Violation of objective requirements of warfare: Ukrainian general on NYT report on 2023 counteroffensive

He shared his opinions with Espreso TV.

"The goal of our 2023 counteroffensive was to cut off the land corridor from Russia to Crimea. But the fundamental principles of warfare — concentrating efforts on the main direction — were strategically violated. We and our allies had gathered and planned forces for a single direction. Then the allies insisted we start on May 1 so the Russians wouldn’t have time to strengthen their defenses. But this argument doesn’t hold, because the enemy already had six months to prepare, since the Americans delayed weapon deliveries. Our leadership postponed the offensive to June 4, but the forces were never fully concentrated on a single direction," Romanenko explained.

According to him, then-Commander of Ukraine's Ground Forces, Oleksandr Syrskyi, was withdrawing troops from Bakhmut, which led to plans for a repositioning. Commander-in-Chief Valerii Zaluzhnyi was supposed to strike in two directions — Melitopol and Berdyansk — where the Russians had spent six months reinforcing their classic defensive lines. It’s also important to note that in spring 2023, a major data leak occurred — an American Air Force captain exposed details on Ukrainian brigades, including their manpower and training levels.

"Under these conditions, five of our twelve brigades were handed over to Syrskyi, which was already a mistake. He claimed that with these forces, he would liberate Bakhmut and then push toward Luhansk. As a result, Zaluzhnyi had to attack heavily fortified enemy positions with what remained. The original main direction — Kherson — had been undermined because the Russians, knowing the situation, blew up the Kakhovka Dam, throwing off our plans. When Zaluzhnyi tried to focus resources on cutting the corridor, the president, as Supreme Commander-in-Chief, refused and redirected resources to Bakhmut instead. Had Syrskyi succeeded, it would have obviously set the stage for Zaluzhnyi’s removal," Romanenko noted.

He recalled that in early 2023, Zaluzhnyi had called for drafting 500,000 conscripts to sustain the war effort but was denied. Since then, no large-scale mobilization in Ukraine has been implemented, despite the ongoing need for reinforcements.

"In these conditions, operations began, but resources had already been spread too thin. The Kherson front was flooded, and in the Russian defenses near Berdyansk and Melitopol, we only managed to break through the first line of the ‘Surovikin’ defense. Syrskyi also lacked the strength to complete his objective — Bakhmut was not liberated, let alone Luhansk. By June 2023, it was clear that there weren’t enough forces, and switching to strategic defense was necessary. By July, NATO forces were already discussing this. But instead, the Zaporizhzhia, Krynky, and island operations were added — another mistake that further dispersed resources. Offensive potential was exhausted, and by fall, it wasn’t even enough for defense. The Russians took advantage of this and launched their strategic offensive. We must learn from this, focus on the enemy’s actions, and prevent similar missteps in the future, as these were clear violations of the objective requirements of warfare," the general concluded.

• On March 30, The New York Times published a detailed article analyzing the successes and failures of three years of Ukrainian-American military cooperation.