Events in Russia’s Kursk, Belgorod regions reveal connected intrigue. Serhiy Zgurets’ column

Frontline situation – Belgorod region

Let’s start with the frontline, where 165 combat engagements took place on March 24. This is the average dynamic over the past few weeks. A third of the clashes occurred in the Pokrovsk sector, while the report from the General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces does not mention the Kursk and Belgorod regions.

However, there is some good news: the Air Force struck a Russian manpower concentration area in the village of Kondrativka in Kursk, killing 30 Russian soldiers, as reported by the General Staff on March 25.

Yet, the combat actions in Kursk and Belgorod have an interconnected internal intrigue. After withdrawing some Ukrainian units from the Kursk region, Ukrainian forces established a new defensive line.

Ukraine Russia war live map, March 15-22, Photo: Espreso

It can now be concluded that our defensive line runs along the heights from west to east, starting from Ukraine’s Basivka and continuing through Russian territory—Hoholivka, Oleshnya, and Huyevo. A defensive line is currently being formed on Russian territory. Ukrainian airborne assault brigades are operating there in coordination with battalions from other brigades. Meanwhile, some brigades that fought in Kursk are carrying out offensive actions in the area of several villages in the Belgorod region.

In the Belgorod region, there are several settlements located about 13 km from Huyevo. We know that on March 18, Ukrainian units breached the border with some losses in armored vehicles and captured Demydivka. This is marked in blue on the map. The Russians retreated under our attack. Ukrainian troops conducted demining and entered the village. There is also information about the capture of the settlement of Popivka, located north of Demydivka, and attacks on the village of Prylisya.

This video shows our UR-77 mine-clearing vehicle launching special shells for demining. Then, pathways are cleared in the minefields, allowing our troops to move through.

This is also the area where the fighting is taking place near Hrafivka. On March 24, we reported on the destruction of bridges in this area, one bridge divides Hrafivka in half. Additionally, bridges further east were destroyed, significantly complicating the Russian logistics.

How are the actions in the Belgorod region related to Kursk? These are our measures to prevent Russian troops from moving from the Kursk region to other areas, stretch or separate Russian forces to complicate their operations in the direction of the Sumy region. It can also deny Russian troops the opportunity to use UAVs from convenient locations and create uncertainty for the Russians about our further actions in conducting active defense in this area. 

I believe that our forces are not advancing more than 2 km from the frontline, relying on reliable logistics from Ukrainian territory. I think this will continue to create significant difficulties for the Russians, who will have to react to our actions.

Ground-based robotic systems for the Ukrainian Armed Forces

But we know that, given the numerical advantage of the Russian army, it is not worth fighting them head-on. We need to seek asymmetric responses, and this involves using ground-based robotic systems that can currently perform various missions on the battlefield.

Last year alone, nearly 70 different types of ground-based robotic systems of various purposes were put into operation. All of these systems are of Ukrainian production. We will discuss one such system with a Ukrainian developer, who manufactures the well-known robotic complex called Sirko-S1.

Yevheniy Rvachov, an engineer-developer and owner of the company SkyLab UA, explained that the Sirko-S1 is a remotely operated machine, which can be controlled by an operator from a distance. This ground-based drone can perform various tasks, such as logistics or remote mine clearing. Currently, the focus is on remote demining. A small system is installed on the ground robotic complex. The operator remotely drives the complex to the mined area and activates the launch mechanism, a booster, which unwinds a demining cable. The cable is lowered and detonates all mines in its path. If remote mine clearing of an area is needed, a special module for this purpose is installed.

The engineer noted that there is already a stable module for anti-tank mines. Work is currently underway on other modules, and soon there will be an announcement regarding which specific detonation mechanisms will be used for remote mine clearing. If all modules are removed from the Sirko-S1 drone, it transforms into an ordinary logistical vehicle, which is very useful on the frontlines, for example, for transporting water, supplies, or combat gear. The main advantage of the Sirko-S1 is its simplicity: two soldiers can remove it from the vehicle, turn it on in 10–15 seconds, and head out on a mission. It is controlled via joysticks. Any soldier can master controlling this ground-based complex within one or two days.

The manufacturer added that by installing a signal repeater and an antenna, which allows operation from cover and extends the range, a distance of 13-15 km from the operator can be achieved. The critical load for the drone is 200-210 kg.

The Ukrainian developer explained that the type of wheelbase for the ground drone was changed because the mud in Donetsk and Sumy regions is very different. Additionally, the manufacturer needs to make quick adjustments considering the season, as robotic platforms need to operate, not remain idle. It should be noted that the surface significantly affects the functionality and characteristics of the drone. While it's said that tanks don't fear mud, the same applies to both wheeled and tracked ground robotic complexes. Of course, the operator needs to choose the right route and not rely on the platform being an all-terrain vehicle. The success of a mission is determined by three factors. First, the operator must know the route the ground robotic platform will take. Second, there must be a visual feed from the ground drone. Third, an aerial view of the ground complex from an aerial drone is necessary.

Rvachov noted that approximately 100 platforms were delivered in the basic version in 2024, excluding local orders from special units that request customized versions. For 2025, there are opportunities to produce around 100 drones, but production is not yet operating at full capacity. Some components are ordered from China, so there are logistical constraints, time delays, and certain agreements with Chinese partners. Sometimes, what arrives from China does not meet the manufacturer's expectations. The production volume is also affected by direct government orders; understanding the production load for the year allows for adjustments with partners regarding prices and component delivery speeds. In short, three factors influence production volume: logistics, shortages, and order predictability.

The SkyLab UA CEO concluded that the current plan is to create a serial version of the S1 drone, which will be fully manufactured in Ukraine, following all protocols and processes. Accordingly, some parts that are currently ordered from China will be produced in Ukraine. The next goal is to develop the improved Sirko-S2 version, which will feature different engines, a new base, and tires. Additionally, the goal is to initiate exports.

Procurement of shells for the Ukrainian Armed Forces

Now let's talk about weapons, specifically those we are trying to procure abroad. On March 24, we discussed the Polish company Lechmar, which is supposed to supply ammunition to the Armed Forces of Ukraine through the State Border Guard Service. Ukrainian Member of Parliament Yaroslav Zhelezniak mentioned that Lechmar has an outstanding debt of 26.5 billion UAH, of which 1.7 billion UAH is overdue, meaning items were not delivered on time.

Today, the State Border Guard Service stated that the overdue debt has nothing to do with Lechmar and the 1.7 billion UAH issue is unrelated to the supply of ammunition under contracts worth 23 billion UAH that Lechmar has with the Border Guard Service. The State Border Guard Service clarified the situation surrounding Lechmar's outstanding debt, revealing that over the past period, nearly 60 billion UAH had been transferred to the company.

The State Border Guard Service states that there has been no delay in the supply of ammunition for the Armed Forces of Ukraine. However, the exact delivery dates are not specified. If I am not mistaken, when we analyzed these contracts earlier, it was mentioned that one batch of ammunition from Lechmar should be delivered by March 30, and another batch by April 30. The Border Guard Service likely assumes that the Polish company will manage to deliver all the shells by April 30.

However, there are new and interesting details from MP Zhelezniak, who today reported that in February 2025, the Ministry of Defence again transferred 78 billion UAH to the State Border Guard Service, in addition to the 50 billion UAH transferred last year to Lechmar. These 78 billion UAH were sent to the Polish company for the purchase of ammunition for the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

If this money was de jure withdrawn from the Armed Forces of Ukraine's budget and transferred to the State Border Guard Service, which then signs a contract with Lechmar, the question arises – why does the Ministry of Defence need the Defence Procurement Agency if the Polish company Lechmar is doing well for both the Ministry of Defence and the State Border Guard Service? After all, the Defence Procurement Agency was created to purchase ammunition and other equipment primarily from manufacturers.

The question remains unanswered, so we will continue to follow this story and investigate why the intermediary company Lechmar, which is not a manufacturer, has such advantages over other companies supplying weapons to Ukraine.