Are Ukrainian fortifications keeping up with war’s pace and expectations set in Istanbul: Column by Serhiy Zgurets

The situation on the front

Let’s start with the front line, where the Russian military’s main objective is still the full occupation of the Donetsk region. But to achieve this, they have to break through a tough chain of defensive lines — Pokrovsk, Myrnohrad, Toretsk, Chasiv Yar — and then move toward Kostiantynivka. That city is part of a key urban cluster: Druzhkivka, Kostiantynivka, Sloviansk, and Kramatorsk. Reaching Kostyantynivka is likely one of the enemy’s top priorities in this spring-summer offensive.

Heavy fighting is ongoing, with Russian forces trying to expand their control along the road from Myrnohrad to Kostiantynivka from the west — if you check the map, that’s clear.

Ukraine Russia war live map, May 3-10, Photo: Espreso

Another long-standing direction of attack is Russia’s effort — ongoing for over a year — to capture Chasiv Yar. It’s the highest point for hundreds of kilometers around. From there, it’s only 7 km to Kostyantynivka and 25 km to Kramatorsk.

Chasiv Yar has been completely destroyed, but parts of the city are still held by Ukraine's Defense Forces. Just recently, a video was released by the Luhansk military group.

It shows a Russian attack on Chasiv Yar — paratroopers advancing in armored vehicles. Usually, they rely on infantry assaults, but sometimes they mass equipment and try these armored pushes. In this case, Ukraine's 24th Brigade spotted the Russian movement and, using artillery and drones, wiped out all Russian forces and equipment that tried to advance into or around Chasiv Yar in airborne combat vehicles.

The 24th Brigade was also supported by artillery from other units, especially the 5th Assault Brigade. Incidentally, that brigade ranked first last month among all Luhansk group brigades for effective artillery use and enemy losses.

Fighting in the area is ongoing. Ukrainian soldiers say privately that the number of Russian drones has spiked, especially at night. There are more drones flying at night now than during the day, and they’re seriously disrupting Ukraine's logistics. Something has to be done. Just as Ukrainian drones are hitting the enemy, Russia is actively using guided bombs (KABs), too. So it makes total sense that in many communities — particularly around Druzhkivka — a mandatory evacuation has been announced for families with children in eight towns. I think that’s absolutely necessary. When it comes to children, minimizing the risk to civilians is critical.

Ukrainian fortifications

But in any case, we understand that Ukraine's defense depends mainly on the number and quality of troops and equipment, and on how effectively everything is managed. It also depends on the presence of engineering and fortification structures. Fortifications should block Russian advances and reduce casualties among our troops. Foreign analysts note that fortification lines in Ukraine are growing in number across various directions. This includes areas around Pokrovsk, as well as toward the Dnipro and Zaporizhzhia. Analysts say these lines are visible from space.

Meanwhile, Ukraine's Support Forces Command released a video showing how fortifications are being built near Pokrovsk together with local authorities. The footage shows continuous lines being created using tank ditches, dragon’s teeth, and wire barriers. This is actually the third line of defense, while the first and second lines are being built by brigades and military units, supported by engineering brigades and regiments of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

The active construction of fortifications is a positive sign, but the other side of the coin is that the pace and nature of the war keep changing the requirements for these defenses. The war has shifted a lot. In 2022 and 2023, standard platoon strongpoints could hold off artillery strikes, which were widely used and served as the main tool for breaking through defenses. That tactic doesn’t work anymore.

The war in 2025 is now a drone war on both sides. Both Ukrainian and Russian forces are creating kill zones or access-denied zones that stretch 5, 10, even 15 kilometers, depending on the drones used. In these zones, it’s almost impossible to move supplies, send in reinforcements, or rotate troops holding the front line.

So when we talk about the front-line positions held by infantry, the requirements for fortifications have changed a lot. We don’t see big platoon or company strongpoints anymore. The situation is completely different now. The focus has shifted, soldiers are now digging small, hidden positions in tree lines and forest strips. These are small trenches or pits, but there are many of them, spread out and better hidden. The priority now isn’t surviving an artillery strike — it’s staying invisible to the enemy.

That’s exactly why today’s frontline fortifications look very different from what’s being built on the third line. And the reason I point this out is because, in reality, the design of these rear defenses has to reflect the changing conditions on the frontline. Only then will third-line fortifications truly meet the needs created by what’s happening at the front, offering new ways to protect both soldiers and equipment.

Ukraine and Russia meeting in Turkey

And now we’ll talk about another side of the hostilities, the geopolitical angle, focusing on the meeting in Istanbul and how Ukraine's European partners are acting. How will Russia behave in these talks? Does it even link its strategy to these negotiations? All of this was discussed with Mykhailo Samus, co-founder of the Information Defense Consortium and head of the New Geopolitics Research Network.

Right now, everyone — viewers, experts, and ordinary citizens — is trying to figure out what to expect from the meeting in Istanbul. Is there any chance Putin or his circle is ready to agree to a ceasefire? Or, on the contrary, will he push the same old demands — limiting Ukraine’s military, strange conditions like denazification, and so on?

"Yes, for Russia the basic playbook, the one they’ve always used, is to drag out negotiations without stopping the war. That’s what they did in 2014 and 2015 around the time of the first and second Minsk agreements. They did the same from 2014 to 2022. And that’s exactly what they did during the Istanbul and Gomel talks at the start of the full-scale invasion. The strategy is simple: start negotiations that can go on forever, because Russia usually puts forward completely unacceptable demands. The goal is to use military pressure to force the enemy — the victim — to give in. That’s been their approach since 2014. From 2014 to 2022, it was more hybrid. From 2022 on, it turned into full-scale aggression,  and that’s where we are now," Samus said.

Mykhailo Samus stressed that, so far, there’s no sign that Russia plans to change this strategy.

"Putin’s thinking, as far as we can tell, is that he still has the resources. He’s still got troops. He still has money. Sanctions do work to some extent, but high oil prices helped him get through 2024, and now in 2025, he’s managed to stockpile enough to plan a summer offensive. So the basic scenario, in my view, is that Putin will go for a summer campaign — try to get the wins he wanted back in 2024. We know what that means: full control over Donbas, maybe more territory that he already wrote into the Russian constitution. He needs that to negotiate from a position of strength. Meanwhile, Europe appears to be taking a stronger stance. European leaders came to Kyiv not by accident and they’ve toughened their position. They’re saying they’ve passed the 17th sanctions package and have started talking about serious, so-called 'draconian' sanctions — like a 500% embargo on Russian oil," he noted.

And secondary sanctions too — also 500% — on countries trading oil with Russia. That would hit India and China, who are Russia’s main buyers.

"But U.S. involvement is key here. Europe alone won’t be able to build a real blockade against Russia. The U.S. is needed. But so far, Washington’s position isn’t clear. Europe, for its part, has backed President Zelenskyy’s calls and the Ukrainian stance — sanctions must kick in immediately if Putin refuses a ceasefire. Not just the start of vague talks that can drag on forever — a real ceasefire. Only after that can we have any kind of talks about history or whatever else Putin wants to bring up, let him propose a topic, we’ll talk. But first — a ceasefire," the military expert said.

He stressed that along with a ceasefire, humanitarian issues must also be raised: prisoner exchanges, the creation of a demilitarized zone, monitoring missions, and punishment for violations of these agreements.

“That is, it’s a huge task, but it absolutely has to be done without delay and in a negotiation format. And, as we see, Trump, in principle, is ready to join the meeting if Putin and Zelenskyy gather in Istanbul. But on the other hand, he has never said that if Putin doesn’t show up, or if he refuses a ceasefire, the U.S. will support sanctions. We're talking about those same harsh sanctions outlined in Lindsey Graham’s bill. Let’s not forget, it’s been sitting in Congress for months. It proposes a 500% tariff on Russian oil and secondary sanctions. So everything seems to be lining up here, except for one thing — Trump’s position is still unclear. Will he risk sharply criticizing Putin and issue an ultimatum to the Kremlin to trigger those same draconian sanctions?” says Mykhailo Samus.

When it comes to sanctions, that’s an economic blow to Russia. On this point, the military expert also shared his view on whether the U.S. stance on allowing Europeans or Ukraine to buy American weapons directly could change, especially if talks in Istanbul fail and it becomes obvious that Russia is trying to drag the negotiation process into its own logic.

“I think so, especially since Ukraine has supposedly kept all its promises. Trump himself said it today, as did his team — that Ukraine has signed, ratified, and already finalized the commercial and technical annexes, created LLCs, and done everything needed to launch what’s being called the Ukraine Recovery Fund, or simply the resource agreement. In short, Ukraine has done everything that Zelenskyy and Trump agreed on. And this agreement opens up a convenient mechanism, which can be described as lend-lease, but technically, it’s a different kind of settlement,” he noted.

The military expert explained that this format lets the United States contribute weapons directly to the Ukraine Recovery Fund. And now Ukraine can choose for itself what weapons it needs.

“It’s not just about the U.S. deciding what to give. Ukraine gets to choose. If, for example, we need Patriot systems, we can ask the U.S. to provide Patriots, or ammunition for HIMARS. The same goes for missiles for Patriot. Maybe we’ll talk about long-range air-to-air or air-to-ground weapons for the F-16 — those would also be useful for us. Because right now, for example, we’re already covering the ammunition needs with the help of Europe. The same goes for artillery and armored vehicles. The Americans can really focus on very specific systems we rely on, which are also unique because, frankly, these systems just don’t exist in Europe,” said Mykhailo Samus.

On the topic of Europe. There are now also encouraging developments showing that the threat from Russia is pushing European defense companies to grow and work with Ukraine. Mykhailo Samus shared whether he sees practical changes, and whether there are barriers that need to be removed to make cooperation with Europe more effective and quicker.

“There’s actually a bit of a paradox here. If you look at the political will of European leaders toward Ukraine, it’s absolutely positive and constructive. Every day we see decisions and statements from European leaders showing that Europe is with us, supports us, and will continue to do so. For example, today French President Macron said France will transfer all CAESAR self-propelled guns that will be produced in 2025. This is a really important step that will seriously strengthen the artillery of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the Defense Forces overall,” he said.

At the same time, when it comes to internal dynamics, the same indecision and lack of leadership continue.

"That is, the European Commission is fully supportive of Ukraine, including in military-technical and defense-industrial cooperation. But when it comes to quick decisions, like building European defense capabilities, I mean joint European defense capabilities — there’s a slowdown. Even when large sums are announced, like 800 billion euros for defense, it's still unclear how that money will be allocated, who the buyer will be, who will manage the funds, or what weapons systems will be ordered. Or will it simply go to national Ministries of Defense and Armed Forces? That could actually lead to very ineffective outcomes," the military expert believes.

Mykhailo Samus pointed out a paradox in Europe’s approach to the war in Ukraine.

"So here, yes, paradoxically, everything is very constructive in terms of support for Ukraine, and cooperation between Ukrainian and European defense industries is actually moving forward. Right now, several events are taking place — two days ago in Brussels, then in Spain, and today in Krakow, Poland, there’s a defense technology forum involving Ukrainian officials, like the Ministry of Strategic Industry, Ukroboronprom, Ukrainian companies, and their European counterparts. But when it comes to internal matters, it’s the same old story about Europeans not trusting each other. What’s needed is leadership from one of the countries. Maybe it will finally be Germany. Maybe France will keep pushing the idea of joint Armed Forces. But the point is, we need to move toward real, practical action," he said.

This raises the question: what should Ukraine do in this environment of uncertainty about projects with European countries? Should it push its own initiatives, which could become the foundation for future cooperation?

"When it comes to cooperation and defense-industrial projects, it’s clear, we need to act, we need to work. Europe is interested, Ukraine is interested, so there are really no obstacles. But there’s another important angle, maybe Ukraine needs to show leadership, even at the doctrinal and conceptual level. For example, the Defense Information Consortium has proposed that Europe, together with Ukraine as a unified front should create strategic defense forces, strategic deterrence forces, and so on. We are sending these signals, but so far, there’s no feedback, no response to these initiatives. It’s all getting lost in the Brussels bureaucracy. That’s why I think Ukraine needs to keep convincing Europe, Brussels and the national capitals, that we have to start building joint structures. That would be a breakthrough, and it would help rapidly boost the defense capabilities of both joint and national armed forces," said Mykhailo Samus.