Putin is too old to build regime 2.0

Putin's rather boring speech unexpectedly sparked a lively discussion on one point. It was about replacing the old elites of the 1990s with new ones that grew up on a 'special military operation'

Among liberal Russians, interpretations about a new purge and so on immediately began. So, I want to express my opinion, which can be summarized in one message: there will be no global purge. Putin is too old to build a regime 2.0.

True, these elections, as the election of a lifetime emperor, will lead to a change in the country's governance system, where all previous agreements with the elites will be renewed, the Kremlin towers will lose their current powers, and the system will be based on 15-20 elders, each of whom will fight for the right to be a gray cardinal in a particular area of the economy (I will describe the model and who they are in more detail in a study to be released in the second half of March, but the basic difference from the Soviet political bureau is that there is no consensus, at least at the first stage, and all decisions will be made by Putin).

Returning to Putin's statement about purging the elites, we need to understand what his statement means:

• nullification of the agreement with the Family (Yeltsin). The main reason is that they were declared traitors to the people (in general, the concept of traitor will become very important in the newest lexicon of the Russian Federation);
• partial nationalization and removal of undesirable businesses (uncontrolled by Putin's inner circle) (following the example of Chelyabinsk billionaire Antipov). This is necessary not only to purge the remnants of theoretically possible opposition financiers, but also to be able to feed the new young generation that will now start a new war for the redistribution of property. Famous names may be involved in this process;
• creating a narrow stratum of politicians, mostly at the regional level, from among those who are fighting to demonstrate the work of social elevators.

But all these changes will not affect the key players who are now part of Putin's inner circle. At least at the first stage.

P.S. Of course, the topic of the Russian narrative of negotiations and peace is a separate topic, but I would like to draw your attention to how the Russian-controlled "opposition" and, above all, Sobchak, have unanimously said that Putin's message is about peace.

This idea is one of the most important in order to understand how the government will try to break away 7-10% of the relatively monolithic 23% of Russians who say they reject the war and Putin. I will repeat now only what I have been saying for the past few months: the main narrative of Russian propaganda: "Peace-loving Russia wants to negotiate, but Ukraine does not." And when we laugh at the Carlson and Ruriks, we have to remember that these are not only Putin's historical delusions, but also part of the information war.

Source 

About the author: Vadym Denysenko, political scientist.

The editors don't always share the opinions expressed by the authors of the blogs.