
Ukrainian forces struggle to fully stabilize Pokrovsk frontline. Serhiy Zgurets' column
A key point in the Pokrovsk area is Russia's advance on the Kostiantynivka-Pokrovsk highway. Moving towards Rusyn Yar and Stepanivka could cut off Kostiantynivka's supply lines
Frontline situation
Let’s start with the frontline, where 170 combat clashes took place on May 26. That’s a high number, and the intensity remains steady. Russian forces are applying pressure across several sections. Some minor Russian gains have been confirmed in the Kharkiv and Sumy regions, according to OSINT agency DeepState.
Ukraine Russia war live map, May 17-24, Photo: Espreso
The main Russian focus, however, is on the Pokrovsk direction, which accounts for nearly a third of all recent combat. One key development here is the Russian push along the road between Kostiantynivka and Pokrovsk. About a week ago, Russian units advanced beyond the T-05-04 route. Progress is slow, but the situation on this part of the front is still not fully under control.
What are the risks? Movement toward Rusyn Yar and Stepanivka opens up the possibility of cutting supply lines to Kostiantynivka. This town is now a strategic hub — a gateway to the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk area. It’s where the main action on the Donetsk front is unfolding. I think both this summer and autumn, Russian forces will keep trying to break through to Kostiantynivka.
Here’s an infographic from a French OSINT analyst showing what Russian intentions might look like. The bright green areas show an attempt to break through between Pokrovsk and Kostyantynivka and threaten other supply routes — particularly to Druzhkivka and Kramatorsk. If that happens, the situation will get a lot worse.
That said, several of our brigades have been moved to this section. What happens next depends on how well the situation is managed, and the balance of forces and equipment. The General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine understands the risks — which makes finding that balance absolutely critical.
Now about fortifications. We’ve seen several Russian videos showing tanks with infantry bypassing our defensive lines, entering a village in the gray zone, unloading troops, and leaving unharmed. This shows that just having fortifications isn’t enough — they need to be backed up by mining and drones. These kinds of breakthroughs must be stopped. In the videos, we don’t see any minefields or enough FPV drones that should’ve been there to stop that Russian movement.
Speaking of FPV drones — today, the 414th Regiment released a video showing Ukrainian drone operators hitting a Russian tank over 40 km away. In the footage, the operator explains step-by-step how the strike was carried out.
It was a high-precision attack using a drone with a fiber-optic link — a Russian tank was taken out from 40 km. That’s a sniper-level hit, but done by a drone. We know snipers are deadly on the battlefield. So the question is — are drones now taking over the sniper’s role in certain areas?
Yuriy Chornomorets, a sniper in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, said the battlefield situation is constantly changing, and the drone war is having a major impact. Compared to previous years, sniper effectiveness is down — they now achieve only about 40% of the hits seen in 2023. Still, that’s a significant number. The most successful snipers today are those working autonomously. But in reality, more and more areas of the front no longer allow for sniper operations. Snipers mainly use .375 caliber rifles. This year, not only the .308 but also the .338 caliber rifles are being used as secondary weapons. And now, snipers are actively using the .375 caliber, previously seen as a sport rifle, and they're landing hits. About 40 hits a month.
He pointed out that sniper survival is the most important thing. Of the roughly 100 distributed .375-caliber rifles, only two snipers have been killed. That’s why all current efforts are focused on making sure every sniper group is equipped with .375-caliber rifles as the main weapon, along with proper support rifles and everything needed for camouflage, countering electronic warfare, and protection against drones. By the way, Hatsan rifles have already shot down 63 drones. Unfortunately, there were cases where command sent out sniper teams without electronic warfare support or a Hatsan, hoping they’d get lucky like in 2022. The result: 80% killed or wounded. That’s why teams must be fully equipped and completely autonomous — with FPV drones, recon drones, electronic warfare tools — only then will they succeed.
Chornomorets also said the state needs to focus on increasing the number of drones at the front. Snipers are constantly saying the state should be supplying far more drones. More armored vehicles are also needed to evacuate the wounded. There was a case when a sniper group couldn't be pulled out for 57 days because there were no armored vehicles. So more transport must be sent to the front. The state needs to ensure a basic supply of drones and protection systems. Then snipers will be able to work more effectively. And it won’t be just 40% hits — they’ll find a way to reach 100%.
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