Putin's inauguration. Some important unpleasant facts

1. Apparently, the West has come to terms with the fact that Putin is in Russia for a long time. And when we talk about the West's understanding of Ukraine's victory, we cannot ignore this fact.

2. The West voiced (very cautiously) that its red line is the advance of Russian troops beyond the Donetsk region, further into the Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia regions.

3. China is likely to engage in peace talks no earlier than the end of 2024, and in reality, only in the first half of 2025. What is important: China is waiting for proposals from Ukraine (someone from the West) on its future role not only in business projects to rebuild Ukraine, but also its role in the Black Sea region as a whole.

4. Putin realizes that the most difficult moment for him will be when the West and China develop common positions. And all of his games, including the Northern route, French Africa, and flirting with India, are an attempt to delay that moment as much as possible. Our problem is that we do not pay attention to this at all.

5. In domestic politics, the Kremlin's main task is to finally split the 25% of Russians who hold an anti-Putin position. The first stage is now underway — an attempt to marginalize the only financially self-sufficient oppositionist, Khodorkovsky. Next, various political technology processes will be used to turn 10-12% of the current opposition into doubters (they will be given a controlled leader). If the situation follows this scenario, it will ultimately be a problem for us as well. Despite the fragmentation of the opposition, it is still a sword of Damocles for the regime and can become the basis for certain unrest if the regime is weakened. And it is no less important for Ukraine that this is a liberal opposition, not an opposition of ultra-patriots.

Putin realizes that he has a few years to spare until all internal political processes are stifled and the economic deterioration of the population's life does not affect public attitudes toward the regime. And the only thing that can affect the internal situation is the expansion of the same 25% of the opposition (with the right information campaign, this is realistic, but more attention should be paid to information warfare on the enemy's territory) and a change in the international configuration of forces to force Putin to peace.

Source 

About the author: Vadym Denysenko, political scientist.

The editors don't always share the opinions expressed by the authors of the blogs.