Will Russia respond to Ukraine’s Operation Spider’s Web with nuclear strike?

Ukraine's spectacular and effective special operation against Russia's strategic airfields is still in the center of the world's attention. Various aspects of this topic are being discussed, including whether Russia could respond, in particular, with a nuclear strike. We analyze the options for the development of events in a conversation with Oleksiy Yizhak, an expert at the National Institute for Strategic Studies, co-founder of the Consortium for Defense Information.

Nuclear blackmail as immunity from punishment for aggression

So, Oleksiy, Ukraine struck at Russia's strategic airfields in defense of itself in this bloody war. Russia, in turn, is aggressively shouting to the whole world: this is a threat to Russian nuclear security, so according to our nuclear doctrine, we will respond. Unfortunately, we know that not everyone accepts our logic. What should the world do about it?

Nothing. This is a chronic Russian issue of nuclear escalation. In Russia, it is often interpreted as the right to immunity from punishment for aggression. How do they manipulate this? The Russian nuclear doctrine in its public presentation, enshrined in Presidential Decree No. 355 of June 2, 2020, and updated in November 2024, provides an extremely broad list of grounds for the use of nuclear weapons. This vagueness of wording creates the impression that Russia reserves the right to nuclear escalation in almost any critical circumstances on the battlefield.

But what does it look like in practice?

In practice, we must ensure that the world recognizes that this maximalist interpretation makes no sense. The reality of war proves that nuclear threats are convincing only when they are made in exceptional circumstances - a threat to the very existence of a state. This is a universally recognized criterion that other nuclear powers adhere to and that is accepted by most non-nuclear countries. Otherwise, the global nuclear order collapses. And it is unlikely that Russia is willing to take ths step, and that other nuclear powers will allow it to go beyond this point.

What argument should these countries use with Russia?

The fact that Moscow systematically involves components of its nuclear forces in the war against Ukraine. Russia's dual-use systems - Iskander-M, Iskander-K, Kinzhal, Su-24M, Su-34, Tu-22M3 - are regularly used by Russia in conventional warfare to strike Ukraine. In such cases, Russia should not expect their potentially nuclear status to provide them with any immunity. Ukraine has systematically destroyed and will continue to destroy these systems on the battlefield, and there is no argument for the West that could refute the logic of Ukraine's actions.

Can you illustrate this with an analogy? Sometimes this technique is more convincing than the most precise formula...

Let me try. Imagine that the DPRK launched KN-23 missiles in the direction of Ukrainian cities. And we are told that we cannot intercept them with Patriot systems only because it could provoke Kim Jong-un to respond with nuclear weapons. Isn't that absurd? These missiles could be part of a nuclear arsenal? They could. But the world is not expecting an immediate nuclear strike from North Korea, is it?

That is, Russia used a dual-use system in a conventional war...

...after which the system loses any special status associated with its potential nuclear function. This is fully in line with the principles of international humanitarian law, which assesses actual use and consequences rather than potential.

But not all of our readers understand what makes up Russia's nuclear power, why in one case it is actually nuclear weapons, and in another case it becomes non-nuclear. Let's look into this.

Let's do it.

Russia's strategic and non-strategic nuclear forces

So, what does Russian nuclear power consist of?

First of all, Russian nuclear forces have strategic and non-strategic (tactical) components. The strategic component is at the highest level of readiness: warheads are mounted on carriers and are on alert. They are the subject of constant communication with the United States. These are more than 4,000 warheads, of which approximately 1,700 are deployed, i.e., mounted on carriers within the strategic nuclear forces. The rest are in storage, usually in centralized storage facilities.

What carriers could Russia use for strategic nuclear warheads?

These are the three main components, the triad that is often on the minds of many:

• Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) - deployed both in silo-based launchers and on mobile platforms. In total, there are approximately 330 missiles that can carry up to 1,250 warheads;
• Submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) - deployed on 12 strategic submarines of the Delfin and Borey projects, which can carry up to 992 warheads in total, of which about 640 are on alert;
• Finally, strategic bombers Tu-95MS and Tu-160 are capable of carrying nuclear-tipped cruise missiles. Theoretically, they can carry up to 586 warheads, but in normal operation, nuclear warheads are stored separately. Their installation would mean a demonstrative preparation for a nuclear war, which Russia does not do in practice.

What then is meant by non-strategic nuclear forces?

These are:

• naval tactical systems - missiles such as Kalibr, Oniks, torpedoes, for which nuclear equipment is provided in centralized arsenals;
• dual-use aviation systems - Tu-22M3, Su-24M, Su-34, MiG-31K aircraft, which mainly perform conventional combat missions, but can theoretically be equipped with nuclear munitions;
• Iskander-M/K tactical missile systems with the option of nuclear weapons;
• anti-aircraft missile systems such as S-300 and S-400, for which, according to some estimates, nuclear warheads may still be stored in centralized arsenals.

And during Spider's Web operation, it was the aircraft from this list that were targeted...

So, on June 1, Ukrainian drones struck two components of this structure: strategic bombers Tu-95MS at Belaya and Olenya air bases; and sub-strategic bombers Tu-22M3 at Belaya air base.

Apart from silo-based ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, almost all other nuclear weapons in Russia's arsenal are multifunctional. The Tu-95MS and Tu-160 strategic bombers, although considered nuclear platforms, are regularly used to launch cruise missiles with conventional warheads. Likewise, non-strategic Tu-22M3, Su-34, Kinzhal, and Iskander are attributes of Russia's daily war against Ukraine. Again, for these systems, nuclear equipment is a backup option: nuclear warheads are stored separately from the carriers and can be used only after special training.

So do I understand correctly: the world must recognize that this status deprives these platforms of any special immunity in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian war?

Yes, this is a conventional weapon of attack by Russia, which is subject to daily destruction as part of Ukraine's legitimate defense.

But here, some so-called independent experts refer to the fact that Russian nuclear forces are covered by the New START treaty, and this is, they say, an important point in this discussion.

Who does New START protect?

What should we understand about this agreement?

Part of the Russian nuclear forces is covered by the New START treaty, the last, though partially suspended by Russia, bilateral arms control treaty between the United States and Russia. It formally remains in force until early 2026. The treaty establishes verifiable limits on the number of deployed strategic warheads and their delivery vehicles, including intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and heavy bombers such as the Tu-95MS and Tu-160. Its peculiarity is that New START does not prohibit the use of accounted for strategic systems in conventional (non-nuclear) operations, nor does it require that carriers be permanently armed with nuclear warheads.

Is this what the Russians are referring to?

Yes, but here we have to talk about the devil, which, as we know, is hidden in the details. The Treaty provides for procedures that make it impossible to perceive the conventional or training use of these systems as the beginning of a nuclear strike - in particular, by means of satellite or long-range radar surveillance.

Strategic aviation is the least strictly regulated component of the nuclear triad. Unlike silo-based ICBMs or SLBMs, bombers are not on constant alert, and their status is much more flexible and less transparent. The takeoff of a bomber flying over the oceans for almost half a day does not mean the immediate start of a nuclear war - unlike the launch of an intercontinental missile that reaches its target in less than an hour and leaves no time to speculate on the type of warhead.

So, as far as I understand it, Russia is pedaling the fact that strategic bombers, for which warheads are usually stored separately, are not as strictly controlled as intercontinental missiles on land and submarines at sea?

The United States and Russia are not obliged to notify each other of every takeoff of a strategic bomber, unlike every launch of an intercontinental missile, which is subject to mandatory notification. And this is what gives Russia the space to widely use Tu-95MS with Kh-101 cruise missiles in a non-nuclear war against Ukraine - without any consequences for the New START treaty. But, and this is the key and most important point for our argument, the destruction of these aircraft does not contradict the treaty, except perhaps for the need to agree with the United States on additional procedures for their elimination and de-registration. The only potential legal or political component that could affect the choice of targets is whether a particular Tu-95 or Tu-160 is designed exclusively for nuclear missions. Therefore, it can be assumed that the absence of Ukrainian strikes on Tu-160 basing sites is a consequence of the fact that in some cases it is difficult to reliably distinguish between nuclear and non-nuclear bomber configurations.

So, am I correct when I say that the criterion here is simple: if a strategic nuclear system is deliberately withdrawn from nuclear planning for long-term use in a conventional war, it becomes a legitimate military target in that war?

Absolutely. We could even assume that if we did not know our enemy: Russia, if it had the political will, could inform Ukraine through neutral countries which bombers it keeps exclusively for nuclear deterrence against other nuclear powers and would never use in a war against Ukraine.

Can we hypothetically rule out this possibility?

There is no indication that Russia made such reports. So we simply state: Russia is deliberately putting its entire strategic aviation fleet at risk.

Doubtful non-nuclear role of nuclear forces

Are strategic bombers the only component of the nuclear forces that Russia has decided to use in non-nuclear weapons? Let's clarify the situation with the infamous Oreshnik...

We know that the launch of a non-nuclear variant of the Yars ICBM, called Oreshnik, has been confirmed at least once. Let's put aside the dubious combat effectiveness of a short-range light and noise launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile and the excessive cost of such a step. Let us state: Russia notified the United States in advance of the launch under the New START Treaty procedures.

Doesn’t sound like our enemy…

Yes, but there was no politics in this - U.S. satellites track ICBM launches, and under treaty obligations, the U.S. must know the missile isn’t headed their way to avoid treating it as the start of a nuclear war. Otherwise, Russia itself would suffer. So in this case, they acted very rationally, not playing with fire: better to notify in advance, knowing the U.S. monitors and has access to such information anyway.

And how should the world react to this when Russia has even used an intercontinental ballistic missile as a conventional weapon, which is hardly distinguishable from the nuclear version of the Yars?

We should be very negative. Russia is willing to take risks by turning some of the Yars, and possibly other strategic systems, into conventional warfare. As for the rest, it is a hypothesis, but... Let's recall that Putin has repeatedly mentioned in various contexts the UR-100NUTTKh ICBM with the Avangard warhead, which may be non-nuclear but can maneuver in the atmosphere as a new generation of hypersonic weapons. This missile, known in the United States as the SS-19, is siloed and accounted for under New START as carrying up to six nuclear warheads.

Let us try to summarize your words. The Spider's Web operation has clearly shown the danger of mixing nuclear and non-nuclear roles of the Russian strategic nuclear forces. Now the aggressor - a nuclear power - is cynically crying out for protection from a non-nuclear country against which it used elements of its nuclear triad.

That's right. Russia itself took a step in this dangerous direction and actively exploited it in public rhetoric until the vulnerability of nuclear platforms to new weapons was revealed.

At the same time, it is not only strategic bombers that are vulnerable, as they have turned out to be large unprotected targets. The Topol-M and Yars mobile systems, which are essentially large military trucks with a missile that is safe in space but vulnerable on the ground, are also barely protected.

What about nuclear ballistics?

Although silo-based ICBMs are protected even from a nuclear strike, when they emerge from the silo for launch, they can be no less vulnerable than bombers, even to light kinetic weapons. Strategic submarines, which are covered by mainsails in docks, are almost as vulnerable in the open sea or bays as the cruiser Moskva, destroyed by a missile, or Russian corvettes and boats destroyed by Ukrainian naval drones.

On the one hand, it is inspiring, but, on the other hand, it frightens us with a real nuclear threat to the world...

Fair enough. However, who poses this real threat? For decades, Russia has justified its opposition to NATO enlargement, among other things, by arguing that non-nuclear missile systems are getting closer to its nuclear forces, which allegedly undermines their survivability and strategic balance. The Kremlin scared the Russian population with this, and the military scared the Kremlin. And now the demonstrated vulnerability of the Russian nuclear triad in the war against Ukraine makes this argument meaningless. Whether NATO expands or not, the newfound vulnerability of Russian nuclear forces will not disappear.

What whould have to happen for it to disappear?

Only when Russia changes its policy, first and foremost, it stops its aggression against Ukraine. Nothing threatens the Russian nuclear forces except their use to seize foreign territories. If the Russian nuclear triad does not pose a threat to others, no one will touch it.

What will happen to it?

Like many other Soviet arsenals, it will safely rot away on its own within a few decades. This will be the best way out for humanity.

Oleksandr Kalinichenko conducted the inteview.