U.S. intel: Russia’s cruise, hypersonic missile stockpiles reflect deepening defense industry decline

The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) published a revealing infographic intended to justify the deployment of the Golden Dome missile defense system, Defense Express reports.

It outlines existing nuclear threats and provides a five-year forecast. While primarily aimed at U.S. lawmakers—who are being asked to approve an eye-popping $542 billion in funding—it includes significant assessments of Russia’s missile capabilities that are especially relevant for Ukraine.

One key section of the infographic highlights various nuclear-capable missile systems. Setting aside intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), the focus narrows to two categories that Russia has routinely used against Ukraine: hypersonic and long-range cruise missiles. 

According to U.S. intelligence estimates, Russia currently holds around 300 to 600 long-range cruise missiles in its arsenal, including air-launched Kh-101s, Iskander’s R-500s, and sea-launched Kalibr missiles.

As for hypersonic weapons—like the Kh-47M2 Kinzhal, Tsirkon, and the Avangard glide vehicle—Russia is believed to have between 200 and 300 units. 

But stockpiles are only part of the picture, Defense Express writes. Production capacity matters too. Based on 2025 procurement data for spare parts, Russia is expected to manufacture 633 Kh-101 missiles this year. 

However, by 2035, U.S. analysts project a total inventory of about 5,000 long-range cruise missiles—suggesting an average annual output of fewer than 500 units across all types.

Russia is also projected to possess roughly 1,000 hypersonic missiles and glide vehicles by 2035. For comparison, China currently has twice that amount, and is expected to grow its hypersonic arsenal to 4,000 units over the same period—highlighting Washington’s broader assessment of Moscow’s declining defense-industrial capabilities.

This decline is further reflected in U.S. intelligence projections for ICBM development. By 2035, both Iran and North Korea could each possess 50–60 ICBMs capable of reaching the U.S. 

Meanwhile, despite its nuclear posturing, Russia is expected to increase its ICBM inventory by only 50 over the next decade, reaching a total of 400. This includes systems capable of orbital bombardment (FOBS), a Cold War-era Soviet concept designed to place warheads in low-Earth orbit.

The Soviet Union deployed such systems in 1968 with the R-36orb missile, carrying warheads estimated at 2.3 to 5 megatons. However, under the SALT II treaty, these systems were retired in 1983 and the units disbanded. Even if Russia revives the FOBS concept, U.S. analysts predict it will manage to deploy fewer than 12 such missiles by 2035—compared to 60 expected in China’s arsenal.

Strategic submarine capabilities paint a similar picture. Russia’s number of nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarines and launch systems is projected to remain unchanged at 192. In contrast, China is set to nearly double its sea-based nuclear arsenal, from 72 to at least 132 missiles.

All of these estimates underscore a broader conclusion: while Russia continues to pose a threat, its ability to produce and maintain advanced missile systems is diminishing, especially in comparison to China’s rapidly growing capabilities.

• Russia's new S8000 Banderol cruise missile, used to strike southern Ukraine, is cheaply mass-produced using easily sourced foreign components, circumventing some sanctions.