Ukraine hits Russian defense plant, Russia strikes training ground, better mobilization. Serhiy Zgurets' column

Attack on a semiconductor plant in Russia 

On the night of May 21, units of Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces, working with other parts of the Defense Forces, hit a defense plant in Russia’s Oryol region — the Bolkhovsky plant. The General Staff confirmed that at least a dozen Ukrainian drones reached the target area. A fire at the site has been recorded. Details about the damage are still being clarified.

Interestingly, video from the scene shows drone parts that don’t match any known types — likely something new, and clearly effective.

This plant is one of the top facilities in Russia making and developing semiconductor parts used by at least 20 other Russian companies. These parts go into weapons systems, including Su aircraft and missiles like the Iskander and Kinzhal. The plant is just 40 km from the Russian border.

Russian attack on the Shostka training ground

But Russian forces are also striking back — and their hits are painful, especially when lives are lost. Sadly, we are seeing the results of Ukraine's own system’s failures during these strikes.

Two days ago, around 4:15 p.m. local time, a Russian Iskander missile hit a National Guard training range in Shostka, Sumy region — also just 40 km from the Russian border, as mentioned above.

Footage shows a Russian reconnaissance drone in the air, watching troop movements at the range, and then the Iskander strikes. The Ukrainian National Guard has confirmed six soldiers were killed and ten wounded.

An internal investigation has been launched. The commander of one of the National Guard units has been suspended, though it’s unclear which one. Possibly the one responsible for airspace security at the site — someone who likely knew an enemy drone was flying overhead but didn’t stop the training or try to shoot it down.

The National Guard says commanders and law enforcement will assess the actions of all involved, as part of this investigation into the deadly incident.

But sadly, this isn’t the first time. Procedures already exist, and there are standing orders for what to do under threat of airstrikes — mainly to avoid large gatherings of troops. Still, here we are. And it’s especially tragic that those hit were young recruits in a training battalion doing shooting drills at the range.

Russian troops gather in the Kharkiv region

This is northern Ukrainian, where Russia is currently stepping up its attacks. By the way, the chief of staff of Ukraine's 13th Operational Brigade Khartiia, Andriy Pomahaybus, reported that Russia is building up its forces near the state border in the Kharkiv direction. This could signal preparations for a new phase of active assault operations.

Just a reminder: two weeks ago, the Khartiia brigade reported that it had pushed Russian forces out of the area north of Lyptsi, from a forest strip Russia had nicknamed “Berlin.” That was a clear success for this National Guard brigade.

Now, the brigade’s chief of staff says Russian forces are trying to move into a new stage of active combat. They’re bringing in both armored vehicles and infantry — for buildup and for assault — and they’re also using artillery and drones.

In any case, it’s clear that the threat from Russia remains very serious. And it seems the counter-drone measures using fiber optics, which the chief of staff mentioned, are once again becoming a priority — as both sides are trying to adapt to each other’s effective tactics. Right now, both Ukraine and Russia are applying the “kill zone” doctrine, where drones make it nearly impossible to supply or reinforce certain areas.

How to improve mobilization in Ukraine

Now let’s shift focus to the front — or more precisely, to how military service is structured in Ukraine, and what can be done to improve it. We discussed this with Lieutenant Colonel Pavlo Kyshkar, chief specialist at Ukraine's Land Forces Command.

Important note: what Pavlo Kyshkar says here is his personal opinion, not the official position of the Land Forces Command — just to avoid any confusion or misinterpretation.

Back on April 20, I also had a long conversation with Viktor Kevlyuk, an expert at the Center for Defense Strategies. He said that when the enemy is trying to push forward, several steps are needed — not just with air defense and drones, but also on the home front. One of those steps, according to him, is launching a serious information campaign in support of mobilization, because this is a major issue right now.

We all know there’s a shortage of personnel on the front. The men and women holding the line are heroes, but they need strong backup. So the big question is: what can be done to fix mobilization? Are there any real steps that could make this better?

"Yes, this is just my personal opinion as a citizen. Honestly, my view hasn’t changed for almost a year. There are three main things that could make mobilization more effective than it is now. First — admit that the current system isn’t working. Second — start working abroad, including with Ukrainians and even foreigners who want to help defend Ukraine. Third — send well-trained, well-equipped men to the front who are currently serving in other parts of the Ukrainian government, not in the Armed Forces. I believe it’s the right time to involve men of draft age from the Ministry of Internal Affairs and other agencies like NABU (National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine - ed.) or SBI (State Bureau of Investigation- ed.)," he said.

Kyshkar also said this ties into public trust in the system — that all men of draft age should serve equally: “Including those working in other departments or structures, who have already taken the oath to serve the Ukrainian people. They should be on the front lines, not in the rear.”

"This has been my position for more than two years. I’ve repeated it many times on your broadcasts. I believe this would bring real change. First, it would restore trust. Second, it would increase the number of men taking part in military service," he said.

I can’t avoid raising the issue of the role of the Territorial Recruitment Centers. On the one hand, they’re in charge of mobilization plans. On the other, we keep seeing reports of bribes involving staff at recruitment centers in Odesa, Kharkiv, and Lviv — those stories came out just recently. Some MPs point out that there isn’t enough public or parliamentary oversight over these centers.

“My position hasn’t changed in years. First, we need to stop calling it ‘mobilization’ and start calling it ‘recruitment.’ Second, we need to pay people fair wages for military service. If we want people to serve, we need to give them proper incentives. We can broaden the list of motivators, like tax breaks or land grants. I think we should look at this more openly.
As for the recruitment centers: I’m not a fan of ‘fighting corruption’ — I believe we should build systems that make corruption impossible. These systems already exist. In the 21st century, we should be using digital records, electronic systems for managing military service, and electronic medical files. These things determine whether a person is eligible for service based on their health and social status,” said Pavlo Kyshkar.

He also said he had changed his stance on economic exemptions from military service.

“By the way, I used to be strongly against financial exemptions — buyouts from service — or funding the army with money from business owners who’d rather pay than serve. But I’ve completely changed my mind. These people already are buying their way out, just through unofficial channels. It’s better to legalize it than to keep fueling corruption in recruitment centers. So yes, my view has changed. I support introducing official deferrals based on financial contributions. Because right now it exists, just illegally. We need to sort this out quickly and give business a legal way to work with the state,” he said.

Trust in the command

Another major issue is when Ukrainian officers go public, whether in the media or on social platforms, with criticism of high-level military leadership and poor planning, which ends in losses.

One example is Oleksandr Shyrshyn, the commander of the 47th Separate Brigade's Mahura battalion. He first posted online, then clarified that he had exhausted every channel before going public. Posting was his last resort.

“We’ve been learning to fight for 11 years now. Not everything goes well. And the enemy isn’t easy, they’re learning too. I don’t support solving command issues through the media. I believe we should fight these battles within the system. I understand the frustration, I’ve felt it myself. Sometimes I also feel like going out and swearing at everyone over some mistake. But first, this directly helps the enemy. And second, yes, there are real issues with some commanders, some are effective, others not. That’s the responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief, the Supreme Commander, and all senior officers. They have to carry that responsibility with them,” he said.

Pavlo Kishkar added that the leadership is capable of making the right decisions based on this.

“About this specific case, I understand the commander’s concerns, but I don’t support how he delivered the message. That’s my position: we need to fight. We don’t have another army, these are the Armed Forces we have, and we serve in them. We must speak up, explain, report — within the system. Like I said, we’re a reflection of our society, flawed like anyone else. There are plenty of problems in the chain of command and in each of us. But we have to look for ways to unite, to come together around concrete combat goals. I believe we’re capable of that. And that applies not just to the army, but to society as a whole. There are gaps everywhere. But I believe this commander will find the strength to keep fighting the Russian occupiers,” he said.

Technological solutions in the army

We’re talking about the need for motivated, well-trained personnel and effective management. Obviously, all of this has to be backed by weapons and tech solutions. Both Pavlo Kyshkar and I still support the broadest possible development of tech solutions in different directions, but it feels like we’re starting to hit some kind of ceiling. Russia seems to be upgrading its Shahed drones, new models are showing up, while on Ukraine's side, apart from talk about various new drone types, we often don’t feel any real momentum forward.

“I just wrapped up a few meetings with people from inside the system who want to ramp up production, only good things to say. But it's a shame how late it all reaches the front. And I can tell you why. Because the system — military administration, the Ministry of Defense, the General Staff — has way too many overlapping functions. If only the President, as Supreme Commander-in-Chief, had the strength to assign a specific person to each process. For example, Sukharevskyi is in charge of UAVs. There’s trust, everything’s built on that, he has full authority to buy or develop anything in the UAV field. Whether it’s the now-popular fiber-optic drones, or large bombers, or deep-strike models, that’s his call,” he said.

Unfortunately, the Ukrainian system hasn’t changed. It's still operating in a peacetime mindset, says Pavlo Kyshkar.

“I keep saying this. If the system were trimmed down, hundreds of people would need to be removed from the management bodies. Sadly, that’s not happening. The system is rigid, Soviet-style, and deeply rooted. That hasn’t changed. I’ve pointed this out many times, including on our broadcasts: the management system needs deep reform. Every process should have a full name attached to it. Then, if the president trusts that person, someone with military experience and the right knowledge, skills, and qualifications, I’m sure no one would question it. Yes, some say that would lead to corruption. But if one person is fully responsible for a specific area, then if corruption happens, God forbid, it’s clear who the source is,” he said.

At the same time, he believes personal responsibility is the best safeguard against corruption.

“But I try to look at things as practically as possible. We have high-tech manufacturing, including within the Ukroboronprom system. And it's only running at 5–10% capacity. I'm talking about UAVs here. I don’t have exact numbers, but you can imagine the level of underuse of enterprises that are core performers in the state’s defense and public sectors. Just imagine, if all those drones and technologies made it to the front, how many lives we could save, how much easier we could make things for our soldiers. Sadly, we still don’t have people assigned to each area. The system doesn’t want to cut itself down. They want to keep expanding the military management bodies. That’s why we see delays in weapons deployment. I keep reminding people, we have a tech advantage over the enemy. Yes, the Russians are learning, and the gap is shrinking, but we still have it. Until we start assigning names to responsibilities, nothing will change. They’ll just keep creating new oversight offices, scaling centers, or something else. But the actual ammunition won’t reach the front. I think we won’t get anywhere unless we cut down the system and simplify decision-making,” Kyshkar stressed.

He also mentioned the fate of Ukraine’s guided aerial bombs, as their last discussion focused on that direction and the possibility of making the project real.

“All I can say is that this direction is being developed. I can’t say more, hope you understand. It’s an interesting area, with a lot of inventions, including missile-based ideas. But really, it’s all about how it will be used on the battlefield. Let it stay secret, for now, a surprise for the enemy. And I think that’s exactly how it’s going to be in the near future,” said Lieutenant Colonel Pavlo Kyshkar, Senior Officer at Ukraine's Land Forces Command.