Trump struggles to find a way out of negotiations with Russia

However, they also highlighted one important thing: the White House is postponing its exit from negotiations because it simply doesn’t understand how to leave them.

1. We should probably start with Trump’s approval ratings. Their decline certainly impacts the White House. The balance of support between Russia and Ukraine clearly doesn’t sit well with the electorate. This doesn’t mean that tomorrow there won’t be another flip-flop, but it is a significant deterrent factor.
2. For now, Trump is largely forced to pause negotiations because the formula: “If Russia doesn’t want to, we’ll impose sanctions, and if Ukraine doesn’t want to, we’ll stop supplying weapons” has hit a dead end. Some do not want it, but sanctions are still far off, and the "case" of five days without intelligence data affected the military lobby, which reacted very negatively when the closest partners began to think about refusing American weapons. Additionally, we cannot forget that we are part of a broader negotiation process between the USA, EU, and Ukraine. And this directly "conflicts" with the pro-Russian line of some of the negotiators on Ukraine.
3. Trump clearly doesn’t want (or is not ready) for a sharp turn against Russia. Trump (and his circle) clearly likes the idea of sidelining the Ukraine issue in a bilateral format. But for now, this process is stalled by sanctions, and lifting them without peace conflicts with his approval ratings.
4. When we talk about sanctions, we must remember that for Putin in 2025, lifting sanctions is more important than imposing new ones. The main goal of the dialogue with Trump right now is to preserve the current status quo. And lifting sanctions is the ultimate goal. Regarding maintaining dialogue with Trump, I think certain additional economic proposals may be made. However, it seems that Dmitriev, who is responsible for this direction, is experiencing a "Italian strike" by key players in the Russian bureaucracy. But this should be followed separately, as Dmitriev has a special option – a personal conversation with Putin.
5. I’ve said many times that Putin is obsessed with the "summer offensive." The summer offensive was supported by his close circle (primarily, Chemezov, Patrushev, Kirienko, the Kovalkuks, and Ushakov). Logically, it would have been beneficial for Putin to make a deal with Trump and lift sanctions now. But he is clearly ill with the mythical takeovers of this summer.
6. Putin’s idea of bilateral negotiations without preconditions is a trap. Entering such negotiations would mean exiting the Ukraine-Russia-USA-EU format without any guarantees and giving the USA the opportunity to wash its hands. Such negotiations can only happen after all parties agree on the basic principles of a ceasefire. It is crucial that Americans don’t start promoting this idea. This is one of the biggest threats to us right now. The information campaign targeted at the American audience must focus primarily on this issue.
7. In conclusion, it’s important to emphasize once again. Right now, it seems that the continuation of negotiations depends on whether the White House can find some unconventional moves. And if it can’t, and there is a very high probability of this, Trump will start exiting them (in my opinion, he cannot make drastic moves in either direction) unless mistakes are made.

I repeat what I have been saying for the past few months. Ukraine's main goal in negotiations is not to fall out with Washington and stay within the security and political perimeter of the USA-EU negotiations. A litmus test that this scenario is primary will be Putin’s refusal of the 30-day ceasefire. If he agrees to peace (the likelihood is low), it will mean continuing the tactic of dragging out negotiations, although it would open up certain opportunities for negotiations.

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About the author: Vadym Denysenko, political scientist.

The editorial team does not always share the views expressed by the authors of blogs.