Ukraine refuses to capitulate to Putin, making compromise impossible — U.S. diplomat Carpenter

Extremely difficult situation: At this stage, a diplomatic resolution to the Russian-Ukrainian war seems highly unlikely. During the negotiations in Istanbul, the Russian side presented an ultimatum and downgraded the level of its delegation to Medinsky, who played a mostly technical role. The Russians have once again begun savagely attacking our cities, which clearly demonstrates their unwillingness to engage in negotiations. They were prepared to issue their ultimatum only to proceed with the summer offensive campaign. What is your sense of the current diplomatic moment — is it predictable at all?

Well, I have been pessimistic about the prospects for a diplomatic resolution to the war for many, many months now, for a very simple reason: Ukraine is not ready to capitulate.

And Vladimir Putin continues to demand its capitulation. So there is no compromise between those two positions. Despite the fact that there has been magical thinking in Washington and other Western capitals over the course of the last few months, speculating on the terms and timing of an agreement that might be negotiated by President Trump, the reality is that Russia continues to want to subjugate Ukraine, to eviscerate its sovereignty, and Ukraine is not going to do that. It is not going to capitulate to Russia.

I would like to ask you about two strategic games. One is the game currently being played by the American administration. Under President Trump, there was an effort to draw the Russians into negotiations. Steve Witkoff was dispatched to Moscow with proposals and extended discussions. Washington even sent out signals of goodwill toward Putin. On the other hand, the head of the Russian Federation was also conducting his own very cunning diplomatic and intelligence-driven game toward the U.S. president and the new American administration. Yet we now see that everything ultimately hinges on Putin’s refusal to adopt any genuine diplomatic approach. He bets solely on war. In your view, how is the American administration, and President Trump in particular, likely to shape their position now?

The Trump administration has tried to pursue a diplomatic resolution by doing what is completely illogical and counterintuitive.

It has tried to punish and pressure Ukraine, while promising some sort of rewards to Russia in the form of lifting sanctions, easing pressure, establishing economic relations, and resetting diplomatic relations between the United States and Russia in the future. Now, that has not worked, as I said before. I think the fundamentals of the diplomatic engagement between Ukraine and Russia are very simple.

Russia demands the subjugation of Ukraine. Ukraine is not willing to capitulate to Russia. And so, no matter how hard the Trump administration tries to apply pressure to Ukraine, I do not think it will succeed in resetting relations with Russia. I take President Trump at his word that this is his primary goal.

But I do not think it will succeed, and I think you are seeing an increasing number of U.S. congressmen who are frustrated with this approach, both Democrats and Republicans, who understand that Putin has been indicted by the International Criminal Court for war crimes, that Russia is the aggressor in this war, and that the United States should be standing with Ukraine in order to seek a just and lasting resolution. But that will take additional assistance, and it will take some form of Ukrainian victory on the battlefield.

For our victory, we need the appropriate means such as long-range missiles and systems capable of deterring Russian aggression. A few days ago, Ukrainian intelligence services surprised not only our enemy but also our American and European partners. The Security Service of Ukraine carried out an exceptionally precise operation, targeting part of Russia’s nuclear triad. Drones struck Russian strategic aviation. No one expected it, but we did it, demonstrating that Ukraine holds strong cards. Still, to win, we need reinforcement with certain long-range systems. Is it at all likely that the Trump administration will eventually grow tired of Russia’s lies and take more radical and decisive steps?

I think you are absolutely right that Ukraine has plenty of cards to play, and Ukraine has innovation, determination, and ingenuity on its side. Without a fully functioning navy, Ukraine has nevertheless neutralized the entire Russian Black Sea Fleet.

And despite having a much smaller air force than the Russian Aerospace Forces, Ukraine has successfully denied Russia air superiority over its territory. The key challenge is how to translate a similar asymmetric advantage to the land domain. And here, I think you are absolutely right. I think long-range strike capabilities, drones, landmines, and innovative tactics are going to be crucial to Ukraine's success.

However, I would not wait to see what the Trump administration is going to do. I think the ball is now firmly in the court of the European powers.

They have the ability to seize the immobilized Russian funds that are within their jurisdiction and to use that capital both to invest in Ukraine’s dynamic and innovative defense industrial base, and to ramp up production lines in Europe, which they themselves will very much need in the future in order to ensure what they like to call their strategic autonomy.

If that is the case, then they need to demonstrate that they have the political will by mobilizing these funds, investing in their own defense production, in Ukraine’s defense production, and then potentially reaching a deal with the Trump administration to acquire some high-end U.S. capabilities as well. I see that as the logical next step, but at this stage it really depends on Europe.

Donald Trump has said on several occasions that he would be ready to walk away from negotiations if necessary. What would that mean for both us and for Russia? How did it come to this — that the current American diplomatic mission has shifted from being one of support for Ukraine to acting as a mediator? Could it be that at some point the United States might return to its earlier stance on Russian aggression and once again choose to help Ukraine defend its independence and sovereign borders through military support?

You are right that the Trump administration has positioned itself as an intermediary between Russia and Ukraine, as opposed to the stance of the Biden administration, which was to support Ukraine and to try to put it in the strongest possible position going into any future negotiations. Now, I would not hold my breath waiting for the Trump administration to change its position.

I think fundamentally, and this is just my reading of the situation, the Trump administration wants to be able to reset relations with Russia. That is its guiding geopolitical imperative or goal. And that is why it has pursued the approach to Ukraine that it has taken over the course of the last five months.

What I think can change is pressure from Republican members of Congress, especially those who do not like to see the United States standing on the sidelines and failing to support the victim of large-scale aggression from a dictatorial, autocratic power like Russia.

And so I think you may see, over time, and you have already begun to see this to some extent with the introduction of the Graham-Blumenthal bill on sanctions, a shift. That bill would impose sanctions against Russia. It marks the beginning of a move in Congress to signal to the administration that the current trajectory is not acceptable.

Now, between where we are today and the imposition of much more forceful sanctions on Russia, there is still a long way to go. And so, frankly, I think the ball is in the Europeans’ court right now to take the next steps. I would not count on the U.S. administration to take any significant steps to support Ukraine.

Despite the fact that there are 3.8 billion dollars in what are called Presidential Drawdown Authority funds, as well as 9 billion dollars in Ukraine Security Assistance funds that could be deployed to Ukraine today if they chose to do so, I would still not count on that. I would really look to see whether European powers can step up and use those immobilized Russian assets to support Ukraine right now.

Where does President Trump’s patience end when it comes to global matters? He broke ties with Elon Musk and called Putin “absolutely crazy”. Donald Trump tends to shift his stance when the pressure starts to build. If we are speaking about a radical change in Trump’s policy, what more crimes does Putin have to commit before Americans finally see that the Russian leader is not mocking negotiations, but mocking President Trump himself? Putin is not making a mockery of talks with Europe or Ukraine — he is making a mockery of the President of the United States in the face of the increasingly unrestrained behavior of the People’s Republic of China.

There is clearly a bit of a double game happening here on the world stage.

Personally, I do not attach much significance to phrases uttered by President Trump, such as "Stop Vladimir" or "Putin has gone absolutely crazy." These appear intended for domestic consumption. But again, the words matter less than the actions. And so far, there have been zero actions from this administration to impose any costs on Russia.

This is despite the fact that the war has been extremely brutal over the past five months while this administration has been in power, not to mention the previous three years of absolutely horrific abuses of human rights, war crimes, and even crimes against humanity. The situation in Ukraine is unmistakable: it is an attempt by a colonial power to subjugate its neighbor using the most brutal tactics.

The Trump administration is fully aware of this. It would be unwise to wait and see what additional atrocities would need to occur to prompt a change of course. It is far more realistic to assume that the administration will continue down its current path. If I were a Ukrainian diplomat, I would be turning to the European powers to drive change in the present circumstances.

There is little reason to hope that the Trump administration will alter its fundamental approach to the conflict. Vice President J.D. Vance stated that there is no pathway to victory for Ukraine. That conclusion is entirely unfounded. A path to Ukrainian victory does exist, but it will require sustained resources and support from Western countries to make it a reality.

Nonetheless, that remains the current position of this administration.

I would like to ask you about the rather unusual behavior of the American administration regarding the absence of Pentagon chief Pete Hegseth at the recent “Ramstein” meeting. Although it was explained that a special U.S. representative was present, the Secretary of Defense himself was not there. It’s worth noting that the previous U.S. Secretary of Defense did attend meetings in the Ramstein format. When it comes to defense support from the United States, is there a concern that a veto might be imposed on the sale of American weapons to our European allies in order to prevent them from passing that equipment on to Ukraine? Or is such a development out of the question?

I think the Ramstein format and the failure of the U.S. Secretary of Defense to even bother showing up at the meetings of what is formally called the Ukraine Defense Contact Group speaks volumes.

If the current U.S. administration is ostensibly unwilling to support Ukraine with its own resources and insists that Europe step up and take greater responsibility for European security, then it should at least continue leading these Ramstein format meetings to encourage more European allies to do so.

If that is indeed their stated goal, then the absence of the U.S. Secretary of Defense from these meetings, where he would engage directly with his European counterparts on how best to support Ukraine, suggests to me that the current administration simply does not intend to provide further support to Ukraine.

I find that deeply troubling. As I said earlier, I hope that members of Congress will be embarrassed by the fact that the United States is failing to support the victim of large-scale aggression, namely Ukraine, and that they will become increasingly vocal in urging the United States to do more, together with our European allies, to support Ukraine.

I believe it will take considerable pressure from Congress before the administration shifts its position.

A signal recently emerged suggesting that Trump may be seeking to replicate President Nixon’s diplomatic move. Just a few days ago, Trump spoke with Xi Jinping, invited him to visit the United States, and also expressed his own willingness to travel to the People’s Republic of China. But for now, these are only potential developments. What is your realistic assessment of China’s position? We know that Putin hosted Xi Jinping in Moscow on May 9, and the Chinese leader was one of the very few world leaders to visit Russia. It is clear that the Russian economy could not function without China’s economic and, to some extent, military support. So what does China’s current foreign policy truly represent?

Well, that is a very good point, and it is important that people inside the Trump administration come to understand that there is actually a coalition of countries fighting against Ukraine. It is not just Russia, but also China, North Korea, and Iran, which are providing enormous capabilities. In the case of the North Koreans, it is even soldiers in support of Russia's attack on Ukraine.

For an administration that claims China is the pacing threat to American security, it must be recognized that China is part of this coalition. Without Chinese optics, machine tools, nitrocellulose, and other components, including financial resources, the Russian war machine would be only a fraction of the size that it is today. China is very much bankrolling this war.

It is also providing the critical components that enable a future threat to European security. So both the United States and our European friends should be extremely dissatisfied and concerned with the situation that China poses — the risk that it presents to Ukraine and to European security.

Nevertheless, it remains to be seen whether the Trump administration will continue to adopt an adversarial position toward China, or whether at some point President Trump will decide to pursue one of these large summits, as he did with Kim Jong-un during the first Trump administration, and attempt to reset relations with China in a manner similar to what he did with North Korea some years ago. That scenario is entirely possible.

Just as he appears eager to reset relations with Russia, there seems to be no clear ideological reason why he would not attempt something similar with China. Although many individuals in senior positions within his administration would likely oppose such a move, the possibility remains very real.

As I understand it, the People’s Republic of China is focused on more than just Taiwan. Beijing seeks to reshape the global agenda and rewrite the rules of the international order. Russia also appears eager to redefine that global framework. Interestingly, a growing number of new populist movements, perhaps loosely connected, are attempting to undermine and transform the existing world order. We have even heard statements from Sergey Lavrov suggesting the relocation of the UN headquarters to Sochi. This is clearly a fantasy, but one that reflects a broader revisionist mindset. The UN, in its current form, has proven incapable of stopping aggression committed by a permanent member of the Security Council who launched an unprovoked war. What kind of global order might we expect to see from Beijing’s perspective?

Well, we are witnessing a fragmentation of the world system.

All of the essential elements of the rules-based international order that have existed over the past five, six, even seven decades are gradually being undone. This includes not only security arrangements like the INF Treaty or the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty, but also economic frameworks such as the World Trade Organization, which is becoming increasingly ineffective as a mechanism for regulating free trade.

From China’s perspective, there is clearly a sense of satisfaction in seeing the diminution of U.S. power on the global stage. This fragmentation of the international order creates opportunities for China to collaborate with other autocratic powers in undermining the influence of democracies, which have dominated the global system, particularly over the last 30 years since the end of the Cold War.

Historically, North America and Europe, together with select democracies in East Asia such as Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand, have shaped the terms of the international security and economic order. That era is ending—or has already ended—and this is something China appears to welcome. It now sees an opportunity to play a much greater role in projecting its power in its immediate periphery and beyond.

Part of the advantage for China lies in its ability to support Russia’s power projection along Russia’s own periphery. The two powers clearly share mutual interests in how they manage and influence their neighboring regions.

For democracies around the world, this should serve as a wake-up call. We are entering a period of intense uncertainty and geopolitical volatility, with the likelihood of more regional wars and even the potential for great power conflict.

In my assessment, the current global alignment shows that Putin is, to a large extent, a tool in China’s hands. I am not sure to what degree he makes decisions independently or chooses his targets on his own, but the broader goal is to change the global agenda. Europeans had placed their hopes in Article 5 of the Euro-Atlantic Treaty. The Trump administration has consistently stated that Europe must contribute more to its own security. Now we are seeing defense spending rise to 5 percent of GDP, which is becoming the new norm. However, there are questions about the fulfillment of existing commitments. I speak with representatives from the Baltic states, and they are, to put it mildly, deeply concerned that Russia might carry out a conventional act of aggression or a hybrid one. The European security system, until recently, was based on the presence of the U.S. Navy, U.S. Air Force, and the American willingness to defend its NATO allies.

It is a very good question. There are many allies right now who are deeply concerned about the United States' political will to enforce Article 5 — to come to the aid of a NATO ally if that ally is attacked.

The reality is that Russia is already carrying out hybrid attacks against many of our allies in Europe, using methods that fall short of conventional warfare. Once the war between Ukraine and Russia ends, there is a very real possibility that Russia could shift its focus toward Europe with the intent of launching a more conventional form of aggression.

The sanctity of Article 5 is therefore absolutely critical in deterring such aggression in the future. At the same time, the alliance must take a far more active interest in stopping Russia in Ukraine, because these issues are fundamentally connected. The defense of Ukraine and the credibility of NATO's deterrence posture are inseparable.

However, the current reality is that the United States appears less committed to an alliance based on shared values. The focus in Washington today is increasingly on the defense of the U.S. homeland itself, rather than on extended deterrence or the defense of allies. This represents a significant shift in mindset from what we saw in previous decades.

We remember how Russia’s full-scale aggression against Ukraine began — with Putin’s ultimatum, which was directed not only at Ukraine but also at the United States and the Euro-Atlantic community. “Pack up and pull back to the borders of the Euro-Atlantic alliance as they were in 1997” — that was the opening line of Putin’s war of aggression against Ukraine. How does the situation look now, considering that Putin speaks less about this publicly? Would this still imply a demand for the withdrawal of NATO forces from Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Poland, and possibly Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania?

Absolutely, and in fact, Foreign Minister Lavrov spoke about this just the other day.

When Vladimir Putin refers to the root causes of the war in Ukraine, the reasons behind Russia’s decision to wage war, he is essentially pointing to three things. First, he speaks of what he calls “denazification,” which all Ukrainians understand as a euphemism for regime change.

Second, he talks about “demilitarization,” which in his view means neutralizing Ukraine’s military so that the country is left vulnerable and subject to Russia’s will in any future security arrangements.

Third, he insists on the rollback of NATO’s expansion into Eastern Europe, a process that, as you rightly noted, began well before the full-scale invasion of February 2022 and continues to resurface in the Russian narrative as something that must be reversed in order to address what they claim are the root causes of the war.

European powers ignore this at their peril. What is at stake is nothing less than a fundamental reordering of European security.

Right now, European states have a real opportunity to stop Russia in its tracks in Ukraine before the conflict spreads further. But that will require demonstrating the political will and committing the necessary resources to support Ukraine in this fight.

I understand that war futurology is a highly speculative and often thankless task. But what is your sense of the trajectory of the Russian-Ukrainian war? Is it at all susceptible to localization, or does it inherently tend to expand into new areas of the front? This includes concerns about Belarus, the Suwałki Gap, and the potential opening of additional fronts in the Russian-Ukrainian war.

My view is that Vladimir Putin has set his sights on subjugating Ukraine, and he will not stop until he is stopped by outside powers and by Ukraine itself. His aims are very clear. As the saying goes, the appetite grows with the eating.

For Vladimir Putin, the longer this war continues and the more opportunities he sees to occupy additional Ukrainian territory, the more willing he will be to deploy and mobilize soldiers to pursue that goal.

However, if he is stopped and if the resources provided by the West are sufficient to turn the tide in Ukraine's favor, then he may be forced to re-evaluate whether he can achieve those objectives or whether he must cease fighting and reconsider the future of the Russian Federation. His aims will shift as the trajectory of the war shifts.

But fundamentally, the strategic aim is to subjugate Ukraine, and I do not believe that will change until, as I said, Russia is stopped.