Ukraine must avoid becoming 'Georgia' to prevent 'Georgian scenario'

Here’s a reminder: the analysts predicted a 50% chance of the “Georgian” scenario — a gradual abandonment, leaving Ukraine alone with Russia and falling into its sphere of influence. The other 50% is roughly split among the “South Korean,” “Israeli,” and “Belarusian” scenarios.

Many well-founded criticisms have been raised about this forecast. The authors are accused of misunderstanding Ukraine, the nature of our resistance, the dynamics of our society, and the changes since 2014 and 2022… All of this is true. It is also very appropriate that this discussion has moved into Western media and social media spaces: the more positive knowledge about Ukraine, the better.

But even such distant — albeit superficial and lacking deep understanding — views of the possible future are actually very useful. They help us look at ourselves. More importantly, they give an idea of how the world sees us: what stereotypes and expectations exist there. And how we should accordingly change our external information efforts and internal substantive policies — the only ones capable of generating convincing content for our information work.

To avoid falling into the "Georgian scenario," we must "not become Georgia." Much has been written about how "we are different." But let’s admit: public opinion dynamics greatly depend on circumstances and prolonged information influence. The authorities can enjoy high "trust" ratings — until they crash into the cold reality.

"Despite all optimistic statements and patriotic calls, troubling signals persist. And as is known, the Russian bulldozer keeps advancing."

1. The very fact that such forecasts appear shows how events are perceived in Western analytical circles. In itself, this is not fatal.

Since regaining independence in 1991, Ukraine has repeatedly proven itself an "unexpected nation," to use the words of Ukraine’s friend, British researcher Andrew Wilson. After all, we seized the chance to restore independence in 1991, avoided internal conflict in 1994-96, thwarted attempts to establish a pro-Russian regime in 2004, defended the European choice in 2014, and committed to the Ukrainian path, and in 2022, Kyiv did not "fall in three days." All this, despite the predictions of respected Sovietologists and Russian experts.

"However, the image of a "country against all odds" has become quite tiresome. We would like to be associated with something more lasting and strategically present. Ukraine has the potential to be a regional leader and take a place in the region similar to Turkey. But for that, we need to, at least like Turkey, put our capabilities in order. So that talks about Ukrainian potential no longer sound like a well-known joke."

2. This highlights the need to change our diplomatic and information work abroad.

The measure of work is the result. This is especially evident on the international stage.

So instead of Yermak’s “family photo deal diplomacy,” there should be a “diplomatic hub” approach — coordinated work of the government, opposition, experts, opinion leaders, cultural figures, journalists… everyone who is heard.

And instead of the Russian-language mess of Dom-Freedom, professional international broadcasting should be restored, filled with meaningful content and delivery methods that make news from Ukraine stand out, Ukraine’s position visible, and Ukraine’s voice impossible to ignore.

The experience of both sides in World War II can suggest effective and ineffective institutional solutions, while the development of social media provides the opportunity to deliver messages where needed and in a format that will “stick.”

And yes, the United News Telemarathon must die. Resources will be needed precisely for proper international broadcasting.

3. The human factor. Many critics of the JPMorgan forecast point out that “Western analysts don’t understand the nature of our resilience.”

I have to defend my colleagues a bit, understanding somewhat how those institutions work. They operate by the principle of “the score is on the board.” You can rightfully be proud of steadfast resilience, but let’s remember the state of mobilization. The key element of the country’s resistance in war.

This is not about “Russian info-ops” — here we are having an honest conversation. Attempts to “shame draft dodgers” may carry moral weight from those fighting, but do they effectively solve the task? Do they actually increase recruit numbers?

"Mobilization is a serious issue that has been discussed here many times. But basic training, service terms and conditions, fair recruitment, quick response to problems, protection of human rights, and informational support — all remain unresolved. Attempts to replace problem-solving with PR reshuffles — whether of the leadership of Territorial Recruitment Centers or medical commission offices — do not improve the situation."

This is a case where a huge problem needs to be broken down into smaller ones and solved, then it will become easier overall. But as long as specific issues remain unresolved, the general problem persists. Meanwhile, the bulldozer keeps moving, and the enemy still has enough money for their troops.

4. Russia’s advantage in manpower can and should be compensated by using new technologies and mass production.

Ukrainians are capable of creative and effective solutions — even Russia acknowledges this.

But these solutions must be adopted and scaled. Instead of resting on laurels, there must be a constant search for ways to harm the enemy and protect our own. There can be no place here for party sympathies or antipathies; all ideas and productions must be engaged, not rejected, suppressed, or raided just because they are linked to Poroshenko or anyone disliked by the authorities.

The country’s survival depends on Ukrainian authorities prioritizing what is effective for the country, not on election prospects.

5. "The current management system of “5-6 managers” is absolutely unsuitable for implementing the necessary changes, or rather, “4-5 managers” after Portnov’s death."

Figuratively speaking, everyone in the boat should have an oar and the chance to row where they are most effective. Instead, the authorities try to hit those they see as obstacles to unlimited and endless rule with oars from the captain’s bridge. They fail to see the danger up close, hoping that “somehow it will work out,” “we’ll get through,” and “we can manage without Poroshenko (as well as generals, mayors, entrepreneurs, journalists, and others).”

These actions, by the way, which are clear and visible to the world, push analysts toward conclusions about the “Georgian scenario.” Because this has happened before, as the former president of Ukraine, Leonid Kuchma, is often quoted saying.

The best rebuttal to such claims is not chants about strong resilience on telethons or through single-party delegations abroad, but by demonstrating real unity. That is precisely why the national unity government was created as an institution for wartime in a democratic state.

Moreover, Portnov’s death somewhat creates an opportunity for this. The pro-Russian raider, who in 2018-19 threatened Ukrainian patriots with camps and "re-education activities," is no longer around. With him gone, the entire nest of corrupt ties connected to the anti-Maidan, essentially pro-Russian faction, can — and should — collapse.

But it won’t happen by itself. Yermak and Zelenskyy have grown too accustomed to absolute power. They will cling to their control at any cost. This already creates a systemic challenge throughout the entire chain of factors described here.

The quality of management by the "4-5 managers" does not match the scale of the tasks. The only question is whether Ukraine will have enough resources to outlast and outsmart Russia when, at every turn, the authorities act at best "adequately," not "well" or "excellently." Yet they explain things well to the people.

But PR images won’t stop drones or Russian assaults.

I wrote earlier that “there will be no miracle.” The removal of Portnov took away one element that made the authorities incapable of change.

Now a window of opportunity has opened. The outcome of the Ukrainian scenario will truly depend on how well Ukrainians can fix the management system, allowing better resource allocation and receiving aid to hold out and wait until Russia exhausts itself.

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About the author. Rostyslav Pavlenko, Ukrainian politician, political scientist, political technologist, lecturer.

The editorial team does not always share the opinions expressed by blog or column authors.