Ukraine's strategy to maintain 'maritime corridor' if Riyadh deal takes effect: analysis

Content

1. Possible risks of the Ukraine-USA-Russia deal in Saudi Arabia

2. What is Ukraine's "maritime corridor" in the Black Sea

3. How Russia attacked Ukraine’s "maritime corridor"

4. What new weapons does Russia have for attacks on Ukraine’s "maritime corridor"

5. How Ukraine can counter Russian attacks on the "maritime corridor"

The material was prepared in collaboration with the Consortium for Defense Information (CDI). It is a joint project of Ukrainian analytical and research organizations aimed at strengthening information support and analytical support in the fields of national security, defense, and geopolitics.

Possible risks of the Ukraine-USA-Russia deal in Saudi Arabia

One of the outcomes of the talks between Ukraine, Russia, and the United States in Saudi Arabia in March 2025 was an agreement on the security of shipping in the Black Sea region. While no formal agreement was signed, the decision was announced by all three parties. Not all details were disclosed, but it is at least known that, if a final agreement is reached, Russian Black Sea Fleet ships will be confined to the eastern part of the Black Sea.

Many experts and officials immediately expressed skepticism and distrust of the hypothetical agreement: Ukraine has pushed Russia out of the Black Sea, and now, with the "help" of the U.S., the Russian fleet will return, and Russia will again attack Ukraine?

How realistic is such a development? Ukraine has indeed managed to radically change the situation in the Black Sea through military means: it has destroyed or damaged a significant part of Russia's Black Sea Fleet, forcing it to retreat to Novorossiysk; opened its own shipping corridor without the participation of Russia and Turkey; and ensured the passage of vessels despite Russian threats.

The potential risks posed by the agreement, initiated by the US and Russia under the guise of "shipping security," are evident. This includes the legitimization of Russia's presence in the Black Sea—Moscow will undoubtedly use the agreement as a pretext to return military ships and resume threats to Ukraine. There is also the possibility of new strikes on Ukrainian ports—Russia may insist on a "security zone," which would effectively limit Ukraine's activity and give Russia more opportunities for attacks. Additionally, there is the rapid weakening of sanctions—Moscow seeks to restore access to SWIFT and ease export restrictions, allowing it to fund its aggression.

Thus, experts believe that the agreement will only create problems, not solve them: the aggressor country has already publicly declared that it will comply with the conditions for shipping security in the Black Sea only after the comprehensive lifting of Western sanctions, which has not happened yet.

It is important to analyze all possible developments in detail.

What is Ukraine's "maritime corridor" in the Black Sea

The "maritime corridor" runs from the Greater Odesa ports (in the cities of Odesa, Chornomorsk, and Pivdenne) to the Danube ports of Reni and Izmail. The corridor is routed in the coastal zone, providing the optimal path for vessel movement.

At the same time, port operations in Kherson and Mykolaiv remain blocked: the exit from these ports to the open sea passes through the Kinburn Spit, which is still controlled by Russian occupation forces.

What has the operation of the "maritime corridor" achieved? By the end of the year since the launch of the "maritime corridor" in the summer of 2023, after Russia withdrew from the "grain deal," the Ukrainian Navy facilitated the passage of nearly 10,000 ships. 100 million tons of various cargoes, including agricultural products, were exported from Ukrainian ports, which is close to the levels seen before Russia's full-scale invasion.

During this time, Russia has attacked Ukrainian port infrastructure or vessels in various ways to complicate the operation of the maritime corridor.

How Russia attacked Ukraine’s "maritime corridor"

Russia has targeted Ukraine's Danube ports infrastructure with Shahed kamikaze drones. It has also used ballistic missiles to strike ships during loading directly at the port of Odesa. Marine aviation has likely dropped sea mines along the routes of ships, as it did in December 2023. Additionally, Russia has used all available means to attack energy facilities that power port infrastructure and access roads to the ports.

It is also important to recall the incident on September 12, 2024, when Russia used a Tu-22M3 bomber to launch Kh-22 missiles at civilian ships in neutral waters near Romania's coastline. A grain bulk carrier heading from Ukraine's Chornomorsk port was damaged in that attack.

There is no doubt that Russia will resort to these familiar tactics again. Meanwhile, the aggressor country has significantly expanded and refined its tools for intensifying such attacks.

What new weapons does Russia have for attacks on Ukraine’s "maritime corridor"

Sea drones. In 2023-2024, Russia showcased several models of unmanned surface drones of its own development, including the GRK-700 Vizir and Murena-300S.

These remotely controlled devices are said to have a range of up to 500 kilometers and can carry a payload (or other useful cargo) of up to 500 kilograms.

Russia has the capability to mass-produce such kamikaze boats, which can be launched from the territory of temporarily occupied Crimea. The wording outlined in the agreements in Saudi Arabia from March 23-25, 2025, stating that "Russian Black Sea Fleet ships must remain in the eastern part of the Black Sea," could be manipulated by the aggressor, claiming that unmanned boats do not fall under this definition.

Naval Aviation. The core of the Russian Black Sea Fleet's naval aviation is the 43rd Independent Aviation Regiment based at the Crimean airfield Saki, which includes Su-24M and Su-30SM aircraft.

Russia has previously claimed to use Su-30SMs to counter Ukrainian marine drones. However, it is possible that Russian forces may begin using naval aviation aircraft for direct strikes with Kh-31 anti-ship missiles on civilian vessels moving through the "maritime corridor."

Submarines. As of early 2025, the Russian Black Sea Fleet had four submarines in the waters of the Black Sea out of seven formally available at the beginning of the full-scale invasion.

The submarine Rostov-on-Don was sunk on August 3, 2024; two more submarines from the Black Sea Fleet, after Russia's invasion on February 24, 2022, were unable to pass through the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits, so they are used for operations in the Mediterranean Sea.

Each of the remaining submarines in the Black Sea can carry not only four Kalibr cruise missiles but also up to 18 powerful 533-mm torpedoes or up to 24 naval mines.

This gives Russia the ability to covertly deploy mines along civilian shipping routes or even torpedo civilian vessels, taking advantage of the fact that Ukraine's naval units currently lack a developed anti-submarine warfare capability.

How Ukraine can counter Russian attacks on the "maritime corridor"

The Ukrainian Defense Forces have means to effectively counter Russian naval drones and partially provide air defense for civilian shipping. However, this capability is limited, as a significantly larger number of systems is needed to intercept ballistic and hypersonic cruise missiles, which Russia uses, including to strike civilian vessels and port infrastructure.

Furthermore, as long as the full-scale war between Russia and Ukraine continues, the relevant provisions of the Montreux Convention will remain in effect, prohibiting the passage of warships from warring countries and non-Black Sea nations into the Black Sea.

These circumstances create a situation where, if Russia launches new strikes on civilian shipping, Ukraine will have to turn to Turkey. How can Turkey assist? Through diplomacy and military actions, as Turkey controls passage through the Bosporus and Dardanelles. Turkey also possesses the most powerful fleet in the Black Sea, including 12 submarines, 16 frigates, corvettes, and missile boats. Furthermore, to protect Ukraine's "maritime corridor," direct assistance will be needed from NATO European countries, particularly France and the United Kingdom. As part of contracts with these and other European NATO countries, the issue of organizing a permanent "air policing" mission to protect the "maritime corridor" from possible Russian air attacks should be raised. This could involve not only the supply of additional aircraft and air defense systems to Ukraine's Defense Forces, but also direct participation from NATO's "air policing" forces in Romania to patrol Black Sea waters, at least in the limited area near the Danube's mouth and the waters surrounding Ukraine's Danube ports.

And, of course, it is essential to demand actions from Russia that will lead to the unlocking of maritime exits from the ports of Mykolaiv and Kherson. This step will significantly bring us closer to victory in this bloody war. It will bring us closer to the day when Ukraine will not only reclaim its land but also become the master of both the "maritime corridor" and the entire maritime space that belongs to it and is recognized in international agreements.

Serhiy Zgurets’, Director of the information and consulting company Defense Express, co-founder of the Consortium for Defense Information.