of direct communication between the crew of the armored vehicle and the assault troops during operations. Because of this, the Russians cannot effectively coordinate the actions of their armored vehicles with assault units.

How the Russian army is trying to improve vehicle protection

The main cause of losses of Russian light armored vehicles during “cavalry raids” on Ukrainian positions is detonation on anti-tank mines. The second leading cause is strikes by Ukrainian Defense Forces’ combat UAVs. Nevertheless, Russian forces largely ignore the issue of improving mine protection of their light armored vehicles.

Instead, the invading forces focus primarily on protecting combat armored vehicles from top-down threats—namely, Ukrainian attack drones. For this, the Russians are installing improvised structures over their light armored vehicles, referred to as “grills” or “sheds.”

The appearance of “grills” is due to the need to improve overhead protection without structurally modifying the vehicles. These “sheds” somewhat protect armored vehicles from drones armed with cumulative or fragmentation-explosive payloads.

However, they disregard the safety of troops sitting on the roof of the vehicle, merely providing more space for soldiers to be seated.

“It is quite telling that Russian forces were forced to abandon the use of Soviet BTR-70s in assaults due to their unsatisfactory protection and ergonomics. Also notable is that Russian occupiers consider the mine protection of the wheeled armored vehicles ZTZ-S Akhmat to be fairly good but emphasize poor steering reliability and the inability to open armored doors if the vehicle flips after a mine explosion,” CDI reports.

Use of light armored vehicles by Russia on the front

For a long period at the end of 2024 and the beginning of 2025, Russian troops primarily used infantry in assaults. In April 2025, the invaders began once again to massively involve armored vehicles in combat operations across the entire front line, according to the Institute for the Study of War (ISW).

For instance, a representative of the Luhansk group of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets, reported that on April 12, Ukrainian forces repelled a large mechanized enemy assault near Chasiv Yar. An enemy company involved at least 13 armored vehicles, civilian cars, and motorcycles. On the Novopavlivka axis, a Ukrainian brigade published a video showing a Russian assault involving over 20 combat vehicles, including about ten IFVs. Also, the Defense Forces destroyed 12 enemy armored vehicles during a mechanized assault near Vilne Pole.

ISW suggests that last year the Russians began using civilian vehicles in assaults due to a shortage of armored vehicles. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), cited by Newsweek, Russia has lost 3,700 IFVs and APCs. According to the Ukrainian General Staff, as of mid-April, the Russians have lost over 22,000 armored vehicles since the start of the full-scale invasion.

ISW believes the increased use of armor may signal a desire by the Russian military-political leadership to gain tactical advantages ahead of a possible ceasefire.

Use of armored vehicles by the Ukrainian Defense Forces

Amid Russian vehicle shortcomings, Ukrainian-made wheeled APCs outperform them in terms of protection, as noted by the Russians themselves.

“The use of MRAP-class wheeled armored vehicles for rapid personnel transport by the AFU always produces a striking psychological effect on Russian occupiers, who lack effective countermeasures to such maneuvers. However, when using light armored vehicles, the cover with heavy weaponry—particularly tanks—is necessary,” CDI writes.

The combination of light armored vehicles and heavy weaponry ensures effectiveness, especially during urban combat. In such fighting, the Russians consider it particularly dangerous when the Ukrainian Defense Forces use a mix of tanks and light armored vehicles with 30mm automatic cannons during counterattacks.

CDI emphasizes that, according to the Russian own assessments, Ukrainian wheeled APCs and armored vehicles offer significantly better protection compared to Soviet-era armor.

What Ukrainian armored vehicles should be like

Experts are convinced that by studying Russian practices related to the use and improvised protection of their wheeled APCs and IFVs, the Defense Forces can draw the necessary conclusions to improve their own vehicles.

For example, Ukrainian light armored vehicles should be enhanced by integrating combat modules onto wheeled platforms, especially modules with 30mm cannons.

It is also important to implement technical solutions that ensure direct communication between the APC crew and the dismounted troops, who also require onboard fire support.

In addition, considering the shortcomings of Russian vehicles, it is necessary to improve mine protection, rollover resistance, and steering reliability under combat conditions.