What awaits Russia in 2026

1. Russian society has already divided into three large clusters. The first is a passive majority (approximately 62-63%), for whom stopping the war along the front line and Ukraine's non-entry into NATO is a sufficient condition for peace. A proactive minority of 22-24% demands war until the destruction of Ukraine and preferably the Baltic countries. Another approximately 15% of the population have closed themselves off and refuse in principle to respond to sociologists' questions in any way.

2. The 22% of ultra-patriots are, on one hand, the pillar of Putin's regime. On the other hand, they are the main problem, because with a high degree of probability, the majority of them will perceive the end of the war negatively, and will automatically transform from a pillar of the regime into opposition. The Kremlin's political bloc does not understand what to do about this. And this is one of the main challenges for the regime in 2026.

3. During 2022-25, the "root causes of the war," without which hostilities cannot be concluded, have undergone a certain evolution. At the end of 2025, the "root causes" appear to be as follows:

• return to the global agenda through the lifting of sanctions and partial return to certain markets; 

• prevent political dependence on the PRC in the next 10 years through diversification of Russia's economic and geopolitical capabilities in the context of the confrontation between the U.S. and China; 

• try to raise the stakes by threatening Europe (Russians proceed from the idea that this is a unifying idea for the PRC and the U.S., and the EU has no agency in this model); 

• take at least Donbas and change the government in Ukraine.

4. Overall, Putin will be ready to end the war in 2026 under two conditions: either he begins to fear pressure from China or joint U.S.-China pressure. So far this is unlikely, although such a development of events cannot be ruled out by the end of 2026. Or Putin will consider that his main demands (territories, lifting of sanctions, and return to geopolitics) are satisfied in one form or another.

5. The economy in 2026 will continue to decline, and this situation can only be corrected by stopping the war and partially redistributing resources that went to the war to other sectors. However, the main problems of the economy—people and technologies—will only deepen. There is no talk of any changes here, even in the event of the war's end. From an economic perspective, Russia needs to find a balance between the West and China. But the West will be very cautious after the massive nationalization of recent years, and China is not going to share technologies.

"Putin's arsenal only includes intimidating Europe, which clearly will not contribute to a return to the pre-war status quo. Therefore, from an economic standpoint, 2026 will be a continuation of the decline of the economy as a whole and people's living standards in particular."

6. The main political stress for the system in 2026 is the Duma elections. A fairly serious renewal of the deputy corps is already being announced. But the Duma elections are viewed, first and foremost, as the incorporation of frontline soldiers (conditional frontline soldiers) into the power system. 

The logic of the Kremlin's political bloc is as follows: future conflicts with the military should be resolved at the managerial, police, and prison levels by former frontline soldiers. It is from this point of view that the Duma elections will be revealing. The thing is that the previous interim elections that took place in 2025 did not show the announced renewals, and at higher levels, the 'special military operation' participants turned out to be ex-officials who were simply sent somewhere closer to the front for a couple of months.

7. Putin will not undertake any radical renewal of his inner circle and will do everything possible to maintain the current arbitration model, where he manually creates and resolves conflicts. At the same time, in the FSB as first among equals of the security agencies, dual power will be preserved between director Bortnikov and first deputy Korolyov. Overall, at the highest level, the system will continue to work exclusively on self-preservation, while at the lower level, the flywheel of repression will be spinning up. Elite changes will occur at the lower and partially middle levels. But the change of people will not entail a change of the system.

Source

About the author: Vadym Denysenko, political scientist.

The editorial board does not always share the opinions expressed by blog authors.