Ukraine’s 2023 counteroffensive doomed by overexposure — military analyst

He shared his opinion on Espreso TV.

“Let’s remember the year 2023 and the overall context leading up to that offensive. There were tons of comments, predictions, and forecasts circulating in Ukraine’s information space. I remember how many opinions and comments I personally made, how many people asked me for insights, and so on. And I was just one of many. There were countless statements, forecasts, and speculations. A counteroffensive should never be something everyone knows about. Any offensive operation must be prepared in total secrecy.

By contrast, look at the operation in the Kursk region — even when it began, no one could understand what exactly was going on. Only a very limited group of people involved in the planning knew anything about it,” he said.

Denys Popovych emphasized that this approach was correct — the operation came as a surprise to everyone, and that’s how it should be. But when it came to the counteroffensive in the Zaporizhzhia region, everyone knew which territories the Ukrainian Armed Forces would try to recapture.

“Everyone knew perfectly well that the goal was to reach the Sea of Azov and cut off the so-called land corridor to Crimea. Everyone knew that the targets were Melitopol, Tokmak, then Berdyansk, and so on. Naturally, if we all knew this, the enemy certainly did too. They began preparing for this offensive as early as the fall of 2022. Remember the reports of the so-called ‘czar trench’ — that massive trench in the Melitopol district — and the ‘dragon’s teeth’ defenses, etc. The enemy was prepared. They mined the territory. They built fortifications — several lines of defense. There were even underground tunnels.

I have direct testimonies from people who fought on the Zaporizhzhia front back then. To take a single tree line, they had to shell it for a whole day with artillery. Thankfully, at the time, there were no ammunition shortages.”

The analyst said Ukrainian troops had to first “process the area” with artillery, then inspect each trench with a drone to ensure it was clear.

“They launched the assault, but then underground hatches opened, Russians emerged and opened fire. They had survived the artillery bombardment underground and were ready and unharmed to repel our assaults on individual positions. And let’s not even get into the topic of landmines — the entire area was endlessly mined. So I believe the core issue was the overexposure and hype around the counteroffensive, which allowed the enemy to prepare. That’s why it failed to achieve its planned objectives.

Also, the enemy had air superiority. Even back then, they had started using glide bombs — not as frequently or densely as now, but they had started. So I think the problem was that the offensive was anticipated, and the enemy was well-prepared for it.

As for the claim now being circulated in the Western press that forces were too spread out — let’s remember there was also the offensive around Bakhmut. It had some tactical gains, but Bakhmut wasn’t liberated and still isn’t. So in my view, the real problem was that everyone knew about the counteroffensive,” Popovych concluded.

• On March 30, 2025, The New York Times published an in-depth article reviewing the successes and failures of three years of Ukrainian-American military cooperation.